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Moral Disagreement and Moral Humility 
 
 We are fallible beings. All of our calculations, judgments, and decisions rest on 
methods and abilities that are not, and cannot be, perfectly secured against mistake. 
Though we must trust our mental abilities in order to think and act, that trust is vulnerable 
to revision. The inescapable fallibility of human cognition is one of the major conclusions 
of modern epistemology. Yet we often ignore the fallibility of human cognition in moral 
reasoning. Many of us - academics and laypeople both - take moral judgments to be not 
only expressions of our inner feelings, but judgments about some objective fact. Moral 
reasoning is as fallible as any other cognitive domain. Yet we often behave as if moral 
judgment were infallible.  
This is, I claim, epistemically naïve. I argue for a more reasonable stance towards 
our own moral intuitions and judgments. I argue neither for total skepticism towards our 
moral judgments, nor unqualified acceptance, but for tentative acceptance, laced with a 
goodly amount of suspicion. I argue for moral humility. 
 For this dissertation, I will focus on the interaction of moral disagreement and 
moral self-confidence. It has often been thought that autonomous agents should not let 
moral disagreement change our beliefs. There seems to be something special about the 
moral domain, something that demands that we make up our own minds about the matter. 
We ought not bow down to moral authority; we ought not acquire moral beliefs from 
testimony; and we ought not change our beliefs from the mere existence of moral 
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disagreement. So, goes this line of thinking, we ought to reject all social sources of moral 
knowledge. We ought to strive for moral judgments that proceed from our own 
understanding, that gel with our genuine and sincere moral intuitions. Though 
conversations with others might yield new arguments or reasons for us to consider, in the 
end only we can make up our mind for ourselves. We should only believe according to 
those reasons and arguments that seem to us to be correct. We should be morally self-
sufficient.  
 I argue that this claim of the essential self-sufficiency of moral reasoning is 
flawed, and rests on naïve epistemology. Once we bring more sophisticated epistemology 
to bear - once we try to take seriously what it's like to be the sorts of beings that must 
always reason with unsecured foundations in every domain - we will see that we must 
allow certain types of disagreement to have weight in any cognitive domains, including 
the ethical. We are cognitively fallible in virtually every domain. Though it is important 
that every agent conduct independent moral reasoning, that requirement is not the only 
relevant consideration. We cannot ignore our fallibility; it is our fallibility that forces us 
to attend to moral disagreement. 
 The claim of absolute moral self-sufficiency is an exaggeration of a more 
plausible consideration, that there is something wrong with giving ourselves over entirely 
to the command of another. Though I grant that there is something wrong with complete 
moral obedience, I claim that the use of disagreement I will describe does not count as 
obedience. It is, instead, a distinct process, part of an epistemic procedure of self-
checking and corroborating our own mental abilities. Employing this procedure does not 
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count as obedience; it is, in fact, virtually the antithesis. The drive to self-checking comes 
from the very same values that lead us to abhor moral obedience: a drive to 
understanding, to self-perfection, to greater responsibility for our moral beliefs; a drive to 
get our morality right. Moral obedience is a form of disengagement from the moral 
process. Using social sources of information to corroborate and discorroborate our 
cognitive abilities is actually a form of increased engagement with moral reasoning, and a 
part of mature rational approach to moral judgment.   
 My central claim is that moral disagreement, in and of itself, matters. I am not 
merely making the weaker claim that moral testimony and moral disagreement can give 
us reason to reconsider our views. Many hold that weaker view, and yet go on to say that 
once I have re-considered the claims and settled my own mind about the matter, then I 
may safely disregard the disagreement. That view strikes me as still essentially within the 
camp of moral self-sufficiency; it treats my own settled judgment as definitive. My 
stronger claim is that the presence of peer disagreement in and of itself gives us reason to 
doubt ourselves - to doubt our beliefs, and to doubt the faculties and methodologies that 
generated those beliefs. Even in those situations where I've considered my opponent's 
arguments and find them unconvincing, and re-considered my arguments and found them 
sound, the mere presence of a rationally and morally respectable thinker who disagrees 
with me gives me a reason to doubt myself, even if I cannot fathom their thinking. 
 I am not claiming that all moral disagreement matters; surely disagreements with 
some sorts of intellectually or morally disreputable sources can be safely discarded. I am 
arguing that some types of moral disagreements - especially those with particularly 
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trustworthy and reliable individuals matter; I am arguing that moral disagreement is the 
type of thing that can matter. Just as in non-moral domains, there will be instances of 
really compelling disagreements - disagreements with peers and experts – and instances 
of entirely uncompelling disagreements. Moral disagreement is of a piece with 
disagreement in any other cognitive domain, I argue, and important in precisely the way 
that scientific disagreement is important. The existence of moral disagreement, especially 
long-standing intractable disagreement, with our intellectual and moral peers, gives us 
reason to doubt those moral beliefs over which we disagree. Disagreement ought to lead 
to self-doubt, and self-doubt ought to lead to restraint in action. This is the form of moral 
humility I will begin to argue for. 
 This argument for moral humility is part of a larger project, which is to 
characterize the epistemically unstable situation we find ourselves in. We have different 
commitments - commitments to epistemic standards for objective inquiry, moral 
commitments, commitments to having independent moral judgment - and these different 
commitments do not happily co-exist. We cannot help but trust ourselves, and we cannot 
do without trusting other people, but these trusts lead to conflict. Where we end up is in 
an unsettled, uncertain position - but one from which we are still called to act. How are 
we supposed to conduct ourselves from a position of moral uncertainty? This, I think, is 
the key question, and one that has been radically unexplored. I cannot hope to settle that 
larger question here; my only hope is to begin the project, and begin to show that our 
moral lives fall under a cloud of doubt. To do this, I will show that we cannot reasonably 
dismiss the testimony of certain other people, and as a result, the existence of unresolved 
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disagreements with them ought lead us to reduce our self-confidence. Moral self-
sufficiency is wrong; we must trust others and they will render us morally humble.  
  
 
Part I. Moral self-sufficiency 
 Our lives are filled with moral disagreement. We disagree not only with 
psychopaths and madmen, but often with reasonable, moral people. I disagree with 
intellectuals and philosophers from other cultures about many basic moral values; I 
disagree with political opponents in my own culture about crucial issues of justice, 
punishment, freedom, and sacrifice. I disagree with my political allies about the relative 
importance of issues about the environment, social welfare, and defense. I disagree with 
my parents about the importance of tradition in my life. I disagree with my close and 
trusted friends about the importance of animal welfare, the importance of honesty. 
Disagreement is frequent, even with people we trust, admire, and respect. 
 If this is so, and if I am right that moral disagreement matters, then we all ought to 
be plagued with moral self-doubt. Instead, for most people, academic and non-academic 
alike, moral life is marked by self-confidence. Often, the people we praise the most - our 
political and moral heroes - are those who are the least morally humble. We praise them 
as men and women of moral conviction, of commitment, integrity, and unswerving 
devotion to their moral ideals. In the methodology of much academic ethics, there is also 
a prevailing attitude of moral self-confidence. Academic ethics often proceeds with a 
mood of self-confidence. We often presume that we are justified in trusting our moral 
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intuitions, and we accept theories when they match our intuitions. In order for this self-
confidence to exist against the background of plentiful disagreement, one must deny the 
importance of moral disagreement. Thus, most people seem committed to some form of 
moral self-sufficiency.  
Why do we so often deny the effects of social corroboration and discorroboration 
in the moral sphere? Corroboration and discorroboration are crucial in most other 
cognitive spheres, especially with empirical judgments. Agreement, we think, means 
something in checking scientific laboratory results, checking mathematical calculation, 
and checking old memories. In most cognition, corroboration gives us some reason to 
trust our mental abilities more, and discorroboration gives us some reason to reduce our 
mental self-trust. What most of our behavior seems to encode, then, is the belief that 
moral judgment is an exception to these methodologies, that it is not open to the usual 
social methods of self-assessment.  
 It can seem quite plausible to grant moral judgment such an exception. Agents 
seem to have a very special, peculiarly personal relationship to their moral beliefs. 
Consider, for example, the widespread intuition there is something wrong with moral 
deference - the wholesale acquisition of new moral beliefs solely through testimony. 
There is no analogous block to deference in empirical reasoning. There, deference to 
experts seems not only unproblematic, but requisite. The sheer intellectual complexity of 
contemporary life demands that we trust the empirical judgment of others without, in 
many cases, understanding the basis for that judgment for ourselves. We may master one 
or two domains, but no single person can adequately understand modern medicine, 
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nutrition, automotive repair, computer software architecture, and meteorology. We must 
trust and act on the judgment of others. That trust is not necessarily blind; we may only 
trust that we have some reason to think of as reliable), but we must trust. We may be able 
to give reasons why we trust this person, but sometimes we must adopt some particular 
belief without understanding the direct evidential grounds for that particular belief 
ourselves.  
But things seem very different with moral beliefs. Though we don't hold every 
person responsible for understanding their medical beliefs, we do seem to hold that every 
person is responsible for arriving at their own moral beliefs independently, through their 
own reasoning and understanding. The requirement of independence for moral judgment 
can seem quite plausible and desirable. We prize moral thoughtfulness; we respect those 
that take responsibility for their moral judgments, who think through their beliefs. We 
find unsavory those who acquire most of their moral beliefs unthinkingly, by trusting 
others. Excessive moral trust is seen at best as naïve and childlike, and, at worse, as evil; 
think of that archetypical villain of moral mediocrity: the unthinking soldier, only 
following orders. The practice of moral judgment seems to be the responsibility of every 
full person. 
 There are at least two distinct versions of the independence requirement that 
might threaten my claims about the importance of disagreement. The primitive thesis is 
that any and all uses of moral testimony are illegitimate - that the process of moral 
judgment ought to be entirely private. Call this the thesis of moral isolationism. The more 
sophisticated thesis is that the use of moral testimony ought to be carefully 
9 
 
circumscribed, and that, in the end, one ought to possess and accept the justification for 
one's own moral beliefs. Moral testimony as to a certain belief can give one a reason to 
consider that belief; moral disagreement can give one a reason to go back and re-consider 
one's own moral beliefs. But, once one has re-considered, the epistemic use of other 
people has exhausted itself.  Other people may point out reasons to us for our own 
inspection, but one's moral judgment ought to proceed from reasons one accepts and 
holds, by reasoning one accepts and understands. Let me call this more sophisticated 
thesis the thesis of moral self-containment, since the thesis demands any moral belief I 
hold must be justified on reasoning I myself possess, understand, and endorse, even if I 
had social help acquiring that justification. Under this thesis, I cannot justify a belief by 
pointing outwards to another's beliefs. Collectively, I will call these theses the theses of 
moral self-sufficiency. Both forms of moral self-sufficiency severely limit the role moral 
discourse. Others may point out reasons to us, introduce us to arguments, and help us to 
understand them. But when we finally make up our own minds, it must be based on 
reasons that we ourselves find compelling, by arguments that we are convinced by. The 
elucidation of arguments and reasons exhausts the role of moral discourse; the mere fact 
that there are still opponents who disagree does not have any weight on its own.  
Either version of moral self-sufficiency would block my claim of moral humility. 
If disagreement is to have its fullest significance, then we must treat the bare fact that 
somebody disagrees with us as important, even if we've settled and re-settled our 
judgment about the matter. Both versions of moral self-sufficiency do not permit 
weighting the bare fact of disagreement. Under moral isolationism, we do not even allow 
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the testimony of others to open any questions about our moral judgment. Under moral 
self-containment, we do allow disagreement to raise a question about our moral 
judgment, but we take our own process of re-inspection as settling the matter. Under 
either thesis, the mere fact of disagreement cannot impugn our cognitive self-trust; if 
disagreement raises a question about the reliability of our cognitive processes, we treat 
our own cognitive processes as either unimpeachable in the first place, or able to 
satisfactorily settle the question.  
My goal in this dissertation is to argue against moral self-sufficiency. While I 
readily admit that outright moral deference is problematic, I will claim that this problem 
is confined to particularly egregious cases of obedience, and does not apply to most uses 
of disagreement. Most uses of disagreement are not forms of obedience, but rather part of 
a rational and autonomous process of cognitive self-perfection. We are not cognitively 
self-sufficient in the moral realm any more than in any realm; we can and should use 
others to corroborate and discorroborate our moral judgments, and when we find 
particularly pernicious forms of moral disagreement, we should become suspicious 
towards our own moral judgments as well as towards others' judgments. The fact that we 
have double-checked our moral reasoning cannot completely settle the matter, for 
disagreement raises a question about the reliability of tools that are used in all forms of 
moral reasoning. 
 I will argue that the view of moral self-sufficiency cannot survive a sophisticated 
appraisal of the epistemic status moral judgment. As long as we take ourselves to be 
cognitively fallible beings, and as long as part of our moral enterprise is to get it right, 
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then we must be open to the evidence provided by disagreement. I will argue that any 
commitment to the objectivity of moral judgment will involve a commitment to certain 
basic epistemic principles, which entail limitations on our self-trust. I hope that this 
epistemic analysis will legitimize social methods of corroboration and discorroboration 
for moral judgment. Insofar as we take our moral judgments to be cognitive, then 
unresolved moral disagreement ought to lead to self-doubt and moral humility. Moral 
self-sufficiency is epistemically unreasonable.  
 My argument rests on the epistemic analysis of moral judgment. I will spend the 
majority of this dissertation arguing: first, that a reasonable epistemic grounding for 
moral judgment admits of fallibility; second, that moral disagreement can provide 
positive evidence of cognitive unreliability; and third, that nothing about the moral 
domain can exclude these effects from disagreement.  
 
 
Part II. A new epistemic foundation for moral judgment 
 The commitment to moral self-sufficiency rests on a naïve epistemic 
understanding of moral judgment. Moral epistemology has been historically 
underdeveloped; for much of the history of metaethical thinking, we have not had any 
epistemic theory capable of adequately accounting for the seeming peculiarities of moral 
judgment. But recent developments in epistemology promise to improve matters. I will 
show that moral judgment is not as epistemically peculiar as was once thought, and that 
our moral judgments are in principle just as reasonable to trust, and just as fallible, as our 
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abilities in any other cognitive domain. This new epistemic grounding will show that 
moral self-trust is reasonable, but only if it is defeasible; that defeasibility will be the 
lynchpin in overthrowing moral self-sufficiency. 
 Our moral judgments are complex, substantive, and often embarrassingly 
underjustified. Ordinary moral judgment often involves applying difficult moral concepts 
to complex, fluctuating states of affairs. In the course of a day's work, we must trust 
substantive raw moral intuitions about particular situations; we must also trust our ability 
to quickly apply complex moral principles to particular situations. In the past, no 
epistemic theory could account for the degree of self-trust needed for any reasonable 
moral life. As long as our available epistemic theories demand that all our judgments and 
cognitive abilities be fully justified, everyday moral judgments seemed indefensible. 
Only two reactions seemed possible: accept that we needed but couldn't provide 
sufficient justification for our moral judgment, and, as a consequence, abandon trust in 
our moral judgments entirely; or refuse to abandon our moral judgments, and abandon 
instead any requirement for normal epistemic justification in the moral sphere. New work 
in epistemology, however, suggests a new and better option, which will provide a more 








Unsecured moral judgments 
 The subject of my discussion is what I will call unsecured moral judgments. An 
unsecured judgment is one whose conclusion is not secured by proof from self-evident 
grounds. The category includes what are often called raw moral intuitions - substantive 
judgments about particular cases, based on phenomenally direct apprehension of seeming 
moral properties. The judgment, for instance, that one ought not push a fat man from a 
bridge onto the train tracks to divert a trolley, believed because it just seems obviously 
so, counts as a raw moral intuition. The category of unsecured judgments also includes 
conclusions deduced from unsecured or intuitively held principles. For instance, if we 
rigorously deduce from a utilitarian principle that we ought to kill one person to save one 
million, but we hold the utilitarian principle simply because it seems right then that 
particular judgment is also unsecured.  
The category of unsecured judgments also includes conclusions drawn from self-
evident principles by non-deductive means; call these rough applications. For example, 
though it might be self-evidently true that three inches is longer than two inches, an 
everyday judgment that this flower over here, which looks about three inches long, is 
longer than that flower over there, which looks about two inches long, still counts as 
unsecured. Even though the central principle may be self-evident, the process of applying 
that principle to the world depends on the application of a fallible cognitive ability to 
connect the principle with a particular state of affairs. Since the cognitive ability is 
unsecured, all judgments that rely on the ability are also unsecured.  
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Rough applications are very common in daily, non-philosophical life. Often we 
must make and trust judgments, in limited time-spans and with limited intellectual 
resources, about time, distance, difficulty, people's facial expressions, human 
psychological responses, and other complex causal interactions. Much of practical life 
proceeds from very rough judgments - judgments based on some synthesis of analysis, 
principles, heuristics, past experience, and native ability. These are judgments often 
performed at speed, with insufficient information, where a multitude of principles, 
considerations and values entangle, with no clear singular decision procedure. Examples 
include judgments that another person is happy, that they're hiding something, that they're 
unreliable behind the wheel, and that it feels like it's going to rain soon.  
Most of the moral judgments we actually make are unsecured. In our present 
theoretical state, moral judgments often involve either direct raw intuitions or unsecured 
applications of principles, or often both. Furthermore, many of principles invoked in 
unsecured applications are themselves also unsecured; they are either held on an 
intuition, or justified with ineliminable references to unsecured intuitions.  
Unsecured moral judgments are very important to consider for a number of 
reasons. First, I do not think ethical theory possesses at present the resources to secure 
moral judgment; I am beginning to suspect that ethical theory will never produce 
anything like entirely secure foundations for moral reasoning. Thus, our moral judgments 
are surely unsecured at present, and will likely remain so. Second, even if we do produce 
secure foundations for some ethical principles, given the finite cognitive abilities and 
time of humans, many of the applications of those principles will be rough, and thus 
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unsecured. Even though we might have a secured math and secured geometry, action in 
the physical world requires the use of unsecured abilities to apply these principles to 
rapidly fluctuating states of affairs. Similarly, even if we could provide a secure proof 
for, say, the principle that we should promote the ends of others as vigorously as our 
own, the application of that principle would require the synthesis of such a vast array of 
facts and considerations that the application of that principle to the world must be 
unsecured for finite beings like ourselves. 
Third, it may be that moral judgment is essentially unsecurable. Warren Quinn 
argues that if forced to choose between accepting a philosophical argument for 
skepticism about the external world and believing in a simple external object like a chair, 
he would take the chair.1 Quinn's argument is not simple-minded; rather, it is a reminder 
that reasoning itself is a defeasible process, substantively dependent on fallible cognitive 
faculties like short-term memory, deduction, and the like. Both processes - the visual 
process by which I see the chair and the reasoning process that casts doubt on the chair's 
existence - are defeasible. I take Quinn to be suggesting that, once we see that both sides 
of the conflict depend on defeasible trust, it's quite reasonable to stand with one's visual 
abilities against one's philosophical abilities. After all, for most of us, we've made far 
more philosophical mistakes than mistakes about nearby middle-sized objects. But if, in a 
given domain, our confidence in our unsecured entry-level facts, be they perceptions or 
intuitions, exceeds our confidence in our ability to secure those facts through some 
reasoning process, then the domain will be essentially unsecurable.  
                                                
1 Quinn (1993), pp. 109-33 
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But no matter how we navigate those options, the fact remains that, at present, 
most of our everyday moral judgments are unsecured. I am not yet prepared to 
conclusively deny the possibility of securing moral judgment, and I am open to 
possibility that the epistemic status of most moral judgments may change in the future, in 
which case any analysis I present here will simply be an epistemic interim solution. I 
suspect, though, that more epistemic work will someday show that moral judgments are 
essentially unsecurable. 
We have historically been suspicious of unsecured judgments. But, I will argue, 
recent epistemic thinking has revealed that most or all human knowledge is actually 
unsecured, including such cognitive stalwarts as sensory perception and memory. We 
must, as a consequence, accept unsecured judgments or lose all rights to knowledge and 
even cognition in general. Any theory that accepts the unsecurability of these cognitive 
basics as epistemically valid entryways into knowledge will also, at least in principle, 
have room for unsecured moral judgments.  
 
 
A brief introduction to entitlement theory 
At present, there are two standard responses to moral disagreement over 
unsecured moral judgments. The first, typical of moral nihilists like Gil Harman and J.L. 
Mackie, is to claim that the pervasiveness of unresolved moral disagreement, combined 
with their unsecured nature, shows that there are no genuine moral facts - that our moral 
intuitions are merely subjective phenomena. The second, typical of many others, is to 
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disregard moral disagreement entirely. Both responses are, I claim, epistemically naïve; 
both arise from on an essential disappointment with the unsecurability of moral 
judgment.  Much of the problem comes from a historical lack of any satisfying epistemic 
account of moral judgment, especially unsecured moral judgment. A move to moral 
cognitivism, then, seemed to demand that we isolate ethics from epistemology. But recent 
developments in epistemology promise to fill in this gap. The most plausible modern 
epistemic theory, entitlement theory, is devoted to the analysis of the many forms of 
knowledge that have unsecured grounds. By applying the developments of entitlement 
theory to moral reasoning, I think we can carve a reasonable middle path between 
nihilism and dismissal. 
  Entitlement theory arises in opposition to the Cartesian approach to knowledge. 
To paint with a broad brush, the Cartesian approach demands that we secure our 
foundations - that we provide a proof or account for any and all of our beliefs. But this 
demand seems impossible to satisfy. If we begin by distrusting all our beliefs and 
faculties until given a reason to trust them, then we shall never trust them, for any 
possible supporting reasons could only arise from some already trusted belief or faculty.2  
Let us consider the following principle; call it the Prior Justification Demand. The 
principle states: in order to reasonably trust a given mental ability, we must have a prior 
account giving us a reason to think that ability is reliable. It is something like this 
principle that's behind both the Cartesian approach to knowledge and justification, and 
the ensuing skepticisms that seem to plague all attempts to provide a complete Cartesian 
                                                
2 The clearest exposition of this thought occurs in Wright (2004), pp. 168-175.  
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justification of any piece of knowledge. This is easy to see in the perceptual realm. We 
have some perceptual experience - it seems to us that we see an apple and smell an apple. 
Suppose the Prior Justification Demand is correct. It seems like any account of the proper 
functioning of our perceptual faculties - our visual system, our olfactory system - will 
have to make some references to a scientific theory - to optics, chemistry, to 
neurobiology. But those scientific theories themselves depend on data gathered from the 
senses. A vicious circle threatens. If we demand a prior account showing us that our 
perceptual system works before we are willing to accept it, we'll never get one, because 
the very sciences that might vet our perceptual systems themselves depend on a basic 
trust in our perceptual systems.  
This circularity is even more apparent when we shift our focus to our basic 
cognitive abilities, and why we trust them. If we demand a convincing argument for 
trusting our mental abilities before we start to trust them then we'll never get anywhere at 
all, because the very act of finding and evaluating arguments itself depends on some 
cognitive abilities. Tyler Burge, in "Content Preservation," argues convincingly that all 
reasoning depends on trusting some substantial cognitive abilities.3 If we do the 
reasoning in our head, we're trusting our short-term memory. When an agent mentally 
rehearses the steps of the argument, she mentally focuses on a single step, and then stores 
the content of the step in short-term memory as she moves to the next step. If she doesn't 
trust her short-term memory, then she might write down the steps - but then she's simply 
shifted her dependencies to her abilities to write, see, and read. Due to the narrowness of 
                                                
3 Burge (1993) 
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human consciousness - the fact that we can only really hold a few words at the forefront 
of our consciousness at once - we must rely on some storage facility for any complex 
reasoning.  
Once we see that any act of reasoning depends trusting some mental abilities, we 
can see that the problem lies with the Prior Justification Demand itself. If we cannot trust 
any mental ability unless we have an argument telling us to do so, and if finding and 
evaluating arguments depends on mental abilities, we will never be able to trust our 
mental abilities. It follows from the Prior Justification Demand that we cannot reasonably 
trust any belief. The proper response, suggests entitlement theory, is not to give up on the 
possibility of knowledge or even reasonable belief, but to reject the Prior Justification 
Demand. We must flip the burden of proof. Instead of adopting a default stance of 
distrust towards all cognitive abilities, we ought, instead, trust our cognitive abilities until 
we discover reasons why we should not.4 The central insight of entitlement theory is that 
cognition in all domains involves initial self-trust, adopted without proof.  
Thus, suggests entitlement theory, we are entitled to start cognitive life by trusting 
our mental abilities and thus trusting that things are as they seem to us, even if we cannot 
provide a proof that our senses and mental abilities are, in fact, reliable.5 This trust is, 
however, only tentative; it is vulnerable to future defeat. Unlike the intuitionism of an 
earlier era, entitlement theory doesn't purport to offer us unshakeable foundations for 
knowledge. Entitlement theory instead claims that our cognitive faculties are fallible, but 
                                                
4 The reasoning here is not simply practical. The Cartesian approach to knowledge depends on holding the 
principle P, that every belief, to be reasonably held, be deducible from another reasonable belief. If P is 
true, then it self-applies, and this shows that it is not reasonable to hold P. Therefore, we ought to hold P 
false, and drop the universal demands for grounds.  
5 Pryor (2000) 
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admits that trusting them is the best we can do. Cartesianism's epistemic miserliness leads 
to skepticism; entitlement theory substitutes, not an epistemic free-for-all, but an attitude 
of qualified epistemic generosity. This generosity entails that the default stance towards 
our own mental abilities is one of tentative acceptance. In contemporary epistemic 
parlance, this stance is called defeasible entitlement. We're entitled in assuming our 
mental abilities work, but, since we don't have an account demonstrating that those 
mental abilities are, in fact, reliable, this entitlement is vulnerable to future evidence that 
shows that it isn't so reliable after all.  
Entitlement theory strikes me as the most plausible epistemic theory presently 
available. I claim that entitlement theory extends to unsecured moral judgments. I will 
expand upon my description of entitlement theory, and argue for its extension to moral 
cognition, in Chapter 2. Loosely, entitlement theories tell us that our default stance 
towards our cognitive abilities should be one of acceptance. We should accept that things 
are as they seem, in both simple perceptual cases and complex cases of rough judgments. 
Insofar as our unsecured moral judgments make claims about what is and isn't the case, 
then they fall under the license of entitlement theory. This is not a special exception for 
unsecured moral judgments. Rather, entitlement theory shows us that the initially 
unsecured nature of moral judgments is not different in kind from initially unsecured 
empirical judgments.  
Entitlement theory will give us the means to describe a reasonable middle ground 
between the nihilists and the dogmatists. I will argue that once we apply entitlement 
theory to unsecured moral judgment, we will see that we cannot regard ourselves as 
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morally self-sufficient. Our moral judgments are defeasible, and vulnerable to defeat 
from social sources. I will present my argument for this claim in Chapter 2.  
My picture of our moral epistemic condition is mildly pessimistic, but not nihilist. 
I do not think that we have no reason to trust ourselves; I think, rather, that we have 
plenty of reason for initial moral self-trust, but we also encounter plenty of evidence to 
reduce that self-trust. The result is, at present, a painfully unstable situation. I find myself 
compelled both by the evidence of my moral intuitions, and compelled by epistemic 
considerations to the contrary. I cannot give up on either; the only remaining path is a 
tormented sort of half-certainty. 
 
 
Part III. Moral humility and its conditions 
 Let me now explain my thesis in greater detail. I claim that we are not morally 
self-sufficient; that the mere existence of disagreement, in and of itself, can and should 
reduce our confidence in our own judgments, when those judgments are unsecured. I'm 
arguing for the epistemic and moral acceptability of social pathways to moral knowledge 
- that, to the extent that we are cognitively fallible beings committed to cognitive moral 
beliefs, we can and should use social methodologies as sources of information about our 
own cognitive reliability. My claim is not that the moral domain is epistemically unique; 
rather, I am claiming that moral judgment is of a piece with other domains of knowledge, 
and subject to the same methodologies of self-evaluation and self-correction. 
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Disagreement with peers is a form of discorroboration and thus vital data for evaluating 
one's own reliability, in moral disagreement as well as in empirical disagreement.  
My central claim is that the mere existence of certain types of moral 
disagreements ought bring us to reduce our confidence in those beliefs over which there 
is disagreement. I do not claim that all moral disagreement ought to reduce confidence, 
only that moral disagreement is the right sort of thing to cause us to reduce confidence, 
and it ought to do so when the conditions are right. These conditions are that the 
disagreements are long-standing, unresolved, and with peers that we respect.  
I do not claim that moral disagreement may bring us to suspend some of our 
beliefs. I suspect, but have not yet demonstrated to my satisfaction, that there may be an 
upper bound to the epistemic effects of disagreement. It strikes me as likely that moral 
disagreement will, at most, raise only reasonable doubt towards our own belief, and never 
bring us to actually suspending a belief outright. But I haven't settled this matter, so I 
limit myself to showing that disagreement will bring at the very least doubt and suspicion 
towards our own beliefs. 
 
 
Moral peers and best cases 
To establish that moral disagreements are the right sort of thing to have epistemic 
effects, I will focus on what I take to be the best-case scenario for epistemic effects: long-
standing, intractable disagreements with our moral peers. By "moral peers", I mean those 
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we take to be approximately at least as morally sensitive, reliable, rational and 
trustworthy as ourselves. 
 This is, I believe, a significant break from the contemporary discussion of moral 
disagreement, which largely focuses on the most radical forms of moral disagreement - 
the saints versus the psychopaths, so to speak. But, while these examples are quite 
striking, they aren't actually the best cases for epistemic effects. When a kind, good, and 
charitable agent is locked in a disagreement with a serial-killing psychopath, the saint has 
very little reason to give any epistemic credence to the psychopath whatsoever. They 
share no values; the psychopath seems to have no sensitivity towards or understanding of 
the moral domain. In straightforward empirical domains, the most epistemically 
compelling cases of disagreement are those that occur between agents that have every 
reason to trust one another, including, by and large, agreement on most issues. A NASA 
physicist has very little reason to reduce her confidence if she discovers she has extensive 
disagreements with an aluminum-foil-hat wearing cultist ranting about alien mind-control 
rays, but has very good reason to reduce confidence in her beliefs if she discovers some 
disagreements with fellow astrophysicists, professors of physics, and NASA engineers, 
with whom she shares a similar training and background beliefs. I am not claiming that 
there can be no epistemic effect from cases of extreme, foundational disagreement - but 
rather, that those types of cases are edge cases, and not the best examples to show the in-
principle epistemic importance of moral disagreement.  
 The best cases will also be cases of intractable disagreement. When I first 
discover the existence of a disagreement, there are many possible explanations. Suppose 
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I'm entirely certain that there's no good tea in Los Angeles. My colleague mentions, as 
she passes down the hall, that she just had some good tea down the street. At the first 
moment, there are many plausible explanations for the disagreement. Perhaps she meant 
something entirely different by "good" - perhaps I mean "delicious" and she means 
"cheap and fast." Perhaps she doesn't have the vast experience and expertise that I have 
with tea. Perhaps she cares about things I simply don't care about - presentation and 
service and the presence of finger-sandwiches. There are many factors that might explain 
away the disagreement. But the more we talk it through, the more I discover that we do 
mean the same thing, that she does have as much experience as I do and cares about the 
same things I do, the more the disagreement becomes epistemically threatening. The 
more I try to explain away the disagreement and fail - the more intractable the 
disagreement turns out to be - the more reason I have to doubt. The doubt will be diffuse 
and spread over many possible explanations. I have reason to doubt the reliability of my 
own taste, the reliability of her taste, even to doubt the objectivity of the whole realm of 
taste in tea. But all of these possibilities constitute markers against my original, all-fired 
certainty in the poor quality of tea in Los Angeles.  
 I suggest, then, that we take up as the best cases for epistemic importance cases of 
long-standing, intractable moral disagreement between peers. Such cases, though they 
don't often appear in the contemporary discussion, are actually quite familiar cases. They 
are the cases that intuitively give the best reasons for worrying about the reliability of our 
moral judgment. The best reason to doubt my moral judgment isn't when I discover that 
the Unabomber has a different moral code than me; it's when I discover that, say, my 
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advisor, the profoundly thoughtful and compassionate Kantian ethicist with whom I 
largely agree on most moral issues, has a strikingly different attitude than me towards 
what's permissible in warfare.  
 Let me present three illustrative cases. Imagine, first, that a species of endangered 
owls have been discovered in a logging forest. We now have a dilemma: ought we cease 
logging for the sake of the owls, thus cutting off the main income source for the small 
town nearby, or ought we allow the logging to continue for the sake of the logging 
community? Imagine that two groups of very liberal, progressive activists come into 
conflict over this issue, and, despite lengthy discussions between the activists, remain 
firmly entrenched on their respective sides. Notice that activists on either side of the 
debate are obviously thoughtful, morally committed, sensitive people, and likely accept 
the other side as similarly morally interested. In fact, both sides of the debate surely 
acknowledge the values and commitments of the other - the environmentalists surely 
think that jobs and families are important, and the community advocates surely think that 
the preservation of endangered species is important. They only disagree about which of 
these moral considerations is more pressing in this case. 
 Second, a case familiar to many: my friend David and I are both graduate students 
in ethics. We've both thought a lot about ethical issues, and we both try to be good. 
David's a vegetarian, and I'm not. Again, obviously both sides are morally committed and 
recognize each other as such. This case is particularly interesting because it's not simply a 
case of bare intuitions are clashing. David isn't immediately struck by the awfulness of 
eating meat; in fact, he ate meat for most of his life, and still craves it. He has reasons that 
26 
 
brought him to, with much tribulation and backsliding, slowly give up meat. We both 
agree that animal suffering is important, and I try to avoid, for example, eating veal raised 
in cruel conditions. But he thinks that the raising and harvesting of animals for our mere 
gustatory pleasure is wrong - that animal shouldn't be used in that way - and I simply do 
not. I have heard his arguments, and am simply not convinced by them. 
 Third, a case that's particularly important to my own biography: I'm Vietnamese. I 
see the fact that something is traditional to Vietnamese people as no particular reason to 
do it - especially, for example, the directive to marry in-race. My father, who is a very 
good, kind, thoughtful person, thinks it's obvious that tradition is important, that it's major 
source of value and direction. Furthermore, he thinks that it is traditional, and therefore 
very important, for Vietnamese people to marry in-race. This sort of case strikes me as a 
conflict of direct intuitions about fairly abstract values. My father simply finds utterly 
obvious that tradition is a major source of reason and value. I cannot even imagine my 
way into it - it seems strange and alien, and I have to, at best, take his word for it that it's 
important to him. Not only do I not feel the value of tradition or find it compelling, but I 
can't even imagine what it would be like to find it compelling. Some values we don't feel, 
but can imagine what it would be like to feel. I do not care about neatness in my life, but 
I've had the occasional glimmer of something feeling better when I organize it to 
imaginatively expand it in my head, and imagine what it would be like to find neatness 
deeply important in one's life. But tradition is blank for me - I simply see nothing there, 
and continue to despite long discussion. When one friend of mine goes through tortures 
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because they are Jewish and they are in love with somebody who is not, and they cannot 
break with their traditions to marry them, I am just flabbergasted; I simply do not see. 
 These are all cases where there are disagreements between people who are or 
might be familiar with each other, and all cases where the people involved have talked 
through the disagreement and found it to be intractable. Notice that the cases I've 
described fall into two categories. In cases like the argument of tradition, one party of the 
disagreement claims that there is a certain value, and the other claims that there isn't. 
Such disagreements are quite vivid, and are the sort usually discussed in the disagreement 
literature. And while there are some disagreements over the very existence of a value, 
most disagreements are more like the environmentalist case: they are cases where there 
are two competing values, which both parties subscribe to. In the environmentalist case, 
we needed to ascertain which value trumps which other value. But there are many 
situations where there is no binary decision - where the interplay of values leads to a 
decision about how much and not whether to. For example, I may agree with my 
girlfriend that it is rather bad that I forgot her birthday, and that she is justified in being 
angry with me, but we may disagree rather strongly about how bad it was and how much 
anger is justified. 
 Focusing on these realistic situations of peer disagreement will, I think, do much 






Consequences, practical and internal 
 If I can establish that there is a class of epistemically active moral disagreement, 
there will be significant consequences. I take it as an empirical fact of most of our lives 
that there are a very large number of such disagreements over a wide array of topics. 
Even though an agent may rate only a small minority of others as their moral peers, for 
most agents there will still be a great number of moral peers. Furthermore, even if we 
imposed a very strict standard for peerhood - agreement across a majority of judgments, 
for example - we'll likely still be able to discover disagreement over a significant 
percentage of our moral beliefs, between the many peers. I disagree with one of my peers 
about vegetarianism, with another about the importance of maintaining ethnic traditions, 
and with another about the permissibility of military intervention.  
 If it's true that we can find such disagreements over most of our moral judgments, 
then we will have arrived at a qualified form of moral skepticism - not the radical 
skepticism of the nihilists, but a constrained skepticism, a skepticism of reasonable doubt 
and moderate suspicion. Notice that this constrained skepticism is not born of the mere 
possibility of failure; it is born of substantive empirical evidence raising the probability 
of malfunction in our own process of judgment. The mere possibility of failure opens the 
door to doubt; it is the actual existence of disagreement that walks through that door. 
Since this skepticism is contingent on acquiring certain types of empirical 
evidence, the amount and degree of suspicion engendered by disagreement will vary from 
one person to another. One agent may rate almost everybody their moral peer, another 
may, for very good reason, consider very few to be their moral peers. A very 
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cosmopolitan person may run across a larger number of disagreements than somebody 
who has never left their small home town.6  
There are practical consequences to this conclusion. Even if we discover that 
disagreement can never bring outright suspension of belief, and the socially acquired 
moral humility is limited to self-suspicion and self-doubt, there will still be practical 
consequences. The reasonableness of actions is complexly related to our degree of 
confidence in our justifying beliefs. Some actions can be justified by the merest hint of a 
reason; other actions require very high degrees of confidence. Even if I think my ability 
to predict when the bus is coming is only slightly reliable, I can still act on my belief. On 
the other hand, highly consequential, irreversible actions - like taking another life or 
calling for a nuclear strike - seem to require a very high degree of confidence. Thus, the 
presence of even a mild doubt may bring us to refrain from action. For the same reason, 
we require belief beyond a reasonable doubt in, for example, calling for the death 
penalty. Even if disagreement can bring only doubt and not the suspension of belief, it 
could sometimes give us a reason to refrain from action. The extent of practical effects 
will depend on the precise principles relating actions to certainty; this is an important area 
for future research.  
 I take the conclusion of the arguments presented in this dissertation to be quite 
narrow. I am only discussing best-case scenarios: intractable disagreements with clear 
peers. It seems clear that the impact of moral disagreement is much broader than these 
best-case type disagreements, but I cannot yet say how much broader. There are many 
                                                
6 Whether or not there is a further rational imperative to seek out more interlocutors and disagreement is an 
open question, though I suspect that there is. 
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further questions that must be settled to ascertain the range of impact of moral 
disagreement. What, for example, are the outer bounds of peerhood? Can we reasonably 
accept another as a moral peer on very general considerations (attention, care, 
thoughtfulness) even though we disagree with them on many particular judgments? 
Another vital topic for future inquiry is the infectiousness of doubt. I only take myself to  
establish the relatively weak claim that a particular disagreement over a judgment creates 
suspicion over that particular judgment. I do not think this is the end of the matter; there 
must be some pathway for belief-specific doubts to infect outwards. I can only be utterly 
certain of my ability to remember the calculus I learned ten years ago for so long when I 
start discovering calculus mistakes; once I make enough specific mistakes, I should start 
doubting my ability to do calculus in general. Similarly, if I have enough failures of my 
memory for people's faces, I should probably start worrying about any similar instance. 
Since the best explanation for a judgment's being incorrect is that the underlying faculty 
or ability is unreliable, and this unreliability should spread throughout the faculty or 
ability. However, it is at present difficult to say exactly how the doubt should spread, 
especially in those cases where we do not have a clear account of what precisely faculties 
or abilities underlie our judgments. Though it does seem likely that doubt will infect 
outwards from the particular judgment, the precise degree and extent of infectiousness 
needs further elaboration.  
 My constant deferrals to future research may strike some as punting on the core 
issues. I think, rather, that the very reason that topics of moral peerhood, the 
infectiousness of moral uncertainty, and action in situations of moral uncertainty, are 
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underexplored is precisely because ethical philosophy has thus far treated moral 
disagreement as unimportant. By arguing for a proof-of-concept - by showing that moral 
disagreement is the right sort of thing to inspire changes in confidence - I hope to show 
that topics concerning social pathways to moral knowledge are relevant and vital. One of 
my primary goals is to show that contemporary ethical theory has neglected of the most 
important areas of study: how we are to behave from a position of profound, and 
potentially irresolvable, moral uncertainty. We cannot, in good conscience, presently treat 
ourselves as perfectly morally reliable, yet we are perpetually called upon to act. How 
unsure ought we be; how ought this uncertainty infect our actions? This is a vital 
direction for future research.  
 But even if I cannot yet map the precise bounds of the practical consequences, I 
take it that my narrow conclusion will show the crucial internal consequence: the attitude 
of moral humility. Even if we cannot say precisely who is our peer and even if we cannot 
say precisely how our doubt will infect outwards, we can say this: there are some people 
who are clearly our peers, who have to power to drag our moral lives into the realm of 
suspicion. We cannot proceed with unfettered confidence; at best, we can proceed with a 
queasy half-certainty, aware that we have plenty of reason to doubt our beliefs, and 
unable to show where precisely those doubts end. Disagreement raises doubt, and until 
we can resolve those disagreements, we must live much of our ethical life inside the 





A brief summary of what is to come 
 In the coming chapters, I will present the following arguments. 
 In Chapter 2, I will argue that our entitlement to self-trust does in fact extend to 
the moral domain.  Though we are reasonable to trust our moral judgments, that judgment 
is defeasible. I will then argue that moral disagreement is a form of partial defeat of our 
entitlement to trust our own moral judgments. My argument will be that if there are 
reliable moral sources with whom we disagree, then we will have reason to doubt. Insofar 
as we take moral judgments to be of objective truths, then disagreement between two 
reliable sources is a reason to distrust both reliable sources.  
The significant question is, then, whether or not there are really such things as 
reliable moral sources. It seems intuitive that there are. There are people whom we turn to 
for advice, whom we trust for judgments on the moral character of others, who we trust to 
tell us when we have gone too far, acted too much in anger. More importantly, it follows 
from the start in entitlement theory that there are moral peers. Entitlement theory permits 
us to trust our moral intuitions. The relevant moral intuitions present themselves as of 
objective content. In trusting our moral intuitions, we are implicitly taking our moral 
abilties to be reliable. Now we turn our gaze to other people. Ought we trust them? The 
answer is: given what entitlement theory says, yes, we should trust some of them, 
because they are so similar to us. 
In the situation of entitlement, we trust our moral judgment to be reliable, but we 
have no account of which particular cognitive abilities are responsible for that reliability. 
Other people are cognitively more like us than not: they seem to have similar abilities, 
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similar physical apparatus, similar biological and educational backgrounds. For the prime 
candidates for moral peerhood, we have every reason to rate them similarly reliable, and 
little reason to rate them unreliable. We must rely on these general features of rationality, 
because with an entitlement start, we have no particular account to help us pick out which 
cognitive features are more or less relevant to the assessment of moral reliability. Thus 
the entitlement to trust myself in some domain extends to trusting others, based on 
empirical evidence that they are creatures substantially like me. In short, reflection on 
our entitlements forces each of us to admit that we are but one cognitive agent among 
many. An agent has no a priori reason to think that she has fundamentally better access to 
the moral facts than another agent.  
 From the entitlement start to moral self-trust, we must admit that our self-trust is 
vulnerable. Moral self-sufficiency cannot stand on epistemic grounds, because we are 
each only a single, finite, fallible truth-seeker among many. The mere fact that an 
interlocutor disagrees is enough to bring doubt - I don't have to understand his argument, 
or have been brought around by his reasoning. Since our moral peers are reliable, the 
mere fact that they believe the opposite from what we do should, in and of itself, worry 
us.  
The above constitutes a summary of my positive argument. In Chapter 3 and 4, I 
will consider what I take to be the two primary objections to my position. In Chapter 3, I 
will consider the claim that disagreement never has epistemic weight in and of itself, on 
epistemic grounds. In Chapter 4, I will consider the claim that, though disagreement may 
give us good epistemic grounds to reduce our confidence, these epistemic grounds are 
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trumped by moral considerations, which makes it imperative to ignore social pathways to 









The Epistemology of Moral Humility 
 
 The present range of moral disagreements should be far more threatening to our 
confidence than the empirical disagreements. Our empirical judgments are far better 
corroborated and well-explained. Our moral judgments, on the other hand, are utterly 
lacking any stable, complete, universally accepted explanatory theory. Furthermore, 
moral disagreements are more pervasive and more varied than empirical disagreements; 
we have disagreements with peers on a wide range of basic judgments. Thus, moral 
disagreement ought to have a significantly detrimental effect on our moral self-
confidence. It seems as though moral disagreement ought to reduce our moral self-
confidence. 
 However, I seem to be in the minority in advocating moral humility through 
disagreement. Most believe that moral disagreement doesn't matter. Instead, the most 
common position seems to be that agents should be morally self-sufficient; that agents 
ought not rely on the beliefs of others in establishing their own moral judgments, nor 
should they let the mere fact that others agree or disagree change their degree of 
confidence in those judgments. The position of moral self-sufficiency therefore depends 
on establishing that there is crucial disanalogy between empirical reasoning and moral 
reasoning. 
 In this chapter, I will argue that the epistemic grounding for moral reasoning and 
empirical reasoning is essentially similar, and that no such radical disanalogy holds. 
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Though I will grant that there may be reasons to block our forming new beliefs through 
testimony, I do not think there are reasons to block the loss of self-confidence through 
disagreement. Given the best currently available epistemic theory, we must treat our own 
reasoning as fallible, including our moral reasoning. Since there are others who have as 
much in-principle access to the moral domain as we do, and since all evidence indicates 
that their reasoning is of the same kind, and of approximately the same reliability, as our 
own, disagreement with them ought to have some effect on our all-things-considered 
moral beliefs.  
 My argument consists of two stages. First, I will argue that a contemporary 
epistemic theory, entitlement theory, gives us the most plausible moral epistemology. 
Second, I will argue that, given entitlement theory, we must treat others as moral peers, 
and, consequently, we must pay attention to disagreement. I take this chapter to present 
my entire positive argument for moral humility and against moral self-sufficiency; the 
subsequent chapters will take up the major objections.  
 
 
Part I. Entitlement Theory and Moral Judgment 
 The position of moral self-sufficiency depends for its plausibility on a naive moral 
epistemology. The position has survived, it seems to me, because much of modern ethics 
occurs in an epistemic vacuum. The divorcing of ethics and epistemology is quite 
understandable, for no straightforwardly foundationalist epistemic theory has been able to 
adequately capture our basic intuitions about how moral reasoning should go. Traditional 
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epistemic theories have usually demanded explicit proof; our moral lives are full of moral 
self-confidence, but precious little in the way of proof. Faced with a choice between 
giving up on our moral confidence entirely or cutting moral reasoning loose from 
epistemic considerations, most of us, understandably, choose to turn away from worrying 
about the epistemology. But recent developments in epistemology will do much to repair 
this situation. Entitlement theory, which I believe to be the most plausible contemporary 
epistemic theory, will neatly capture many of our basic intuitions about how moral 
reasoning should go; it will show how some amount of moral self-confidence is 
reasonable even in the absence of proof. But entitlement theory only grants us tentative 
self-confidence; it is incompatible with moral self-sufficiency. 
First, let me specify the domain of discussion. My arguments concern only our 
confidence in unsecured moral judgment - moral judgments for which we have no 
explicit proof. This includes, as I argued in Chapter 1, both raw moral intuitions and more 
complex forms of judgment. I also confine my discussion those judgments that present 
themselves as making claims about objective affairs. Though not all moral judgments 
present themselves as objective in this way, a claim to objectivity is prerequisite for the 
existence of moral disagreement. The presence of disagreement presupposes a single 
object over which there is disagreement.7  
I am not yet claiming that our moral judgments are of objective affairs; only that 
they present themselves as being so. I am also not claiming that purported objectivity is a 
                                                
7 Of course, Tom and Quentin could have a disagreement about whether Quentin actually likes 
pomegranate or is just pretending, but this is a psychological disagreement, not a moral disagreement. I 
take it that the existence of distinctively moral disagreement presupposes, at the very least, that the 
involved parties are committed to the existence of some objective moral facts in some minimal sense. 
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necessary part of any moral judgment or intuition; rather, I claim it as a matter of 
empirical fact about the phenomenology of many people's moral experience. When I see 
a person beating their dog, it seems to me wrong, and objectively wrong. When I first 
meet somebody that doesn't share my judgment that beating dogs is wrong, I am shocked.  
My naïve moral phenomenology is of rightness and wrongness as plain, public, objective 
affairs.  
   
 
Introducing entitlement theory 
 The problem with providing an epistemic grounding for moral reasoning is that so 
much of moral reasoning is unsecured, and, historically, most epistemic theories demand 
security. But entitlement theory is distinctive in this regard; entitlement theory is an 
epistemic theory with thoughtfully lax standards of security. Entitlement theory arises 
from the observation that virtually all knowledge requires trust in unsecured judgments. 
We can, for example, assess the reliability of our eyes only if we possess a science of 
optics, but such a science could only come through trusting and using our eyes. The only 
way to possess any form of science is if we begin with an attitude of trust - an unsecured 
trust - towards many of our empirical faculties and cognitive abilities. It might have 
seemed that moral knowledge was uniquely unsecured, but, if we accept entitlement 
theory's analysis, moral knowledge turns to be not so peculiar after all.   
 Let's begin with a more detailed look at entitlement theory. Entitlement theory is 
the body of epistemic theories that claim that knowledge and reasonable belief must 
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begin with some degree of cognitive self-trust, even in the absence of secured 
foundations. The best overview of entitlement theory comes from Crispin Wright, in his, 
"Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?" Wright dissects older epistemic 
theories by showing how their basic methodology must necessarily lead to skepticism. 
 
Call a proposition a cornerstone for a given region of thought just in case it would follow from a 
lack of warrant for it that one could not rationally claim warrant for any belief in the region The best 
- most challenging, most interesting - skeptical paradoxes work in two steps: by (i) making a case 
that a certain proposition (or restricted type of proposition) that we characteristically accept is 
indeed such a cornerstone for a much wider class of beliefs, and then (ii) arguing that we have no 
warrant for it.8  
 
Typically, skeptics argue for (ii) by claiming that the cornerstone depends for its 
justifications on other claims from the very domain for which it is the cornerstone.  
 
...There is a vicious circle: it is only if I can get a warrant for a specific proposition about it that I 
can acquire a warranted belief that there is a material world, yet it is only if the latter is already 
warranted and part of my collateral information that I can draw on my experience to provide warrant 
for specific beliefs about it.9  
 
This, says Wright, is the formal structure of virtually all skeptical arguments, including 
skepticism towards other minds, the external world, and the existence of past events. 
Take, for instance, skepticism towards the external world. Typically, an external world 
skeptic begins by noting that our knowledge of the external world depends on the thesis 
that our senses are reliable. The skeptic simply needs to show that the thesis of the 
reliability of our senses depends for its justification on some facts about the external 
world - for example, that there is no omnipotent evil deceiver, or that the biological 
apparatus of our sense organs is well-functioning. But both of these requisite facts are 
                                                
8 Wright (2004), p 168 
9 Wright (2004), p 171 
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themselves facts about the external world. Insofar as our having any warranted beliefs 
about the external world depends on having some particular warranted belief about the 
external world, then we fall inescapably into the vicious circle. 
The problem is not confined to skepticism towards the external world. Tyler 
Burge argues that this form of problem extends to virtually any form of cognition. In 
"Content Preservation," Burge argues that any form of reasoning with multiple steps 
relies on the substantive use of fallible cognitive faculties. We are either holding the steps 
in our head, in which case we are using short-term memory, or we are writing down the 
steps, in which case we are using our ability to see and read. Burge is pointing out that 
reasoning of any non-trivially complex form depends on the well-functioning of an array 
of fallible cognitive faculties and abilities. But if we demand that we possess a 
justification for trusting these cognitive abilities before we begin using them, then we fall 
again into the vicious circle, for all possible justifications involve the use of those very 
abilities. Thus, argues Burge, all cognitive life must begin with an entitlement to trust our 
basic cognitive abilities without justification.  
I accept Burge's argument. There seems to be a vast array of substantive, fallible 
cognitive abilities employed in any non-trivial reasoning, of which short-term memory is 
but one clear example. The argument concerning short-term memory is a particularly 
useful one, because the use of short-term memory is clear and obviously pervasive. 
Burge's analysis shows that we need entitlements not only for empirical knowledge, but 
for any form of extended reasoning whatsoever. Almost all reasoning depends on the 
well-functioning of some cognitive abilities. If we demand that any agent possess a 
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justification for trusting in the well-functioning of that ability before they may reasonably 
trust the ability, then we will never gain such a justification. In the empirical realm, we 
use the empirical sciences to vet the reliability of our senses, but we can only build those 
sciences using our senses. For any complex cognition we must rely on short-term 
memory, but any justification we might provide for the reliability of our short-term 
memory seems to require some form of complex cognition. The demand for prior 
justification for fundamental cognitive abilities leads inevitability a vicious circle, and 
thus to skepticism.  
Entitlement theory treats this analysis as a reductio of a stringent demand for prior 
justification; for knowledge to be possible, we must begin without justifications for all 
our starting points. James Pryor considers his version entitlement theory to be a 
development of G. E. Moore's discussion of common sense. Moore, famously, claimed 
that he could know it to be true that the external world existed; he could prove this 
because he knew that he had his two hands in front of him. But Moore famously refused 
to offer any proof of that latter piece of knowledge. Writes Pryor, 
 
…Moore doesn't seem ready or able to offer any considerations at all in favor of the claim that he 
has a hand - even defeasible, ampliative considerations - without begging the question against a 
skeptic who refuses at this stage of the dialetic to grant the existence of the external world. This is 
why Moore's "proof" strikes us as so unsatisfactory: he hasn't offered any non-question-begging 
reasons to believe his premise. Yet Moore claims he can know these premises to be true. He can 
know them to be true, though he has no non-question-begging arguments to offer in their support.10  
 
Moore is being reasonable only if his refusal is reasonable, and this refusal is reasonable 
only if Moore doesn't owe us considerations in favor of believing that his hands are in 
                                                
10 Pryor (2004), p 518 
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front of him. Entitlement theory offers us an explanation of why the refusal is reasonable: 
it is because the burden of proof is not on Moore to provide a proof of every claim. 
Rather, the burden of proof must lie on the skeptic's side, to give Moore a reason why he 
ought to take up the question.  
Entitlement theory suggests that, instead of beginning our cognitive lives by 
distrusting our cognitive abilities until given a reason to trust, we initially trust our 
cognitive abilities until given a reason not to. I believe that entitlement theory is the best 
epistemic theory in the running. I will presume that the basic insight of entitlement theory 
is correct: that we must begin our cognitive lives with an initial attitude of epistemic 
generosity rather than an attitude of epistemic miserliness. I will provide no further direct 
arguments for entitlement theory; such arguments can be found elsewhere.11 However, 
though I take the general approach of entitlement theory to be correct, I don't take any of 
the presently available theories to be entirely satisfying.12 I will attempt to show is that 
the general approach of entitlement theory is quite plausible as an epistemic basis for 
moral judgment, and that this is enough to show that moral self-sufficiency is wrong. 
 
Entitlement and moral judgment 
 I would like to show that entitlement theory applies to unsecured moral judgment. 
Since I'm not committing myself to a specific entitlement theory, I won't be able to argue 
this definitively. I'll do the best I can under the circumstances: I will introduce a number 
                                                
11 Burge (1993) and Pryor (2004) 
12 Wright (2004) provides an overview of what he takes to be the primary candidates in the running for 
entitlement theories, and shows why none of them are satisfying. I am in agreement with Wright's 
conclusions - that some form of entitlement theory has to be true, but that nobody has yet formulated a 
satisfying specific theory.  
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of representative entitlement theories currently in play, and show that each of those easily 
extends to moral judgment. Then I'll give a set of considerations why it seems likely that 
any reasonable entitlement theory will so extend. 
It will be easiest to see why entitlement theory ought to extend to moral judgments 
if we look at some of the earliest, most intuitively straightforward versions of entitlement 
theory. According to Wright, one of the earliest versions of entitlement theory was 
developed by Hans Reichenbach. Reichenbach proposed what Wright terms a "strategic 
entitlement." According to Reichenbach, an agent is strategically entitled to believe p if 
believing p is part of one's dominant strategy - in other words, if one's best practical 
strategy is to act as if one believed p. Imagine, says Wright, Robinson Crusoe stranded on 
the island, confronted with a new fruit. He is dying of starvation. Crusoe has no reason to 
think that the fruit is poisonous rather than edible, or vice versa. He is, however, 
warranted in acting as if the fruit is edible and eating it, since he would be no worse off if 
the presumption were wrong than if he refused the presumption, and significantly better 
off if the presumption were right. Since starvation will kill him just as surely as poison, 
epistemic conservatism here has no rewards. Pragmatism warrants his acting as if he 
believed that the fruit weren't poisonous.  
 Trusting our senses is also a dominant strategy, says Reichenbach. Our senses are 
our sole access points to the empirical domain. If we don't trust our senses, we have no 
access to empirical facts at all. If we trust our senses and they are unreliable, then we are 
no worse off then if we didn't trust them. Since the worst-case scenario of trusting our 
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senses is no worse than what will happen if we refuse to trust and the best-case scenario 
is considerably better, we are warranted in acting as if our senses were reliable.13  
 The argument works on any set of abilities which are purportedly the sole access 
to some domain. Reichenbach's legitimization of dominant strategies is the dressed-up 
version of an old response to skepticism, often made by non-philosophers: "Well, what 
other options do we have besides trusting our senses?" This pragmatic argument, of 
course, will have many detractors. Wright's chief objection is that the pragmatic 
argument can make reasonable acting as if it were true that the fruit was not poisonous, 
but couldn't make reasonable the belief that the fruit was not poisonous. As Wright 
worries, it is a pragmatic entitlement, but not an evidential entitlement.14 But if one finds 
Reichenbachean pragmatic entitlements acceptable, note that they easily extend to moral 
judgments. In the absence of a developed moral theory, our loose moral judgments are 
the only access we have to the domain of moral facts. If we trust and our moral 
judgments are incorrect of the facts, our actions will be as good as random as to what we 
actually ought do - just as if we took our moral judgments to be unreliable. In fact, if we 
trust our moral judgments and it turns out that we are deeply wrong, and there are no 
moral facts whatsoever, then we still have taken no morally wrong action. Thus, trusting 
our loose moral judgments is the dominant strategy, and so warranted. 
 The other progenitor of entitlement theory is Wittgenstein. Wright reads 
Wittgenstein in the following way: 
 
                                                
13 Wright (2004), p 178-184 
14 Wright (2004), p 184-188 
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To take it that one has acquired a justification for a particular proposition by the appropriate exercise 
of certain appropriate cognitive capacities—perception, introspection, memory, or intellection, for 
instance—always involves various kinds of presupposition. These presuppositions will include the 
proper functioning of the relevant cognitive capacities, the suitability of the occasion and 
circumstances for their effective function, and indeed the integrity of the very concepts involved in 
the formulation of the issue in question. I take Wittgenstein’s point in these admittedly not 
unequivocal passages to be that this is essential: one cannot but take certain such things for 
granted… 
That is not to deny that, if one chose, one could investigate (at least some of) the 
presuppositions involved in a particular case. I might go and have my eyesight checked, for 
example. But the point is that in proceeding to such an investigation, one would then be forced to 
make further presuppositions of the same general kinds (for instance, that my eyes are functioning 
properly now, when I read the oculist’s report, perhaps with my new glasses on.) Wherever I get in 
position to claim justification for a proposition, I do so courtesy of specific presuppositions—about 
my own powers, and the prevailing circumstances, and my understanding of the issues involved—
for which I will have no specific, earned evidence. This is a necessary truth. I may, in any particular 
case, set about gathering such evidence in turn—and that investigation may go badly, defeating the 
presuppositions that I originally made. But whether it does or doesn’t go badly, it will have its own 
so far unfounded presuppositions. Again: whenever claimable cognitive achievement takes place, it 
does so in a context of specific presuppositions which are not themselves an expression of any 
cognitive achievement to date.15 
 
Wright suggests that Wittgenstein can be read as proposing an entitlement theory, which 
Wright calls the entitlement of cognitive project. One might, admits Wright, take these 
insights about the ineradicability of presuppositions to fuel a new sort of skeptical 
paradox. Better, says Wright, to swallow the bitter pill and keep going.  
 
If there is no such thing as a process of warrant acquisition for each of whose specific 
presuppositions warrant has already been earned, it should not be reckoned to be part of the proper 
concept of an acquired warrant that it somehow aspire to this—incoherent—ideal. Rather, we should 
view each and every cognitive project as irreducibly involving elements of adventure—I have, as it 
were, to take a risk on the reliability of my senses, the conduciveness of the circumstances, etc., 
much as I take a risk on the continuing reliability of the steering, and the stability of the road surface 
every time I ride my bicycle. For as soon as I grant that I ought—ideally—to check the 
presuppositions of a project, even in a context in which there is no particular reason for concern 
about them, then I should agree pari passu that I ought in turn to check the presuppositions of the 
check—which is one more project after all—and so on indefinitely, unless at some point I can 
foresee arriving at presuppositions all of which are somehow safer than those of the initial project. If 
not, then there will be no principled stopping point to the process of checking: the quest for security 
will be endless, and therefore useless. And if that is the situation, then the right response—the reply 
will continue— is not to conclude that the acquisition of genuine warrant is impossible, but rather to 
insist that it does not require this elusive kind of security. Rather, warrant is acquired whenever 
investigation is undertaken in a fully responsible manner, and what the paradox shows is that full 
epistemic responsibility cannot, per impossibile, involve an investigation of every presupposition 
                                                
15 Wright (2004), p 189 
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whose falsity would defeat the claim to have acquired a warrant.16 
 
I quote these passages at length partially because I think they are some of the most clearly 
articulated defenses of entitlement theory on record. Wright emphasizes that the complete 
of ineradicability of presuppositions. One cannot but take certain things for granted in 
any cognitive project, including skeptical projects. This gives us a ready weapon to fend 
off the skeptic: her position is unstable. In order for a skeptic to convince a non-skeptic, 
the skeptic will have to present skeptical arguments; but such arguments themselves 
depend on substantive assumptions about cognitive functionality. Abstract reasoning, 
including the reasoning of the skeptic, does not get a pass from any proposed criteria for 
acceptable reasoning. Issuing challenges of philosophical skepticism is itself a cognitive 
project, which itself depends on presuppositions; excessively stringent prerequisites for 
knowledge cannot pass their own muster.  
What Wittgenstein is saying, says Wright, is that one might have a reason to seek 
the justification for the presuppositions of one cognitive project as part of another 
cognitive project, but that undertaking another cognitive project will involve taking up a 
different set of presuppositions. This may be a good idea in some circumstances - for 
example, if I am engaged in the project of learning history in a class, I take on the 
presuppositions that my teacher and our history textbook are correct. But if I come to 
worry about these two sources, I can then challenge these presuppositions and seek 
justification - for example, by checking their professional credentials. But in doing so, I 
am engaging in a new cognitive project, which involves taking on presuppositions about 
                                                
16 Wright (2004), pp 190-1 
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the trustworthiness of the credentialing institution. It is possible, then, to justify the 
presuppositions of one cognitive project by taking on a different set of presuppositions, 
but it is impossible to do without presuppositions entirely. The right response to this 
insight, says Wright, is not to abandon all hope of knowledge or reasonable belief, but to 
realize that the "elusive security" of the eradication of all potentially flawed 
presuppositions is impossible, and so not a reasonable criterion for the acquisition of 
warranted belief. Sums up Wright:  
 
This line of reply concedes that the best sceptical arguments have something to teach us—that the 
limits of justification they bring out are genuine and essential—but then replies that, just for that 
reason, cognitive achievement must be reckoned to take place within such limits. The attempt to 
surpass them would result not in an increase in rigour or solidity but merely in cognitive paralysis.17 
 
Wright proceeds to turn these elusive thoughts into a firm proposal about entitlement. P is 
a presupposition of a cognitive project if to doubt P would rationally commit one to 
doubting the significance or competence of the project. Wright then proposes that we 
have an entitlement of cognitive project when a presupposition, P, of a cognitive project 
when we have no sufficient reason to believe P to be untrue, and the attempt to justify P 
would involve further presuppositions of no more secure a priori standing.18  
 Provided then that forming moral judgments is a form of cognitive project - and it 
is hard to imagine why it wouldn't be - it seems clear that the entitlement of cognitive 
project also extends to cover moral judgments. The proposition, "My moral intuitions are 
reliable" is surely a presupposition of the cognitive project of everyday moral judgment, 
                                                
17 Wright (2004), p 191 
18 Wright (2004), pp 191-2 
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by Wright's definition of presupposition. Thus, we are entitled to our loose moral 
judgments.   
 Let me now turn to contemporary entitlement theories. One of the most 
straightforward entitlement theories is James' Pryor's. Pryor describes his theory as a 
form of "dogmatist epistemology," and his description is one of the clearest statements of 
the commitments of entitlement theory.  
 
The dogmatist about perceptual justification says that when it perceptually seems to you as if p is 
the case, you have a kind of justification for believing p that does not presuppose or rest on your 
justification for anything else, which could be cited in an argument (even an ampliative argument) 
for p. To have this justification for believing p, you need only have an experience that represents p 
as being the case. No further awareness or reflection or background beliefs are required. Of course, 
other beliefs you have might defeat or undermine this justification. But no other beliefs are required 
for it to be in place. 
 Note that the dogmatist is not saying that your justification for believing p rests on your 
awareness of your experiences. His view is that you have justification for believing p simply in 
virtue of having an experience as of p. On his view, your experiences give you justification for 
believing p, but it would be misleading to call these experiences your "evidence" for believing p. 
For saying that your experiences are your "Evidence" for a perceptual belief suggests that your 
justification for that perceptual belief depends in part on premises about your experiences - as if you 
were introspectively aware of your experiences, and your perceptual belief were based in some way 
on that awareness. The dogmatist denies that you need any "evidence" of that sort… 
Of course, you can become aware of your experiences, by introspection. And your 
introspective awareness that you have experiences of certain sorts might, together with appropriate 
background beliefs, provide you with additional reason to believe p. The dogmatist does not deny 
that. He allows that you may have some justification for believing p that does rest on your 
introspective awareness of your experiences, and on background beliefs. He only claims that there is 
a kind of justification you have which does not rest on these things.19 
  
In Pryor's account, the dogmatist does not take perceptual beliefs to be self-justifying; the 
dogmatist takes us to be entitled to believe along with our perceptual experiences without 
justification. The dogmatic position is essentially non-reflective.  
Pryor claims that only a dogmatist about perceptual justification can successfully 
escape from the skeptic's challenge. Does Pryor's theory plausibly extend to moral 
                                                
19 Pryor (2000), p 519 
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judgments? First, a full theory of entitlements will go beyond perceptual entitlements, 
and that Pryor's story here is, by his design, incomplete. But even Pryor's account of the 
simplest of entitlements - our entitlements to perceptual judgments - covers certain forms 
of moral judgments.  
Pryor fleshes out his notion of perceptual justification in the following way: we 
are justified in trusting "perceptually basic propositions, or propositions that our 
experiences basically represent [Pryor's bolding]."20 Pryor contrasts perceptually basic 
propositions to those that require background knowledge. The judgment that there is a 
blue object in front of me is perceptually basic, says Pryor; the judgment that there is a 
policeman in front of me is not. This is not to say that perceptually basic proposition are 
merely statements of sense-data, a la some logical positivists. Perceptually basic 
propositions are "about manifest observable properties of objects in the world."21 Which 
propositions are actually basic is actually an empirical matter. Says Pryor, it is up to the 
cognitive psychologists whether "there is a complete hand" or "there is a facing flesh-
colored surface of such-and-such a shape" is the basic supposition. Pryor also admits that 
what's perceptually basic will vary between people, and will vary for one person over 
time. I take it, for instance, that, under some descriptions of autism, what's perceptually 
basic for the one person is the judgment, "the person is raising the corners of their lips" 
and what's perceptually basic for another person is the judgment, "the person is smiling," 
or even, "the person is happy." Thus, says Pryor: 
 
                                                
20 Pryor (2000), p 539 
21 Pryor (2000), p 539 
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The official version of my view is that we have immediate prima facie justification for believing 
those propositions that our experiences basically represent to us - whichever propositions those turn 
out to be.22 
 
Pryor's intention here is not to provide a complete account of all possible entitlements, 
but merely to provide an account of the simplest entitlement: our entitlement to bare 
perceptions. Surely there will be more entitlements to cover more complex, synthetic 
cognition. But even here, we can see that even the simplest entitlement extends to the 
moral sphere. Do our experiences basically represent moral judgments to us? The answer 
will depend, as Pryor suggests, on the details of each person's phenomenal experience. 
But it seems that, for many of us, some moral judgments are basically represented in 
experience. These are the sorts of judgments that are sometimes referred to as "raw 
intuitions." If I see a state of affairs and it strikes me as obviously wrong, then I take it 
that the judgment is not the result of the application of background knowledge, but, 
rather, is a part of the basic representation of my experiences. I experience certain events 
as wrong, or horrifying, or repugnant, or dignified. 
 Other entitlement theories interface even more easily with moral judgment. A 
variation on Pryor's version of entitlement theory is Lawrence Sklar's methodological 
conservatism. Sklar thinks that a fairly weak principle can get us out of various skeptical 
dilemmas. 
 
What is the principle of methodological conservatism. Basically, the idea is that the very fact that 
that a proposition is believed can serve as a warrant for some attitude to be rationally maintained in 
regard to believing it.23 24 
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24 This is Sklar's earliest, and most intuitive, formulation of methodological conservatism. Sklar eventually 




Where Pryor's perceptual dogmatism focuses on perceptual experiences as entitling 
beliefs, Sklar's conservatism works directly on the beliefs themselves. Sklar's 
conservatism is even easier to apply to moral judgments, because we don't even have to 
worry about the question of whether or not moral experiences count as a form of 
perceptual judgment. Sklar works, so to speak, on the discovered phenomenology of 
belief, rather than the phenomenology of perception. If I already believe that eating meat 
is right, and I discover the alternative hypothesis that eating meat is wrong, and there is 
no greater reason to believe the alternative hypothesis, then I may continue to believe that 
eating meat is right.  
 Burge makes the extension of entitlements to non-perceptual faculties explicitly. 
Burge grants that perceptual beliefs are justified in virtue of the individual's having 
certain sense experiences, seemingly in parallel with Pryor.25 But Burge adds that in any 
form of reasoning that involves multiple steps, we must deploy and trust our memory. 
Memory plays a "preservative" role. Once we demonstrate to ourselves a particular 
judgment satisfactorily, memory preserves our acceptance of that judgment for use in 
future reasoning. But if we reserved our trust in our own memory until we had a 
satisfying argument, we'd run straight into a vicious circle. We could never produce such 
an argument, for the use of memory is requisite for any argument. A prior demand for 
                                                                                                                                            
believing p would serve as a reason to believe p. The humbler proposal he eventually commits to is that, if 
you already believe some proposition, it is unreasonable to cease to believe the proposition merely because 
of the existence of alternative hypothesis whose positive warrant is no greater than that of the proposition 
already believed. However, the earlier formulation is more comprehensible, and the differences between 
the formulations is negligible for my purposes. 
25 Burge (1993), p 460 
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justification, applied to basic faculties of reasoning, will lead directly and inescapably to 
skepticism. Normal human cognitive life, then, requires more than just perceptual 
entitlements. Entitlements must therefore capture non-perceptual faculties as well. Burge 
suggests the following approximation, which he calls the Acceptance Principle: 
 
A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to 
him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so.26 
 
Once again, the key entitlement principle is crucially non-reflective. We don't need to 
accept, understand, or even know of the Acceptance Principle in order to be entitled; one 
doesn’t have to be an epistemologist to be entitled to self-trust. The Acceptance Principle, 
says Burge, allows us to accept information instinctively.27 The Acceptance Principle, 
says Burge, also shows that we are a priori entitled to accept the testimony of others for 
the very same reasons that we are entitled to accept the deliverances of our memory: both 
are intelligible and present themselves as true. He argues that the fact that a faculty's 
deliverances seem true and are intelligible are defeasible a priori markers of that faculty's 
being a rational source.28  
Burge's extension of entitlement to testimony is part of his overall commitment to 
a very generous epistemology. Unlike earlier thinkers on the subject, Burge doesn't think 
we are entitled only to those faculties that are necessary for all reasoning. There are many 
internal faculties that make claims about the world that are not necessary to reasoning in 
general - our sense of smell, for example, or our ability to read facial expressions. 
                                                
26 Burge (1993), p 467 
27 Burge (1993), p 467 
28 Burge (1993), p 469 
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Perceptual judgments are not indispensable to all reasoning, but any reasonable 
entitlement theory must cover them.29 "Such resources may enrich reason without being 
necessary to every rational activity," says Burge.30  
 What may we trust then?  Burge suggests that we are entitled to trust rational 
resources. A rational resource is a resource that's aimed at truth, though not necessarily 
always correct; but the fact that a rational resource is aimed at truth is sufficient to treat 
it, prima facie, as source of truth. Says Burge, the very fact that a rational resource 
presents content marks it has having an "a priori prima facie connection to truth." This is 
because "content is constitutively dependent, in the first instance, on patterned 
connections to a subject matter, connections that insure in normal circumstances of true 
thought presentation. So presentations' having content must have an origin in getting 
things right."31 The very fact that a rational resource presents content requires that it has 
some patterned connection to the world, and that is sufficient grounds to begin by 
supposing, a priori, that the resource presents truths about the world.   
How then, are we to tell the rational resources from the irrational noisemakers? 
Once again, we have no sure path to telling a rational resource from an irrational one, 
suggests Burge, but we have an a priori entitlement to presume that certain claimants are, 
prima facie, rational resources. Intelligibility is an a priori prima facie sign of rationality, 
because the presentation of propositional content presupposes at least a derivative 
connection to a system of perceptual, cognitive, and practical interactions with a world. 
                                                
29 Burge (1993), p 466 
30 Burge (1993), p 470 
31 Burge (1993), p 471 
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In short, prima facie intelligibility is a prima facie sign that a source is rational, and a 
source's being rational is a prima facie reason to take the deliverances of that source as 
true. Says Burge, intelligibility, rationality, and truth are all of the same domain - 
cognitive, truth-seeking activity - so prima facie intelligibility confers a prima facie 
entitlement to presume rationality and so presume reliability. None of these connections 
are vetted with the force of proof, but, of course, this is a theory of entitlements, not of 
firm foundations. 
This argument is not intended to refute the skeptic, says Burge. Burge is 
comfortable assuming that knowledge about the external world is possible; what he's 
looking for is a theory that explains that possibility, and sets out its boundaries.32 Once 
we see that something like the Acceptance Principle is the most plausible source of 
knowledge, we will see its generality, says Burge.  
Burge's Acceptance Principle extends easily to cover moral judgments. Insofar as 
I have the experience as of something's being wrong, or the experience as of some moral 
axiom's being true - if something seems wrong or true to me - then I am entitled to take 
the corresponding judgment to be prima facie true. Furthermore, the Acceptance 
Principle easily extends to moral testimony. Part of the main argument of "Contention 
Preservation" is that one is entitled to trust testimony on the very same grounds as one is 
entitled to trust one's own faculties. Testimony is comprehensible and so prima facie it 
comes from a rational source. Thus I have a defeasible entitlement to presume any 
comprehensible person rational and so to presume their testimony true. This entitled trust 
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for others obviously extends to cover moral testimony, as well. An interlocutor's claims 
about something's being good or bad are just as intelligible as my own moral intuitions, 
and thus bear the same sort of prima facie entitlement.  
 
 
Why we should expect any reasonable entitlement theory to cover moral judgment 
 I've shown that, for a representative sampling of entitlement theories, each theory 
extends to cover moral judgment. I've tried to show that these extensions aren't the result 
of desperate semantic juggling, but are clean, plausible, and even obvious extensions of 
the entitlement theories. However, I do not take any entitlement theory yet proposed to be 
entirely successful. I agree with Wright: though no currently available entitlement theory 
is has entirely overcome its theoretical obstacles, some version of entitlement theory must 
be correct.  
In writing about the extension of entitlement theory to moral judgment, I am, I 
admit, jumping the gun a bit. I had hoped to provide an argument that any reasonable 
entitlement theory must extend to moral judgment, but I find myself unable to do so. The 
properties common to any possible entitlement theory as so poorly developed and so 
minimal that such an argument is likely impossible. It is possible that some future 
candidate entitlement theory will arise that does not extend to moral judgments. But I 
doubt it, and the fact that all of the present theories so easily extend to cover moral 
judgments I take as strong evidence in favor of this approach. 
56 
 
 Let me close this section with some further thoughts about why it seems likely 
that any reasonable entitlement theory will extend to moral judgment. The general mood 
of entitlement theory is one of generosity, of starting in a mood of acceptance rather than 
one of suspicion. Why ought we think that generosity extends to the moral domain? 
Many of the entitlement theories we looked at are hyper-permissive and extend to cover 
loose moral judgments quite easily. Any entitlement theory formulated along the lines of 
Pryor's or Sklar's or Burge's - that entitles us to accept any proposition that prima facie 
seems right to us, or that we already believe to be true, or that is comprehensible - 
extends easily. The majority of entitlement theories out there seem to extend entitlements 
to any propositional claim that carries it with it some minimal stamp of cognitivity - 
either a claim to truth, or seeming to be right, or prior commitment, or even mere 
intelligibility. For most of us, our naïve moral experience comes with those stamps of 
purported cognitivity.  
 But why should we expect any reasonable entitlement theory to have such 
minimal conditions for entitlement? To understand this, we have to turn to the underlying 
motivations for turning from more traditional theories to entitlement theories. Entitlement 
theories are constructed to capture the way in which everyday knowledge works. They 
begin with a commitment to the reasonability of everyday knowledge. Thus, entitlement 
theories are likely to have quite minimal conditions for granting entitlements, because 
entitlement theories must grant entitlements to non-reflective agents - the holders of most 
everyday knowledge. Entitlement theories cannot, for example, demand that an agent 
understand entitlement theory, for this would imply that almost all non-philosophers (and 
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many philosophers) were not entitled to their every-day beliefs. Entitlement theory ought 
not demand extensive knowledge of the nature, structure, and inner workings of the one's 
cognitive abilities as prerequisites for being entitled to trust those abilities. This would 
leave most people at cognitive sea.  
Furthermore, it seems that there ought to be some first-personally available 
criterion for entitlement. To the degree that an epistemic theory like entitlement is a 
normative theory, there must be some sort of phenomenally available stamp for the 
legitimate starting points designated by that epistemic theory.33 Even if it is, as Burge 
says, instinctive, an agent ought to be able to recognize their legitimate entitlements, even 
if they cannot fully describe them as such. Furthermore, this phenomenal stamp must be 
easily accessible and comprehensible, in order to capture the successful knowledge in  
philosophically unreflective agents. The stamp cannot depend, for example, on some fine 
distinction between phenomenal states that requires meditative training, or a working 
knowledge of Husserl. It seems likely that the proper phenomenal stamp will be a very 
general one.  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a fully developed entitlement theory will limit 
entitlements to merely those bearing the stamp of perceptual cognitivity - that is, to limit 
entitlements to propositional claims directly arising from perceptual states. Though many 
of those working in entitlement theory take perceptual entitlements to be the clearest and 
best case for entitlements, none think that perceptual entitlements are the only 
entitlements. In order for everyday cognition to work, we need to trust not only our 
                                                
33 Dretske a similar point in (2000), pp 595-6. 
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perceptual abilities, but non-perceptual cognitive abilities, like short-term memory and 
basic logical abilities.  
The possibility remains that entitlements will be limited in some particular way. 
Perhaps, we might imagine, entitlements will only extend to the cognitive minimum - 
those faculties necessary for logical and scientific reasoning, which include sensory 
perception and short-term memory, but excludes the rest. But this, too, would fail to 
capture so many everyday cases of knowledge. Take, for instance, our ability to judge the 
emotions of another person; or a therapist's ability to feel out the best thing to say to a 
bereaved patient; or a military officer's ability to quickly assess, in a moment, the best 
tactic for a newly evolving situation.  
It seems then, prima facie, that entitlements ought to be broad-based. It is unlikely 
that entitlements would extend strictly to very generic cognitive faculties, like general 
faculties of logic, because there are many very domain-specific faculties, like the 
empirical senses, memory, and reading emotions, which it seems like entitlement theory 
ought to capture. It is also unlikely that entitlements will be limited only to concrete, 
perceptual faculties, since we clearly need entitlements to things such as short-term 
memory, synthetic judgment, and the like. Thus it seems likely that any reasonable future 





Part II: From Entitlement to Humility 
 I've argued thus far that entitlement theory is the most plausible epistemic 
grounding for loose moral judgments. Entitlement theory shows us that we are reasonable 
in trusting our loose moral judgments, but we have to trust defeasibly. Our entitled trust 
is tentative and revocable in the face of future evidence. I argue that, as a consequence of 
the epistemic analysis, we cannot treat ourselves as morally self-sufficient. 
My argument centers around one basic idea: that we are each but one rational 
agent among many. Each of us has a priori no better or worse claim to epistemic access to 
the moral truths than other rational agents. Entitlement theory permits us to trust our 
unsecured judgments and cognitive abilities. Entitlement theory carries with it no grounds 
for thinking that my access is better than that of another rational being - thus, our 
testimony and theirs ought to downgrade and defeat each other in similar ways. In fact, as 
a consequence of entitlement theory, the present state of evidence suggests that we ought 
to think there are other people with reliable access to moral facts, an access comparable 
to our own. The evidence indicates that we have epistemic peers in the moral domain. 
This epistemic peerhood is the reason why we cannot be morally self-sufficient  
  
 
Some simplistic arguments for moral self-sufficiency 
 I intend to argue this claim against the intelligent supporter of moral self-
sufficiency. But first, I think it will be useful to discuss some simplistic arguments for 
moral self-sufficiency. The diagnosis of these simplistic arguments will set the stage for 
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the discussion of the sophisticated version of moral self-sufficiency. The sophisticated 
versions, I will argue, fall prey to the same problems, albeit in subtler formulations.  
Here is the first simplistic argument: that our entitlement to trust ourselves grants 
us the entitlement to treat ourselves as infallible. Suppose that entitlement theory grants 
that I trust my intuitions. Suppose I have an intuition that p, and that I have a further 
intuition that the former intuition is infallible. If I am entitled to trust my intuitions, then I 
am entitled to trust this meta-intuition's guarantee of the first-order intuition. Thus, I have 
a reason to take myself to be infallible. Thus I am entitled to believe p, and to believe that 
I am infallible in this belief.  
There seems to be something very funny about this form of reasoning. It seems 
like I've bootstrapped myself out of defeasibility. Entitlements can't possibly work this 
way. There may indeed be a way for agents to rid themselves of the tentativeness and 
defeasibility that comes with entitlements, but surely it can't be as simple as just adding a 
second-order intuition. After all, that second intuition is itself merely another intuition. 
The flaw of this simplistic argument to infallibility is that it treats the meta-intuition itself 
as infallible. But, since the meta-intuition is itself an intuition held on a mere entitlement, 
it is also defeasible. Thus, a consideration that bears against p also bears against my 
infallibility in judging p. After all, the second intuition is merely a claim of infallibility. 
Suppose, for example, that there is a new oracle - the Oracle of Seattle. The Oracle of 
Seattle claims that there will be an earthquake next Saturday. Furthermore, the Mayor of 
Seattle claims that the Oracle of Seattle is infallible. When the prediction turns out to be 
wrong, that is evidence both against the Oracle's infallibility and against the Mayor's .  
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 The simplistic argument to infallibility is simply a more convoluted version of the 
following argument: 
 
Tom: I see a red ball. 
Jerry: No, the ball is blue. 
Tom: It can't be blue. It's red. 
Jerry: Why do you say that? 
Tom: Because I see that it's definitely red! So it's got to be red! So you've got to be 
wrong! 
 
Tom's mistake here is thinking that adding an emphasis creates an epistemic guarantee. 
The emphasis may arise from a genuinely distinctive phenomenal experience, but the 
emphasis itself does not provide an iron-clad guarantee. If I have some cognitive ability, 
A, and then support that with the pronouncement of another cognitive ability, B, then this 
support is only as strong as the reliability of ability B. As long ability B is itself 
defeasible, then we have still failed to make our claims waterproof. Good evidence 
against the reliability of cognitive ability A will transfer and also function as evidence 
against the reliability of any cognitive abilities that attest to ability A's reliability. This is 
true no matter how many further guaranteeing systems we add. If a disagreement weighs 
against my intuition, it will weigh against any other defeasible second-order, supporting 
intuitions. So long as the higher-order intuitions are defeasible, I cannot get out of the 
epistemic effect of disagreement merely by adding higher-order intuitions to the pile. 
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 Let us turn to the second simplistic path to self-sufficiency. Some have argued 
that it is rationally incoherent to doubt one's own rational faculties, for such doubt is self-
defeating. Wright sketches a form of entitlement he calls the entitlement of rational 
deliberation. He writes: "The generic thought is that since rational agency is nothing we 
can opt out of, we are entitled to place trust in whatever (we have no evidence against and 
which) needs to be true if rational decision-making is to be feasible and effective."34 This 
form of entitlement yields an interesting approach to self-sufficiency. I cannot opt out of 
rational deliberation; thus, I cannot doubt any faculties necessary for my basic 
functioning. It's impossible to reason my way into doubting my basic faculties of 
reasoning, for such an argument relies upon the reliability of those very rational faculties 
in order to be convincing. Thus, the core rational faculties are immune to defeat, on pain 
of incoherence. Core rational faculties get a special bye from the requirement of 
defeasibility. 
This argument from internal coherence has more legs then the previous argument, 
but I do not think it will carry us all the way to moral self-sufficiency. First, internal 
coherence considerations only extend to those faculties necessary for coherent reasoning. 
They will not extend, for example, to perceptions of the external world. It is entirely 
possible to be a brain in a vat and be a rational decision-maker. Surely, moral cognition is 
not necessary for the minimum of coherent reasoning. Both perceptions of the outer 
world, and moral intuitions, are products of faculties that claim to be about external, 
                                                
34 Wright (2004), p 128 
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mind-independent facts. Thus, moral judgment are excluded from these the protections 
afforded by internal coherence considerations.  
  More importantly, internal coherence cannot block all suspicion, even towards 
faculties associated with basic reasoning. The argument from internal coherence must be 
something along these lines: 
 
1. I have some degree of belief in my rational faculties, f. 
2. I have some degree of belief that my rational faculties are unreliable, g. 
3. Since my argument against my faculties depends on the use of my faculties, it 
cannot be that the confidence in g exceeds the confidence in f. It must be that f 
is greater or equal to g.  
 
But this proves only that I can never believe less than 50% in my rational faculties, based 
on my rational faculties. It does show, for example, that I can't downgrade my belief in 
my rational faculties to 0%, based on an argument using my rational faculties. My 
confidence in the conclusion comes from my confidence in its source, and believing on 
the basis of my reasoning faculties that my reasoning faculties were more untrustworthy 
than not would lead to a version of the liar's paradox. But I can certainly downgrade my 
rational faculties, so long as I maintain f > g. Though I can never give up on my rational 
faculties entirely, I can certainly come to doubt them to some degree. This version of the 
worry from internal incoherence provides a very interesting result: it shows us an upper 
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bound to the self-doubt we can have in our rational faculties. But this worry cannot forbid 
us from self-doubt inside that upper bound. 
 Crispin Wright argues that this entitlement gets going because it's a 
presupposition for an activity that we can't opt out of – the activity of rational 
deliberation. But I can surely opt out of the activity of rational deliberation with absolute 
certainty in my faculties, and opt into the activity of rational deliberation with some 
degree of doubt towards my faculties. Considerations of internal coherence can only grant 
immunity from downgrading for activities I can't opt out of, but surely I can opt out of 
cognizing with absolute certainty.  
 Thus, neither the argument from infallibility, nor the argument from internal 




The argument from trumping 
 Let me now present what I take to be the most plausible and significant argument 
for moral self-sufficiency. It is very hard to imagine life without any moral trust 
whatsoever - there would be no moral education, no moral advice; the most plausible 
versions of moral self-sufficiency must therefore make allowances for some 
circumscribed uses of moral testimony.  
One promising solution for moral self-sufficiency would be to grant that an agent 
may use moral testimony when the agent has no considered judgment of their own on the 
65 
 
topic, but claim that once an agent develops their own considered judgment, their 
judgment blots out the weight of moral testimony. After all, all that's required to capture 
many of our intuitions about legitimate uses of moral testimony is to acknowledge that 
moral testimony has some weight, but this does not have to be very much weight at all. 
The proponent of moral self-sufficiency might plausibly hold that moral testimony is just 
barely weighty enough to move me to action when I have no substantive moral judgments 
of my own, but too trivial to have any effect once I form a moral judgment of my own. 
There are many such epistemic featherweights in intellectual life: a vague memory, or the 
hint of a feeling, or testimony from an unvetted source. Imagine, for instance, that I have 
no idea which direction to go to get out of a maze. I see some graffiti saying, "This way!" 
Now, I have very little reason to trust this graffiti, but given that I have no sense of my 
own which way to turn, the whisper-thin weight of evidence provided by the existence of 
the graffiti provides a reason to go in a particular direction, and if I have absolutely no 
other reason to choose one way over the other, then that whisper-thin reason might be 
decisive. But if I have any more solid reason - the memory of a map, the feeling of fresh 
air from a certain direction - this counts far more than the graffiti of unknown origin. I 
have a reason to act according to the featherweight reason only so far as I'm lacking 
anything better, but any subtantive evidence will effectively wipe out the epistemic effect 
of the featherweight. 
Let's call this the argument from trumping: that, though moral testimony can have 
some evidential weight for an agent, the presence of an agent's own moral judgment is of 
sufficiently greater importance or weight as to trump any weight from moral testimony. 
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This is similar to how one might use movie reviews or restaurant recommendations. If I 
know nothing about a restaurant, then the fact that somebody recommended the 
restaurant is a reason to think the restaurant good. It is entirely reasonable to act on the 
testimony - for example, to actually go to the restaurant. But, it seems, once I go to the 
restaurant and eat some meals for myself, then my direct judgment supercedes any 
testimonial reasons. The fact that others like it cannot weigh on my judgment in any way 
- in fact, what I'm most likely to do is lose trust in anybody that recommended such a 
lousy place.35 
 This argument from trumping is particularly compelling in the space of moral 
judgments because of the special relationship we seem to have with our moral judgments. 
We have no special relationship to our empirical judgments; there is nothing personal 
about eyesight. I see reasonably well, but I will happily admit that some others see better 
and others see worse. More importantly, I have no trouble trusting another person's vision 
over mine, if I have evidence that they are more sharp-eyed or more color-discerning or 
the like. Moral judgment seems somehow more personal. Even though we are often 
willing to describe different agents as more or less apt at moral reasoning, it seems vital 
that our own actions and beliefs emanate from our own moral judgments.  
 The argument from trumping is a very plausible defense of moral self-sufficiency. 
It explains away most normal uses of moral testimony while still dismissing moral 
                                                
35 In fact, I think this view of aesthetic recommendations and aesthetic self-sufficiency, though common, is 
flawed, for exactly the same reasons that moral self-sufficiency is flawed. I bring up this example only 
because this attitude is familiar, not because I think it is correct. 
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disagreement. In order to resist the argument from trumping, I will have to show that 
moral testimony provides sufficiently weighty reason to effect my own beliefs.  
 
 
The existence of moral peers 
 To block the argument from trumping, I will have to show that contrary moral 
testimony is of the right kind and of sufficient strength to have some non-trivial effect on 
my belief-state. I will argue that we have, in most circumstances, reasons to accept 
certain others as our moral peers, and so to accept their testimony as being of sufficient 
strength. I define a "peer in domain X" as an agent whose believing p gives me a 
substantive reason to believe p. Defined this way, the argument against self-sufficiency 
breaks down into two steps: first, showing that there are moral peers, and second, 
showing that a substantive reason to believe -p, when I have judged p, ought reduce my 
confidence in p. Let me differentiate the notion of a "moral peer" from the broader notion 
of a "moral source." A moral source is somebody whose belief that p gives me some 
reason to believe p; that reason could be substantive or featherweight. Moral peers are 
particularly important kind of moral source. The argument from trumping gains its 
strength by allowing that there are moral sources, while denying that there are moral 
peers. 
 Let us begin by considering the existence of moral sources. It does seem, at first 
glance, that there are moral sources. The examples are hard to find when we move to 
abstract principles, but examples come readily to mind when we look to more concrete 
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and mundane affairs. We ask for assessments of other people's moral character; we trust 
our friends' judgment about who is compassionate and who is cruel. Annette Baier argues 
that normal human life would be impossible without some moral trust. She points out, for 
instance, that social cooperation requires that I delegate judgments to others.36 I might 
wish contribute money to a good cause and pressed for time, ask a friend which cause I 
should contribute to. I am in this sense taking moral testimony - I trust not only their 
assessment of the morally neutral facts, but also their moral assessment of those facts. 
When I use a newspaper's voting guide to guide my hand for the vast array of city 
ordinances, I am trusting the author's research capacity and her moral judgment.  
 All of these examples, however, are cases where I use testimony where I have no 
judgment of my own; they support only the existence of moral sources, and not moral 
peers. The mere existence of moral sources is compatible with the featherweight view of 
moral testimony, and compatible with the sophisticated moral self-sufficiency I've 
described above. But there are plenty of everyday examples that suggest the existence of 
moral peers. Take, for instance, any situation in which a friend urges me to reassess a 
situation because she suspects that I am biased, or blinded by rage, or unable to assess the 
situation neutrally. I might, for instance, after having been insulted by a colleague, 
angrily rush to report it to our boss. Suppose, though, that my friend tells me to wait. I'm 
too angry to consider the issue fairly right now, she says, and need to cool off. And, she 
says, I have always disliked my colleague for morally irrelevant reasons - they have a 
grating voice - and I am letting that color my moral judgment. When I take my friend's 
                                                
36 Baier (1986), p 232 
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advice to heart and stay my hand, I am treating her as a moral peer. Even if I don't see for 
myself in the moment that she is right, even if my own argument still seems to me to be 
sound, even if I don't actually think that I am biased at the moment, the possibility raised 
by her testimony is sufficient to alter my degree of confidence and my course of action.  
These examples are not intended to be conclusive; I am aware that determined 
opposition could suggest alternate explanations for these cases. The examples are only 
intended show the existence of moral peers, rather than being an alien thought, fits with 
many familiar social phenomena.  
It is, however, interesting to note that in these everyday examples peer testimony 
reduces, but does not obliterate, the confidence I have in my own moral judgment. Most 
of the really intuitively plausible cases of moral peerhood seem to share this quality. Our 
intuitions comport with the existence of moral peers, but also seem to set an upper bound 
on the impact of their testimony. The presence of such an upper bound is compatible with 
my own conclusions; I aim only to show that moral disagreement has some impact, not 
that it has unlimited impact, nor even to show that moral disagreement has as much 
weight as my own moral introspection. I suspect that there are very good reasons for such 
an upper bound. Cases of treating another person as a moral expert - that is, of treating 
them as so vastly superior to myself that their moral judgment trumps my own - sit 
uneasily with many intuitions. I suspect that we will discover very strong considerations 
against treating others as moral experts. I am happy, then, to grant that there is, in this 
respect, some disanalogy between moral judgments and empirical judgments. There may 
be something wrong with trusting another's judgments to the complete exclusion of one's 
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own judgments in the moral sphere, and perhaps that there is something wrong with 
trusting another's judgments as much as one's own. But there is also something wrong 
with excluding testimony and disagreement entirely.  
 
 
The generalization argument 
 I will now argue that, given that we are merely entitled to our moral self-trust, we 
ought to trust some other agents. This argument is the lynchpin of my positive project. In 
brief: we ought to regard as peers those who have, as far as we can tell, approximately the 
same cognitive capacities as we do. This is because the mechanisms which underlie the 
reliability of my own moral judgments are, to the best of my knowledge, shared by other 
human beings. Thus, the entitlement I have to trust my own mental abilities extends to 
trusting the mental abilities of others.  
This argument applies to all of our entitlements, moral and non-moral alike. If I 
am to trust my own vision, I ought to substantively trust the vision of (some) other 
people, for their visual equipment is, to the best of my knowledge, similar to mine. For 
the same reason, if I am to trust my own moral judgments, then I ought to extend a 
similar order of trust to the moral judgments of those who have similar cognitive 
equipment to mine. 
My goal here is to show that the generalization argument, which is 
uncontroversial for empirical matters, must extend to moral cognition. I claim that any 
entitlement theory that licenses thinking of myself as prima facie rational requires that I 
71 
 
also that I think of others sufficiently like me as prima facie rational. I mean by "rational" 
here that the rational agent or ability reliably tracks the truth in the relevant domain. (One 
does not have to track the truth perfectly to be rational, under this definition.) Purported 
rationality is a prerequisite for the existence of moral disagreement. In order for an agent 
to take herself to be in a disagreement, the agent must believe her relevant judgment to be 
of an objective affair, and be moderately confident in that judgment. The agent must, at 
the very least, take herself to be making a claim about something distinct from her 
personal preferences. 
Merely from these prerequisites to disagreement - the objectivity of content and 
self-confidence - we can already make some substantial deductions. I am entitled to 
believe that my loose moral judgment is likely true. Since the content of that judgment is 
an objective claim, I must take myself to have some ability to reliably track objective, 
mind-independent facts. In trusting myself, I am imputing to myself some reliable ability 
for tracking the truth - for getting onto states of affairs outside of me. Insofar as I take my 
judgment to be evidential rather than pragmatic - to be about what is actually the case - 
then it must be that the abilities and methodologies involved in generating these 
judgments are reliable. That reliability is the explanation for the purported correctness of 
my judgments. Entitlement theory says I am reasonable in imputing to myself such a 
reliable ability, even lacking an account of why the ability is reliable.  
Now we turn our gaze to other people. Ought we trust them? Yes, for trusting 
others follows from trusting ourselves. In the situation of entitled moral judgment, we are 
trusting that our cognitive capacities will be reliable, but we have little to say about these 
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cognitive abilities. We don't know what they're like, how they function, the basis for their 
reliability; we don't even know, in many cases, which cognitive abilities we're using. But 
we do know that certain other people - our peers - are cognitively very similar. They 
seem to have mostly the same abilities; we seem to be able to understand each other and 
reason very similarly in most situations; we seem to have the same physical apparatus, 
and we seem to come from similar sources - similar genetic material, a similar 
evolutionary background.37 Given that we have no particular account of where in our 
mental makeup our moral truth-tracking ability resides, and many reasons to think that 
the mental makeup of others is largely like our own, we have many reasons in favor of 
taking others to be our moral peers and few reasons against.  
Any entitlement that licenses me in thinking of myself as rational in some domain 
thus requires that I think of others as rational, provided I have reason to think that they 
are sufficiently like me. To the extent that I take my judgments to be accurate, I must take 
myself to have some ability to track the truth. That ability depends on my rational 
features and abilities. Others who have similar features and abilities are then likely to 
have similar capacities for truth-tracking. What counts as "sufficiently like me"? It's very 
hard to say because of the impoverished nature of our epistemic self-knowledge. In the 
situation of entitlement, I don't have enough information to draw the line precisely but, 
for my peers, the evidence weighs on the side of similarity. For my peers, there are many 
empirical reason to think that they're similar to me, and no prima facie categorical reason 
to think they're not. There are, of course, sometimes contingent reasons to think that 
                                                
37 This argument should also work for a monotheist creationist, who, I take it, takes all humans to have 
been created by the same God.  
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certain people aren't as truth-tracking as I am - they're biased, they're angry, they haven't 
thought things through as long as I have, they don't have the background or education I 
have in this particular area. But the proper initial presumption, given that they're people 
rather like me, is that they're also rational like me, and thus approximately as morally 
reliable.  
My entitlement to trust my own mental abilities extends to trusting mental 
abilities of others, because there is a wide range of empirical evidence that they are 
creatures substantially like me. They are human, they seem to have brains similar to 
mine, educations similar to mine, genetics similar to mine. They seem to reason largely 
as I do. They're of the same species, and have been shaped by the same evolutionary 
pressures.38 Since I take my own faculties to be providing me with substantive reasons to 
believe and since, for some other agents, I have every reason to believe that their faculties 
are like mine and little reason to suspect they are unlike, then I ought to believe that their 
faculties are also well-functioning, and thus should take them as providing substantive 
reasons to believe.  
The argument I've given depends on a thick, juicy stack of empirical data. It's not 
an argument that the bare existence of testimony or the bare existence of other speakers 
gives us reason to believe. It depends on some very contingent empirical data: that we're 
surrounded by people that all of our experience, history, and science tells us are largely 
like us. I don't think, for example, that a person stranded on Easter Island, surrounded by 
                                                
38 This is the version for the believer in humans as evolved creatures. I believe, though I'm not sure, that 
theists would also have a similar belief in essential similarity, though it would come from something like 
sharing a creator and being made from the same mold, so to speak. 
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statue heads of unknown origin chanting, "Chicken is evil! Chicken is evil!" has any 
reason to trust those statues. It's certain people that we have a reason to trust.  
Thus, I claim, the argument from trumping is not a viable route to moral self-
sufficiency. The argument from trumping depends on claiming that the evidential weight 
of testimony is of a radically lesser strength than the evidential weight of my own 
reasoning. But the situation of entitlement doesn't support such an epistemic asymmetry. 
Rather, in the situation of a disagreement over entitled judgments, the evidence weighs 
on internal reasoning and external testimony weighing in at approximately the same 
magnitude. Things might be different if we had something like a proof for our 
conclusions, but at present, we do not. So long as we are relying on the substantive 
conclusions of defeasible faculties, and so long as the evidence weighs in favor of the 
faculties of others being substantially like those faculties, testimony counts and thus 
disagreement counts. 
The argument I've given clearly applies to empirical abilities, but why should we 
take it to apply to moral abilities? I think that, in fact, the argument applies more strongly 
to moral judgment. The crux of the argument from generalization is that given that I don't 
know very much about the source of my reliability, general features of cognitive 
similarity weigh more. The argument applies most powerfully to our entitled moral 
abilities, precisely because they are the most mysterious of our purportedly objective 
faculties. We don't have to rely on general features for assessing vision because vision is 
so well understood, and we have a well-developed and trustworthy method for assessing 
the reliability of visual systems. It is when we lack such an account that we must default 
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to general cognitive similarity, and our account of moral cognition is, at the moment, 
terribly impoverished.  
As clear and obvious as some of our moral experience may be, we must admit, on 
further consideration of the nature of our epistemic relationship with moral facts, that we 
are each but one agent among many, each making claims about essentially public data. 
None of us has any essentially privileged relationship to moral reasons, though we may 
be more or less able or accurate. We are each merely one cognitive agent among many, 
all looking at the same set of facts. 
 
 
The publicity of moral reasons 
 What I'm claiming here is that moral reasons are essentially public, and that this 
publicity is woven throughout the structure of our epistemic commitments in situations of 
moral disagreement. Why do I take moral reasons to be basically public? It is an essential 
part of the phenomenal character of most moral intuitions. When we take another to be 
responsible for behaving a certain way, we must think that the reasons are in principle 
available to them. We couldn't hold another to be responsible for understanding and 
following considerations that were essentially inaccessible. Insofar as I judge not only 
that Tim ought to give some of his money to the relief effort but also that Tim is 
responsible for giving money, I must think that the relevant demand is intellectually 
accessible to Tim. This follows straightforwardly from the "ought implies can" principle. 
I cannot hold that Tim is responsible for knowing that he ought to do such-and-such, and, 
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at the same time, hold that the fact that he ought to do such-and-such is a fact only 
accessible to me. In order to hold others morally responsible, I must believe that they 
potentially have access to moral reasons. Since our intuitions about moral responsibility 
commit us to the publicity of moral reasons, then we must take up that publicity, with all 
its consequences. We must admit that others have, in principle, the same sort of moral 
access we do. Publicity is a two way street.  
The epistemic publicity of moral reasons is quite intuitive; for straightforward 
moral truths, we take each other to be responsible for discovering them. It is wrong to 
cruelly insult others without cause. I do not take this to be a private fact, but a public one. 
I do not take myself to be the only agent in the world privileged with this knowledge; 
rather, I expect others to be familiar with this fact, and when they are not, I am surprised 
and think that they have failed in their responsibilities of reflection and moral awareness. 
I may have some personal relationship to my moral judgments, but insofar as I take my 
moral judgments to be of objective, public facts, then I cannot deny that others also have 
access.  
What about topics on which one is an expert? One can surely take some fact to be 
public in principle and yet think that one has better access to that fact than one's 
interlocutor. Suppose, for instance, that I have an art student, who I hold responsible for 
learning to tell the difference between red ochre and burnt umber. They take a test on 
color discrimination and fail, and so I can reasonably judge myself to have better access, 
and so dismiss (at least for the moment) my students' claims about which earth tone is 
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insurmountable difference in principle between my own judgments and the testimonial 
judgments. It is a particular dismissal in a particular context, about a single considered 
epistemic relationship between myself and my student and our (evidentially supported) 
degrees of competence in this domain. It is the situation of discovering that somebody is 
not a peer. Defenders of moral self-sufficiency cannot avail themselves of such a 
situation. In order to show that dismissal is reasonable between peers, one needs a 
principled way set my own judgment as categorically distinct from, and above, the 
judgment of all others. But such a commitment is incompatible with basic moral 
commitments concerning the responsibility of others, and the publicity this entails. That 
we may hold others morally responsible entails that we be morally humble.  
 
 
Kant and me 
 The moves of the generalization argument are very much in the spirit of a Kantian 
transcendental deduction. I argue that in order for moral knowledge to be possible, I must 
be entitled to trust my moral faculties. It follows, I argued, that if I take myself to be 
reliable, it must be in virtue of my cognitive capacities and abilities. To the extent that 
other people share those human features, I ought to take them to be reliable also. This 
argument loosely follows the form of a Kantian deduction to the value of other people. 
To oversimplify the Kantian deduction: I take my will to be authoritative, therefore I 
must take my will to be valuable, therefore I take wills to be valuable in virtue of its 
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rationality, therefore other people with rational wills are valuable.39 The key step in both 
is claiming that if I assign myself a certain property, the only reasonable explanation for 
my having that property is in terms of certain other properties, which are shared by 
others. But if I'm availing myself of Kantian deductions-type arguments for my rather 
slender and tenuous argument for some minimal degree of caution and humility, why not 
go whole hog and avail myself of the full-strength deduction for value, and get a robust, 
Kantian ethics out of it? 
 I think that the epistemic deduction is more plausible. My epistemic deduction far 
has fewer commitments, and is thus more universally palatable, than the value deduction. 
It's plausible to claim that the reliability of my cognitive faculties depends on features 
that are shared by other cognizers. On the other hand, there are many reasons to think that 
my valuing my own rational will depends on some essentially personal feature of it: 
namely, that it's mine. The objectivity of value is much easier to deny than the objectivity 
of basic epistemic norms.  
For a subjectivist, the Kantian deduction would be unconvincing. The subjectivist 
would simply deny the premise that I valued my will for impersonal reasons; they might 
hold that I valued my will because it was mine and that such a personal basis couldn't be 
extended to others' wills. On the other hand, it's very hard to think that I trust my rational 
faculties simply because they're mine. The reasons that underlie reliability have to have 
something to say about the way in which the faculty hooks up, gets onto, and processes 
data from the external world, and does it well. This is because the function of rational 
                                                
39 This is an oversimplification of the version presented by Korsgaard (1996). 
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faculties is essentially outwardly directed – they're supposed to get on to some external, 
objective truths. It's very hard to deny that there are objective norms for proper epistemic 
procedure.  
 It is hard to deny that epistemic procedures for getting on to objective facts are, 
themselves, objective. Many deny the objectivity of value, but few deny the objectivity of 
good truth-gathering methods, even the subjectivist. It seems like a presupposition of any 
argument, including a subjectivist argument, that there are objective epistemic norms. 
The subjectivist's commitment to subjectivism is itself an objective claim. The 
subjectivist doesn't think subjectivism is correct because of something special about her 
relationship to the theory; she thinks it is correct on objective, rational grounds. It is 
much easier to be a radical subjectivist about value then a radical subjectivist about truth. 
Since my argument depends only to commitments to objective norms of epistemology, its 
reach is broader. 
 
 
Problems from the non-reflectivity of entitlements 
 I now take myself to have presented a complete, positive argument for trusting 
others, based merely on the fact that one must take oneself to be entitled to one's moral 
judgments. But a problem arises from the very structure of entitlement theory itself. 
Entitlement theory must, by its very nature, grant entitlements to non-reflective agents. 




My argument does in fact depend on a certain degree of reflection in the agent. I 
deduced, from the fact that we trust our moral judgments, that we must trust our mental 
abilities used in forming these moral judgments, and those abilities exist in others. In 
order for my argument to have any effect on the actions of an agent, it must be that the 
agent recognizes that there is a degree of entitled self-trust they have towards their own 
judgments. This is reflective awareness. Without it, the agent would not be compelled to 
accept that others were as reliable as herself, even it that were true.  
The rest of my generalization argument proceeds from this claim of reflective 
self-trust. But, under any plausible entitlement theory, extensive reflective self-
knowledge cannot be a pre-requisite for possessing entitlements. Entitlement theories are 
supposed to fit our intuitions about ordinary knowledge by ordinary agents. In order for 
ordinary knowledge to be possible, entitlement theories must offer entitlements with 
some degree of immediacy. If it seems to me that there is a red apple in front of me, then 
I am entitled to believe that there is a red apple in front of me. I do not need to have any 
further supplementary beliefs about my visual system, my cognitive processing 
capacities, nor do I need to be familiar with entitlement theory or any other philosophical 
theory. An agent cannot be required to know something about, for example, their visual 
system, or entitlement theory, to be entitled to self-trust. Thus, says entitlement theory, it 
must be reasonable for agents to believe and act without reflective epistemic self-
knowledge.  
Many earlier epistemic theories allow for unreflective starting points, but require 
that they be minimal and very abstract; they were, perhaps, modeled on axiomatic 
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mathematical knowledge. But in order to capture our intuitions that non-philosophical 
agents can come to know things about everyday objects, modern entitlement theories 
typically extend entitlements to a very large body of discrete phenomena - sights, sounds, 
memories, fuzzy judgments. Thus, entitlement theory endorses not only non-reflectivity 
in principle, but endorses the simple, everyday unreflectiveness of concrete, particular 
judgments. Though it is possible that some entitlement theories might be formulated as 
lending entitlements to cognitive faculties, most leading candidate theories lend 
entitlement to unreflective judgments of particulars. 
 In light of this wide-ranging unreflectiveness, we might worry that the 
generalization argument won't get its hooks into most agents. The generalization 
argument depends on the premise that an agent is entitled; for an agent to accept the 
generalization argument, she would have to reflectively acknowledge her own status as 
entitled. But entitlement licenses unreflective confidence; the agent may be entitled 
without being rationally required to acknowledge that entitlement. Thus, even if the 
generalization argument is true, it wouldn't convince reasonably unreflective agents.  
 This is, I grant, a serious worry. There are two ways out - a tidy way, and an 
inelegant, brute force way. The tidy way would be to show that the very existence of 
disagreement itself forces one to reflect on the epistemic basis of one's self-trust. I can 
demonstrate that this is true under some particular entitlement theories. For example, 
Burge claims in "Content Preservation" that we are defeasibly entitled to enter as a 
premise in our reasoning any comprehensible propositional phenomena, including visual 
phenomena, remembered phenomena, and more cognitively complex phenomena of 
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judgment. This entitlement, explains Burge, comes from the fact that we have an a priori 
entitlement to trust the deliverances of any faculty aimed at representing the world, and 
we have an a priori entitlement to trust that a faculty is so aimed if it gives us 
comprehensible deliverances. Thus, from the very same principle of entitlement, we are 
entitled to trust both our own judgments, and to trust testimony, since both are 
comprehensible phenomena. Since we are entitled to enter them as premises, then in any 
case of disagreement over a judgment, we can directly enter contradictory premises. 
Surely, if anything is grounds for defeat, it's a logical contradiction. Thus, under Burgean 
entitlement, the existence of disagreement defeats my entitlement to self-trust and to 
trusting others. In order to get either back, I must get past my entitlements and provide 
some theoretical basis for self-trust; I must begin to reflect. That reflection will surely 
involve reflection about the reliability of my faculties, which will set the stage for the 
generalization argument. 
 I had hoped to provide a generic argument along these lines, but such a generic 
argument has not been forthcoming. I suspect that it is the case that in any reasonable 
entitlement theory, the existence of disagreement will trigger the reflection required to 
get the generalization argument up and running. I also suspect, however, that this 
argument will only be furnished piecemeal, against the background of specific, well-
developed entitlement theories, and that no generic argument along these lines is 
possible. 
 In its stead, I will now provide an inelegant, brute force, but properly generic 
argument. Entitlement theories show that we are not required to justify our immediate 
83 
 
judgments with further reflection. They do not show that we can ignore convincing 
evidence that has been presented to us. A theory that allowed us to ignore contrary 
evidence that had been raised would not be a theory of defeasible entitlements. That is, 
entitlement theories show that I am not required to reflect on my cognitive resources in 
order to reasonably believe in my immediate judgments. They do not show that I can 
ignore manifestly true claims about my cognitive resources when I am presented with 
them. So, though it does not follow from entitlement theory that an agent is required to 
begin reflecting about their cognitive resources, it does follow from generic rules of 
rationality that an agent is required to believe arguments that are manifestly true once 
these arguments are presented to them. So, I claim, though it may be that not every 
entitled agent is rationally required to believe the generalization argument, it is rationally 
required for every agent that has read this chapter. 
  
 
From disagreement to doubt 
 I have set up all the pieces; now let me assemble them from across the last two 
chapters. Here is the complete argument that moral self-sufficiency is wrong, and that, in 
the face of moral disagreement with peers, we ought to reduce our confidence in our own 
judgment to some degree; we ought to be morally humble.  
In Chapter 1, I showed that there are such things as moral peers; and, as a simple 
matter of (admittedly contingent) fact, most of us are in a position to discover many of 
them. Let us assume that we are discussing an agent who has discovered evidence in 
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favor of there being moral peers, and that she has disagreements with some of those 
peers. These disagreements will most likely be over specific topics, embedded against a 
largely shared set of moral values and principles. I do not know of anybody I rate as a 
moral peer who thinks that torturing children is right, but I do know of plenty of people 
who I rate my intellectual and moral peers - good, sensitive, thoughtful people - with 
whom I disagree on issues like vegetarianism, cultural traditionalism, the relative 
importance of environmental concerns, and the degree of one's special obligation to one's 
family members.  
The most compelling cases against moral self-sufficiency will be disagreements 
with peers over the sorts of topics over which peers might plausibly disagree. I will focus 
on those best cases, since what I'm doing here is a proof-of-concept. I am arguing against 
the position of moral self-sufficiency by asserting that disagreement is the right sort of 
thing to matter; thus, I confine my discussion to the best cases for moral disagreements' 
mattering. Imagine, then, a disagreement between two agents who are, to the best of their 
knowledge, as reasonable, as rational, as reflective, and as morally sensitive as one 
another. For all imaginably relevant cognitive attributes or experiences, imagine that 
these agents share them: they have similar intellectual abilities, educational backgrounds, 
etc. etc. Furthermore, since we often assess one another's intellectual abilities by looking 
at the degree to which they agree with our confident judgments, imagine that the two 
agents agree with each other on the vast majority of moral conclusions. Their 
disagreement is over one particular thorny issue. Furthermore, imagine that the 
disagreement is longstanding and intractable, for reasons given in Chapter 1. 
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These specifications may seem to narrow the scope of my arguments, but I do not 
believe this to be a serious problem. I don't claim that only cases like this are important; 
rather, I claim that these sorts of cases represent the simplest and clearest cases for 
significant moral disagreement, and are the least complicated to handle. In order to 
ascertain the impact of less ideal cases, we will have to clarify a number of further issues, 
including the ways in which we rate people moral peers, the degrees of possible 
peerhood, and the interaction between the degree of an interlocutor's peerhood and the 
weight of their testimony. Very little work has been done on the topic, largely because I 
believe most contemporary moral philosophers have, implicitly or explicitly, subscribed 
to some version of moral self-sufficiency. By showing through a best-case study that 
disagreement is the sort of thing that matters moral peer, I hope to motivate further 
investigation into the theory of moral peers.  
Second, though these best-case scenarios are rare, they are precisely the sorts of 
cases that are intuitively compelling. It is disagreements with respected thinkers, with the 
very morally sensitive and reflective, with our trusted comrades, which naturally startle 
us and force us to worry and reflect. 
Imagine, then, that one disagrees with a best-case moral peer over a moral 
judgment, p. Let us say that that one judges, after careful consideration, that p, and one 
discovers that one's respected interlocutor judges, after careful consideration, that not-p. 
Let's assume that we have every reason to believe that the interlocutor both genuinely 
believes not-p, and that the interlocutor has actually given the matter due consideration. I 
presumably have a substantive reason or reasons to believe p that underlie my judgment 
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that p. I now have a substantive reason to believe not-p, namely, that my moral peer so 
believes. Now the question is, does the substantive reason to believe not-p give me a 
reason to change or reduce my present degree of belief in p? 
It might strike one that the matter is settled by the generalization argument. What 
I've argued in this chapter is that entitlement theory is the most plausible epistemic theory 
covering our self-trust in our unsecured moral judgments. I have argued that it follows 
from this start in entitlement that our self-trust generalizes to trust in others. This means 
that we ought to treat others as having a substantive degree of reliability. The 
generalization argument shows that the testimony of a moral peer is substantive on the 
same order as the reasons generated by my own judgments, because, as far as we know, 
the mechanisms generated the reliable judgments are the same. This, I think, is the nail in 
the coffin for moral self-sufficiency. It seems, at least prima facie, that when I judge p 
and then encounter a substantive reason to believe not-p, I ought to reduce my confidence 
in p by some degree.  
There is, however, still the standing possibility that a substantive contrary reason 
to believe not-p will not necessarily constitute a reason to change my degree of 
confidence in p. But this possibility seems prima facie very strange; it seems a general 
rule of rationality is that a substantive reason bearing on the truth of some proposition, p, 
ought to change my degree of confidence. I will consider this possibility at greater length 
in the next chapter; but it strikes me that, in this case, the burden of proof is on defender 
of moral self-sufficiency to show why an agent could be permitted to ignore a substantial 
reason to believe. I raised some reasons earlier why one might dismiss testimonial 
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reasons: that testimonial reasons might be of trivial strength, or of a different order of 
evidentiality. But these considerations have been defeated by the argument from 
generality. The argument from generality shows, from the nature of entitlement and the 
weight of empirical evidence, that other human beings generate reasons from faculties 
that are prima facie as reliable as our own, and thus of a similar order of evidential 
strength. I claim that it is prima facie true that substantive contrary reasons will always 
give one a reason to downgrade one's belief; I will consider particular positions against 
this prima facie principle in the next two chapters.  
 I take the positive part of my argument to be finished; the discussion of peers, 
entitlement theory, and generalization show completes the basic thought as to why we 
ought to treat some others as sufficiently trustworthy such as to allow disagreement to 
have some effect on us. There are several remaining objections to deal with, significantly 
more sophisticated than the arguments from trumping I discussed above. The 
sophisticated arguments will be cognizant of the usefulness of disagreement in many 
empirical reasoning. Thus, the plausible objections will insist on some form of disanalogy 
between empirical disagreement and moral disagreement. I will spend the remainder of 




The Epistemic Case for Dismissal 
 
Given the current range of evidence, moral disagreements can seem more 
threatening than empirical disagreements. Though we are entitled to both realms, our 
empirical abilities are much more satisfactorily corroborated. There is widespread 
empirical agreement on most everyday judgments; furthermore, using our empirical 
abilities we've managed to find a very convincing theory that explains the reliability of 
our empirical abilities. We have far less corroboration in the moral realm, and we have no 
satisfying theory explaining our purported moral abilities. The widespread existence of 
moral disagreement ought to have some significant effect on our moral self-confidence. 
But many people's intuitions, and the position of moral self-sufficiency, reject this: they 
claim that moral disagreement is epistemically unimportant.  
 In the previous chapter, I've argued against moral self-sufficiency by arguing that, 
in any situation of entitlement, we must regard the judgments of our peers as providing 
significant evidence. This is because we are each only one fallible cognitive agent among 
many similar agents. But merely showing that moral testimony is significantly evidential 
is not sufficient to show that disagreement ought have some effect. I must also hold that, 
in the situation of moral disagreement, significant evidence that not-p gives one reason to 
downgrade one own belief that p. Let me call this the open downgrade principle - that my 
belief that p is open to influence from significant evidence to the contrary. I claimed in 
the end of the last chapter that the open downgrade principle was intuitive, and that the 
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burden of proof was on my opponent to refute it. There are several notable opponent 
positions that refuse this step in the case of moral disagreement. These opponents grant 
that moral testimony provides significant evidence, but refuse to grant that this significant 
evidence ought influence our moral beliefs. They are denying that downgrading is 
entirely open; they seek, at the very least, an exception in the case of moral testimony. In 
this way, an opponent could grant my arguments from Chapter 2, and still hang on to 
moral self-sufficiency.  
 I will present only a very brief argument for the general form of the open 
downgrade principle - it seems obvious, and no writer seeks to reject the principle 
entirely. Given that the generalization argument from the previous chapter establishes 
that contrary testimony gives me substantive evidence, and assuming that the open 
downgrade principle is true, then we have vanquished moral self-sufficiency. The 
defender of moral self-sufficiency, then, in order to hold her ground, must insist that open 
downgrading does not apply to moral cases. They must seek an exception from the open 
downgrading principle for moral disagreement. I take this disanalogy to be the most 
plausible remaining path to moral self-sufficiency, and will spend the remainder of this 
dissertation discussing various forms of this response.   
In this chapter, I will examine epistemic arguments for the disanalogy between 
moral and non-moral disagreement; in the next chapter, I will look at arguments from 
moral grounds. I will devote most of this chapter to a consideration of Thomas Kelly's 
epistemic arguments for self-sufficiency.  
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Kelly argues that, in situations of absolute epistemic parity between two 
interlocutors, contrary testimony from another a peer does not transmit. Instead, contrary 
testimony only gives an agent a reason to stop rating their disagreeing interlocutor a peer.  
Kelly's argument applies to moral cases especially, as Kelly himself notes, because, 
though the situation of absolute epistemic parity is quite rare in empirical cases, it is the 
paradigmatic case of moral disagreement. 
I will argue, contra Kelly, that the evidential nature of moral testimony carries 
through to situations of disagreement. I will argue that we may not dismiss the testimony 
of others in the moral case precisely because our moral abilities are defeasible - that is, 
precisely because we have them on an entitlement. I will claim that dismissing the 
opponent depends on a presumption of infallibility in our own cognitive abilities - an 
unreasonable presumption under entitlement.   
 
 
Part I. How vulnerable are our entitlements? 
Before we begin a consideration of Kelly's arguments, I'd like to further consider 
some of the concepts in pay. First, the open downgrade principle: 
 
Open downgrade principle: If I have a reason to believe p, and substantive evidence 




The principle seems intuitively true. It clearly applies to testimony in empirical cases. 
Entitlements are supposed to model certain common sense intuitions of how knowledge 
gathering is supposed to work. If the downgrade principle were false, we would lose 
much everyday reasoning. Consider these two cases: 
  
Case A: It seems to me that there is smoke in the distance, but somebody standing 
next to me disagrees. 
 
Case B: I recall having given an assignment out to my students yesterday, but my 
students disagree. 
 
Imagine how I would reason if the open downgrade principle were false. Case B is the 
easiest. If open downgrading were false, I could treat my memory as providing a settled 
belief. In that case, I could surely conclude that my student have all either 
misremembered or lied. This seems obviously wrongheaded; in Case B, I clearly ought to 
have some reason to suspect my memory. Case A is a little more difficult. It is plainest if 
we multiply the testimony. Imagine that hundreds of people claim there was no smoke in 
the distance. If open downgrading were false, I could discard each individual piece of 
testimony on the basis of its being contrary to my settled belief. But surely I ought not - 
even if the impact of each individual testimony is low, surely in the aggregate I ought to 




 Any entitlement theory which disallows open downgrading in general will fail to 
capture basic intuitions about how knowledge-acquisition and empirical reasoning is 
supposed to go. In order to capture basic intuitions about cognition, entitlements ought to 
be moderately vulnerable to defeat. They shouldn't be too vulnerable, since entitlement 
theory is supposed to provide a relief from endless calls to justification.  For example, it 
shouldn't be such that another's merely pointing out that one doesn't possessing a proof 
for p constitutes a defeat for one's belief that p. The mere question, "How do you know 
your eyes work?" shouldn't, in and of itself, defeat one's entitlements. If, however, one 
receives good evidence that one might have ingested a hallucinogen, or that one might 
actually be a brain in a vat, then one's entitlements ought to be partially or fully defeated. 
A reasonable entitlement theory should provide a relief from trivial challenges, but 
demand that an agent respond to adequate challenges, or face defeat. But where should 
that bar for adequacy be? If we set the bar for adequacy too high, then we lose the 
defeasibility that helps make entitlement so reasonable.  
I cannot hope to specify the criteria for adequate challenges here. Developing a 
complete account of adequacy seems to depend on committing to and developing a 
particular theory of entitlement. But it seems, prima facie, that any reasonable entitlement 
theory should grant that a contrary report from a source of comparable epistemic status 
must constitute an adequate challenge. Entitlement theories are built to model common-
sense intuitions about how knowledge works. In the empirical realm, common sense 
clearly indicates that the presumptions of self-trust are defeasible through social 
pathways. We check our memories against the memories of others, the sensitivity of our 
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tastebuds against the reports of others. It seems, prima facie, that any reasonable 
entitlement theory ought to allow testimony and disagreement to defeat, at least partially, 
my entitlements to self-trust. I will assume that the open downgrading principle is true in 
general. The burden of proof, therefore, is on those who seek an exception to the 




 The most plausible path to blocking the open downgrading principle is the path of 
dismissal. Here, we grant that a peer might affect one's beliefs when one has no judgment 
of one's own on the matter. But once one decides for oneself what one thinks on the 
matter, peer testimony loses all its weight.  Thus, the defender of moral self-sufficiency 
might grant that testimony can provide substantive evidence, but claim that acquiring a 
judgment of my own defuses the evidential weight of contrary testimony. The difference 
between the trumping argument considered in Chapter 2 and this new dismissal argument 
is that the trumping argument maintains that the weight of contrary testimony is 
featherweight but constant, while the dismissal argument allows that contrary testimony 
is initially substantive, but that its evidential weight evaporates for some reason when I 
acquire a judgment of my own. 
 Why might acquiring my own judgment defuse the weight of contrary testimony? 
On first blush, dismissal seems implausible. There seems to be continuity in the reasons 
one has to believe one's interlocutor before and after one has decided for oneself. 
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Suppose that an interlocutor's believing not-p provides me with a reason to believe not-p 
when I have no formed judgment about the matter. I must some reasons for taking my 
interlocutor to be reliable. These reasons for trusting my interlocutor cannot emerge from 
considerations directly pertaining to not-p, because I have no direct considerations to 
believe not-p. The reasons for trusting must, then, emerge from general considerations 
about the reliability of the interlocutor - about their status as an epistemic peer. These 
reasons might include their being well educated or sensitive, or their having a history of 
accuracy in the relevant domain. The fact that I later discover my own reasons that p 
seems to be entirely unrelated to these general considerations for reliability. The reasons I 
have for trusting testimony have to do with the moral reliability of my interlocutor and 
nothing to do with particulars of the situation at hand, while the reasons I have for 
trusting my own judgment have to do with details about the situation at hand and my own 
moral beliefs, and little to do with my interlocutor. The two do not bear directly on each 
other, and so the process of forming my own judgment should have no bearing on my 
reasons for trusting my interlocutor. My trust in my interlocutor should be continuous 
between the situation of having no belief of my own, and the situation of disagreement. 
Thus, after I form my own judgment that p, the considerations for trusting my 
interlocutor, and thus testimonial reasons in favor of not-p, should still be active. This is 
not to say that I don't have plenty of new reasons to believe p; it is simply to say that 
whatever reasons I had to trust my interlocutor that not-p in the first place are still active.  
 But my continuity argument ignores one very crucial interaction between 
peerhood and making up my own mind about the matter. The argument depends on 
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presuming that there is no direct interaction between my trust in my interlocutor's claim 
that not-p and my judgment that p. But there is one very important interaction: through 
the very proposition itself. The very fact that we disagree over p is a reason to reduce my 
trust in another person. After all, one of our primary tools in evaluating another's 
reliability is their agreement with a wide body of conclusions we take to be true. If 
agreement establishes reliability, then disagreement ought establish unreliability.  
 I grant that there is a direct path to downgrading through disagreement, but this 
direct path isn't enough to rescue moral self-sufficiency. This is because, though 
disagreement does give us a reason to downgrade, the downgrading is bilateral. Suppose 
we accept the following principle: 
 
Simple transmission principle: The fact that a rational source, S, disagrees with a 
trusted judgment, J, is a reason to downgrade confidence in S in proportion to one's 
confidence in J. 
 
The simple transmission principle seems perfectly reasonable to me, but in a situation of 
disagreement, the principle applies to both sides of the disagreement. My interlocutor and 
I are both rational sources, and each us is in conflict with some judgment that we have an 
antecedent reason to trust. There is downgrading through disagreement, but the 
downgrading is bilateral. Even if the initial self-confidence is of a different degree from 
my trust in my interlocutor, this only shows that the resultant downgrading is 
asymmetric. This form of disagreement-based downgrading cannot eliminate my trust in 
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my interlocutor entirely, because simple transmission is bilateral, and thus the ensuing 
downgrading is bilateral. 
Simple transmission is correct, but it does not block the core insight of the 
continuity argument. The original reasons to trust my interlocutor are continuous before 
I've made up my mind on the matter, and after. Once I make up my mind, I have acquired 
one new reason to downgrade my interlocutor - namely, that they disagree with me on 
this one issue - but I still have all the old reasons to trust. Since neither side is guaranteed, 
both sides must downgrade their trust in each other and in themselves.  
 
 
Problems with self-discounting?  
Bilateral downgrading requires an attitude that might seem odd: it requires that I 
reflect on myself and render a judgment about my own reliability. I must treat myself as 
an authoritative source in such a way that I can stand back from that source and assign it 
a reliability rating. Bilateral downgrading requires that I treat my own judgments as 
having some qualified degree of reliability.  
This may seems a strangely distant relationship to have with one's own capacity 
for judgment. The strangeness of this reflective, self-discounting stance is captured very 
well by David Enoch.40 He argues that discounting one's own all-things-considered 
judgment results in a circularity. If you and I are both holding thermometers, and our 
thermometers disagree, says Enoch, it makes perfect sense for us to qualify our trust in 
                                                
40 Enoch (2011) 
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our thermometers. But this depends crucially on the fact that a thermometer is separate 
from our rational faculties, says Enoch. One cannot separate oneself from one's all-
things-considered judgment; one cannot treat oneself as a mere truthometer. One cannot 
make a final all-things-considered judgment then discount one's confidence in it by some 
amount, because that latter, post-discounted judgment is one's all-things-considered 
judgment. Self-discounting isn't possible, says Enoch, because of the ineradicability of 
the first-person stance.  
Enoch's argument seems to me quite plausible, but his argument applies only to 
discounting one's final, all-things-considered judgments. One can come to distrust a sub-
faculty or particular process without running aground of the circularity - we do it all the 
time, and are surely reasonable in doing so. One can, for example, come to distrust one's 
memory - by, for example, discovering that one's memory for faces is quite poor. 
 To the degree that one's moral judgment depends on a subset of one's general 
reasoning abilities, then one can stand back from them and coherently engage in 
substantive self-distrust. It is no more paradoxical than standing back and using my 
cognition in general to discover evidence that my mathematical ability is poor, or that my 
ability to judge the character of people was poor. What's important here is that my 
general cognitive abilities are distinct from my domain-specific abilities. That is, my 
confidence in, for example, my mathematical judgments will have two parts: first, the 
output of my mathematical process, and second, my evaluation of my own ability to 
perform the mathematical process. A student that knows themselves to by very shaky 
mathematically can perform the mathematical calculation to the best of their ability, but 
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have reflective doubt in that calculation. The only thing that Enoch's argument forbids us 
from doing is discounting our all-things-considered judgment. The output of my 
mathematical operations is not an all-things-considered judgment, for it leaves out 
reflective information of the reliability of my mathematical abilities.  
Self-discounting can happen for any subset of reasoning, but it is particularly 
pertinent for sealed cognitive faculties. One's memory and raw vision are, in an important 
sense, particularly like thermometers - they are faculties quite distinct from one's general 
cognitive faculties, and not entirely transparent to introspection. Since we cannot get 
inside them introspectively and check the steps and proper functioning of the 
mechanisms, we must rely on external data for reliability. We must look to their outputs, 
and check their outputs against the outputs of other purportedly reliable sources. Raw 
moral intuition, to the degree that it emerges without introspection and explicit reasoning, 
is sensitive to self-discounting for these same reasons.  
Self-discounting is possible precisely because our reasoning process is divisible, 
and some of those sub-divisions are particularly vulnerable to self-discounting because 
they are sealed to introspection. Enoch-style considerations provide no viable pathway to 
moral self-sufficiency. In fact, the seeming reliance of most moral reasoning on raw 
moral intuitions make moral reasoning more susceptible to downgrading than other, more 
introspectively transparent cognitive processes. 
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Part II. Introducing Thomas Kelly 
 Thomas Kelly presents, in "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," what I 
believe to be the best contemporary argument that disagreement in and of itself ought 
have no effect. His argument presents a sophisticated block to the open downgrading 
principle. His argument is strictly an analysis of how we ought to reason about 
disagreements; it makes no special reference to the epistemic status of the positions held 
on either side. In fact, I will claim that Thomas Kelly's analysis suppresses crucial 
epistemic considerations.  
 Kelly has two arguments for the epistemic of insignificance of disagreement. The 
first argument is that we only rate others as peers based on agreement; for once we 
disagree with somebody on some topic, we ought to stop regarding them as a peer on that 
topic. Thus we will never be in the situation where we disagree with a peer. The second 
argument is that we ought take testimony to be weighty, but only as a proxy for the 
evidence itself. But once I see the evidence and reasons for myself, the testimony has no 
further weight in and of itself. Once I've settled the matter for myself, contrary testimony 
can only give me reason to reduce my trust in the testifier. I will discuss each of these 
arguments at length momentarily.  
 Kelly's arguments concern the nature of disagreement in general, but they have a 
particular application to moral disagreement. Kelly's arguments depend on there being 
epistemic parity between the disagreeing parties; disagreement only doesn't count when 
the agent has access to the all the same evidence and reasons as my interlocutor. But, in 
most empirical disagreements, I can easily suppose that my interlocutor might have 
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access to evidence and reasons that I don't. As a result, most empirical disagreements fall 
outside of the scope of Kelly's conclusions. But the paradigmatically problematic moral 
disagreements are the ones where both parties have access to the same evidence. 
Distinctively moral disagreements occur when we agree on the straightforward facts of 
the matter, and only disagree in our moral assessment. Kelly's conclusions may apply to a 
few rare empirical cases, but seem to apply to all the cases I take to be paradigmatic of 
troubling moral disagreements, for precisely the reasons that I take them to be 
paradigmatic - that they are long-standing disagreements between peers. Kelly himself 
explicitly claims this his arguments apply to such paradigmatic cases of moral 
disagreement, and takes the dismissal of such moral disagreements to be one of the major 
consequences of his argument.   
 For the remainder of this chapter, I will take up Kelly as the best representative of 
moral self-sufficiency on epistemic grounds. I will argue that Kelly's argument leaves out 
a crucial factor of most moral disagreements: the fallibility and defeasibility of the 
involved faculties. Kelly's arguments succeed when our judgments are non-defeasible - 
perhaps, for example, short logical proofs - but fail when our judgments depend on 
defeasible faculties. Thus, they may succeed for those moral judgments that are grounded 
in non-defeasible proofs - but they will fail in any cases where an agents' confidence in 
her moral judgments depends on an entitlement to a loose judgment, including any 





Kelly's conclusion, and its scope 
Kelly's discussion of disagreement focuses on the question of how we ought to 
weight contrary testimony.41 He grants that testimony has weight when an agent has no 
judgment of her own, but claims that testimony contrary to an agent's considered 
judgment has no weight in a situation of epistemic parity. I'd like to begin by discussing 
the scope of his conclusion. 
It is easy to think, contra Kelly, that contrary testimony from a rational, reliable 
person ought to have some sort of weight. As I've argued in previous chapters, this 
position of weighting contrary testimony arises naturally from two basic epistemic 
commitments. First, we think testimony can often furnish reasons to believe. We often 
rely on the observations of other people - eyewitnesses in jury trials, fellow scientists 
publishing experimental data. We also rely on the judgments of experts - our doctor, our 
car mechanic. If contrary testimony provides an undismissed good reason to believe the 
contrary of our own judgment, then, prima facie, it seems it should reduce our confidence 
in our own judgment.  
Kelly's position navigates between these commitments. He allows that 
disagreement can provide reasons to believe in many circumstances, but in those cases it 
is not the mere fact of disagreement that's doing the work. Rather, what's doing the work 
is the fact that one's disagreeing interlocutor has access to information or abilities one 
does not. Once we pare away all these other factors, and look at the impact of only the 
disagreement itself, claims Kelly, we will see that disagreement in and of itself can have 
                                                
41 Kelly (2006) 
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no effect. His claim is quite specific: he claims that contrary testimony has no weight in a 
situation of epistemic parity. Parties are in epistemic parity regarding p if and only if:  
 
1. They are approximately as intelligent, well-educated, and rational in general. 
2. They possess the same body of evidence as to p.  
 
Individuals who satisfy both conditions relative to each other are considered each others' 
epistemic peers on the topic of p.  
There are plenty of cases where do we take contrary testimony, but Kelly explains 
them away as deriving from situations of epistemic non-parity. Thus, Kelly's claim is 
compatible with many everyday uses of testimony. One scientist may weight the contrary 
claims of another scientist, because the other scientist has access to evidence that that the 
first does not - different observational data from a different clinical trial, perhaps. The 
claims that my math professor makes about the wrongness of my proof has weight 
because my math professor is better educated than me in the relevant domain. The 
controversial situations, says Kelly, are those where "I have a firmly-held belief, [and] 
there are some who disagree with me whose judgment cannot be simply discounted by 
appeal to considerations of intelligence, thoughtfulness, or ignorance of the relevant 
data."42  
Kelly's description of epistemic parity fits precisely my paradigmatically 
important cases of moral disagreement. Thus, Kelly and I are in precise opposition on this 
                                                
42 Kelly (2006), p 2 
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core set of cases. Claims Kelly, "once I have thoroughly scrutinized the available 
evidence and arguments that bear on some question, the mere fact that an epistemic peer 
strongly disagrees with me about how that question should be answered does not itself 
tend to undermine the rationality of my continuing to believe as I do."43 Continuing to 
"confidently retain my original view in the face of such disagreement" is not irrational, 
says Kelly, and "might very well be the uniquely reasonable response."44 Thus, Kelly can 
explain away many of the everyday cases of the seeming weightiness disagreement as 
situations of epistemic disparity; his arguments target quite specifically the weight of 
another agent's judgment to the contrary from an identical set of evidence.  
 Kelly intends his conclusion to cover moral disagreements. One of his three basic 
examples of dismissable disagreement is the issue of whether "Truman's decision [to drop 
the atomic bomb] was morally justified."45 Moral cases like the Truman case are apt 
targets for Kelly's arguments, in virtue of his conditions for epistemic parity. His 
argument only applies when we believe ourselves to have all the same evidence as our 
interlocutor, and take ourselves to have fully scrutinized that evidence. These strict 
criteria for epistemic peerhood will rarely apply in everyday cases of disagreement over 
empirical matters of fact, but such disagreement between epistemic peers is the 
paradigmatic situation of the epistemically significant moral disagreement. I take it that 
we are supposed to image a dispute between two contemporary interlocutors about 
Truman's historical decision. Since the Truman case is historical, and thoroughly public, 
                                                
43 Kelly (2006), p 4 
44 Kelly (2006), p 5 
45 Kelly (2006), p 1 
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then most ordinary moral disputants would be in an identical epistemic relationship to the 
facts of the matter. The strictly moral disagreement occurs once we've reached agreement 
about all the pertinent historical facts.46 Kelly's conditions of peerhood are precisely the 
conditions of moral disagreement raised in favor of moral skepticism. The reason why 
intractable moral disagreement are supposedly so epistemically remarkable is that they 
survive even after we've agreed on the description of the state of affairs in question.  
 Thus, I take Kelly to be making an exemplary argument for the dismissal of 
contrary testimony on epistemic grounds.47 His argument is not targeted at moral 
disagreements uniquely; rather, they are targeted at the category of disagreements in 
situations of epistemic parity. If Kelly is right, his claims will fit quite neatly with the 
intuitions that dismissal is rarely warranted in empirical matters, but are par for course in 
moral matters - since epistemic parity is so rare in empirical disagreement, and so 
common in moral disagreement. Thus, Kelly's model neatly fit our intuitions of the 
disanalogy between empirical disagreement and moral disagreement, without invoking 
any special properties of moral disagreements. It's simply an empirical feature of moral 
disagreements that they often occur in situations of epistemic parity. Furthermore, Kelly's 
arguments fit many of the intuitions about which cases moral self-sufficiency applies to. 
Most of my opponents grant that moral disagreement matters in various side-cases - for 
example, in moral education, when I am young and inexperienced, and you are wise in 
                                                
46 Even we consider moral intuitions to be a form of evidence, that, too, can be shared - I may know that 
my friend sees it as entirely obvious that mass murder is never justified, and she knows that I see it as 
undeniable that killing is often justified in the defense of one's country.  
47 Kelly's argument strictly concerns the question of whether contrary testimony may be dismissed on 
epistemic grounds. The question of whether contrary testimony may be dismissed on moral grounds - say, 
as a violation of personal integrity or moral autonomy - is a separate issue, which I take up in Chapter 4. 
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the ways of the world; or, for example, in taking advice on how to deal with an angry 
girlfriend, from somebody who has more knowledge and experience about her inner 
workings. But for the paradigmatic moral disagreements, the ones where we seem to have 
access to all the same facts and reasons, the intuitions seems to be that here we ought to 
make up our minds for ourselves. This split in intuitions is again captured precisely by 
Kelly's criterion of epistemic parity. 
 
 
Part III: Kelly and the Argument from the Evaluation of Rationality 
Kelly has two significant arguments for his conclusion, which I will consider 
separately. His first argument proceeds from an analysis of the grounds for judging others 
to be peers. Before I present Kelly's actual argument here, I would like to discuss a more 
primitive version, which I'll call the direct argument. Though the direct argument is 
obviously flawed, it will be useful to make these flaws as clear as possible, for these 
flaws recur in subtler form in Kelly's sophisticated version.   
The direct argument claims that, if I've judged that p, and you offer testimony that 
not-p, then I can dismiss your testimony precisely because you believe not-p when really, 
it's p. Your belief that not-p is direct evidence that you've failed to reason well about p. 
Suppose I've read some arguments and made up my mind that it's wrong to eat animals. 
My friend, who is as philosophically astute as me, claims he thinks that it's right to eat 
animals. Normally I would give some weight to my friend's advice, but here, I already 
know it's wrong to eat animals, and so I may, on the basis of this knowledge, conclude 
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that my friend is wrong in this case. And, since I know he's wrong, I should accord his 
contrary testimony no weight. In the direct argument, my assurance that p underwrites 
my dismissal of any interlocutor that believes not-p.  
The direct argument violates the open downgrading principle and bilateral 
downgrading. The direct argument depends on an agent's treating themselves as 
infallible. Without the presumption of infallibility, direct dismissal would be circular - I'd 
be settling the question of whether or not I was reliable in judging p by referring to my 
judgment that p. But the presumption of infallibility is unreasonable under entitlement 
theory, as we have already seen. The direct argument depends on, at best, a terrible sort 
of rational egotism, and, at worst, solipsism.  
Kelly presents an improved version of the direct argument that lacks this 
commitment to rational egotism. He freely grants that we are epistemically fallible and 
that we are each but one rational being among many. But, argues Kelly: 
 
Whether we find the possibility of disagreement intellectually threatening, I suggest, will and should 
ultimately depend on our considered judgment about how rational the merely possible dissenters 
might be in so dissenting. And our assessment of whether rational dissent is possible with respect to 
some question (or our assessment of the extent to which such dissent might be rational) will depend 
in turn on our assessment of the strength of the evidence and arguments that might be put forward 
on behalf of such dissent. But if this is correct, then the extent to which merely possible dissent 
should be seen as intellectually threatening effectively reduces to questions about the strength of the 
reasons that might be put forward on behalf of such dissent… The role of disagreement, whether 
possible or actual, ultimately proves superfluous or inessential...48 49 
 
                                                
48 Kelly (2006), pp 18-19 
49 Kelly talks about the possibility of disagreement here, rather than the existence of actual disagreement, 
because he thinks that possible disagreement is more important than the existence of actual disagreement. 
This is because actual disagreement is vulnerable to non-rational forms of resolution - for example, a tyrant 
may remove disagreement by having all disagreers put to the death. I do not believe the distinction has any 
importance for my discussion.  
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Provided that we are in the situation of epistemic parity, Kelly argues that our evaluation 
of the epistemic weight of the disagreement of an interlocutor will depend on our 
evaluation of the rationality of that interlocutor. This in turn depends on our evaluation of 
the strength of their reasons. If their reasons seem poor, then we will dismiss the 
interlocutor. And, in making a judgment contrary to theirs, I'm judging that their reasons 
are, in fact, poor. In short, once I settle for myself that p, I cannot judge that somebody is, 
or could be, rationally dissenting with me on p - for their very dissent shows that they are, 
to the best of my own ability to judge, not rational on the issue. I will call this the 
argument from the evaluation of rationality, or the argument from evaluation, for short.  
 Kelly's argument from evaluation, though similar in spirit to the direct argument, 
avoids the latter's commitment to rational egotism. It is predicated not on an agent's 
taking themselves to be infallible, but on an agent's epistemic limitations. We cannot 
know automatically whether the people around us are rational and reliable; we need 
grounds for evaluating them. The only way to judge the reliability of others is by their 
outputs, and the only way to judge those outputs is in terms of what I take to be correct.50 
We trust others based on their agreement with us. Thus, in situations of disagreement, the 
direction of downgrading must always be in the favor of our judgments over interlocutor 
testimony - not because we are infallible, but because the only way we can assess 
interlocutor peerhood is through agreement with what we take to be the case, which, in 
turn, we can only access through our judgments.51 In other words: since others' agreement 
with one's own judgments is the source of one's trust in others, then we would be 
                                                
50 Kelly's argument here seems to follow the lines of Davidson's comments on radical translation. 
51 Kelly's argument here has a passing resemblance to Donald Davidson's discussions of radical translation. 
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unreasonable in trusting another above and beyond their agreement with us. Our 
epistemic limitations pervade every aspect of our reasoning, including our ability to 
evaluate the rationality of others. For Kelly, it is not that we know ahead of time that we 
are infallible or that they are irrational; it's that our confidence in their rationality can 
never exceed our confidence in our own.  
This argument I take to be a significant improvement on the direct argument; it 
falls, however, to a more sophisticated version of the same problem. 
 
 
The Unity of Rationality 
 Kelly's argument for dismissal from the evaluation of rationality is incorrect; it 
depends on a radically disunified conception of rationality. Suppose that Tim takes John 
to be an epistemic peer, such that John's believing something is sufficient to give Tim 
some reason to believe it. Suppose that Tim has a settled judgment that p. Then, he meets 
John, and John claims the contrary. If Kelly's argument is to work, then the mere fact of 
disagreement over p alone must be sufficient grounds for Tim to think John entirely 
unreliable on the topic of p. Kelly's argument depends on the truth of the following 
principle: 
 
Disagreement Dismissal Principle  (DDP): An interlocutor's believing against one's 
settled judgment that p is sufficient grounds to dismiss that interlocutor as entirely 




On what grounds could DDP rest? It might rest on the claim that agreement was the sole 
grounds for taking the interlocutor to be reliable in the first place. 
 
Agreement as Sole Grounds Principle (ASGP): The only relevant evidence of an 
interlocutor's reliability on the issue of p is their agreement with one's independent 
judgment on the issue of p.  
 
If the only reason to trust an interlocutor on the topic of p is agreement on the particular 
topic of p itself, then disagreement would indeed rob one of all of one's grounds for 
trusting that interlocutor. Thus, ASGP supports DDP. But ASGP is obviously absurd. As 
one consequence of ASGP, I could never gather new beliefs from testimony. If I had no 
belief on whether p or not-p, I could never have the grounds to trust anybody's testimony 
on the matter.  
But we do gather new beliefs from testimony all the time. It follows, then, that 
ASGP is false, and that there must be more general ways to establish an agent's 
rationality on p than their agreement with me that p. This latter claim is quite everyday. I 
trust my mechanic's claim that it's the fuel injection system that's the problem, not 
because he agrees with my judgment about the fuel injection system, but because he's 
fixed my car in the past, and he seems to know his way around an engine, and he has 
many satisfied customers. It's a good thing that I can do this, because I know nothing 
about fuel injections whatsoever. I trust a restaurant reviewer's recommendation based on 
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the degree to which the seem to express sensitivity and passion, the sort of details they 
pick up on, and their past reliability on other restaurants. If I had to agree with the 
restaurant reviewer on a particular restaurant before I could trust his recommendation of 
that restaurant, then the whole enterprise of recommending restaurants would be useless.   
AGSP rests on a presupposition of the radical disunity of rationality. It supposes 
that that we judge others to be peers proposition by proposition, and that success on one 
proposition confers no probability of success on a related proposition. But AGSP must be 
wrong; in order for ordinary social knowledge gathering to work, there must be some 
other means to assess reliability on a particular topic than agreement on that very topic, 
and that very topic alone. My argument against AGSP here is, in a way, an extension of 
the old puzzle about teaching. If the only way to be able to judge that a teacher is a good 
teacher of a particular domain is to already have domain-specific knowledge, then finding 
a good teacher to start learning about a new domain would be impossible. Since we can 
find good teachers for new domains, then there must be other ways to judge good 
teachers besides domain-specific knowledge. There must be general signs of intelligence, 
wisdom, and ability that we can recognize that allow us to form reasonable judgments 
about who is likely to be, say, a good teacher of pottery, when we presently know nothing 
about pottery.  
 But if we drop ASGP, then Kelly's argument from the evaluation of rationality 
fails. Once we drop the commitment to disunity, we will see that we are allowed many 
forms of evidence that somebody is reliable on the topic of p, of which agreement on p 
itself is merely one. For example, let us say that Fred contests my claim that the proper 
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etymology of "knight errant" is "knight on an errand." I have a good reason to believe 
that my etymology is correct - I remember reading it somewhere, and it makes sense to 
me. And so I have good reason to disbelieve Fred. But I know many other things about 
Fred - he's smart, he's well-read, he's good a good memory, and he's often right about 
neat historical facts. So I have all these reasons to think that he's right, and I'm wrong. It 
is very likely that this trust in Fred is not enough to settle the matter conclusively against 
my own judgment, but it surely worth something. In other words, if we drop ASGP, then 
the following must be true: 
 
Other Grounds Principle (OGP): There is relevant evidence for an interlocutor's  
reliability on the topic of p, other than agreement with one's independent judgment 
that p. 
 
But the argument from evaluation fails to completely eliminate contrary testimony, once 
we grant OGP.  
 The only way to make DDP true in the face of the eminent truth of OGP is by 
subscribing to the following principle: 
 
Disagreement Trumping Principle (DTP): An interlocutor's disagreement with my 
settled judgment on the topic of p yields evidence that the interlocutor is entirely 





If DTP were true, then OGP wouldn't matter. The general reasons for trusting Fred would 
be trumped by the specific reason that he believes the wrong thing. But DTP fails for the 
same reason that the direct argument fails: it presumes the infallibility of my own 
judgment. If we grant the possibility of our own fallibility, then bilateral downgrading 
applies once again. All the specific reasons I have to believe in my etymology are also 
reasons to think that Fred is unreliable here, and all the reasons I have to think that Fred 
is reliable are evidence that I am unreliable. In short, if I have evidence that p, and my 
interlocutor disagrees, my evidence that p would be only one reason to dismiss them 
against many reasons to trust them. It may be that my reason to believe is rather strong, 
and my reason to trust them is rather weak - I just read the etymology in a book the other 
day, and Fred's kind of absentminded and prone to invention. Or it might be the reverse - 
my memory for this sort of thing is only mediocre, but Fred's memory for trivia is 
spectacular. In either case, the principle of bilateral downgrading applies, and so 
complete dismissal and elimination is impossible. After disagreement, we may accord our 
interlocutor less epistemic weight, but we still accord them some epistemic weight.  
 In order to support the crucial DDP, Kelly is driven either to subscribe to a 
radically disunified view of rationality, or to the same problematic egotism that made the 
direct argument unpalatable. Since both are untenable, we must reject DDP - and without 






Why would somebody, then, subscribe to DDP in the first place? Perhaps it is 
because the crucial AGSP is very similar to some other, very plausible principles. Take, 
for instance: 
  
Contraries Undermine Principle (CUP): Disagreement with my best judgment on the 
issue of p is good evidence against an agent's rational reliability on the issue of p. 
 
CUP is quite sensible, but it won't yield elimination. CUP yields that disagreement is a 
reason to think that a disagreeing interlocutor is unreliable. But it doesn't say 
disagreement and agreement are the only reasons bearing on the reliability of the 
interlocutor on this topic. CUP leaves the door open to bilateral downgrading. CUP is 
correct, and may lead to a reduction of confidence in my interlocutor, but it will not yield 
complete elimination. 
 Another principle, very subtly different from CUP, is: 
 
Correctness Principle (CP): The only relevant evidence for me of an agent's rational 
reliability on the issue of p is their correctness about p. 
 
This principle seems almost tautological. But it will not provide us with elimination, 
because of the epistemic space between "my best judgment about p", and "correctness 
about p". In short, in order to apply CP, I would need direct, antecedent access to the 
114 
 
truth of p - which I don't have. In order to eliminate an agent entirely using CP, I would 
need to be entirely confident about my judgment that p. But I can't be - at the very least, 
because I have a piece of undismissed contrary evidence from a reliable resource. CP 
requires a god's eye view.  
Though both these principles are plausible, neither will support Kelly's argument 
here. The crucial move for Kelly is the claim that our evaluation of the rationality of a 
dissenter on a given topic depends solely on our evaluation of their evidence and reasons 
for their belief on that topic. I have argued that this claim depends on an excessively 
limited view of what may contribute to an evaluation of an interlocutor's rationality. Once 
we see that we must allow more sources of evidence for the rationality of others, the 
argument from evaluation falls.  
 
  
Part IV: Kelly on Independent Reasoning and Proxies 
 Kelly's second argument for dismissal is based on the importance of independent 
reasoning. The mere fact of disagreement ought not have any weight, Kelly argues, over 
and above any convincing force that the arguments advanced by the other side have. 
Once again, his argument is a sophisticated version of a more primitive argument. I will 





Rejecting all testimony 
 The primitive claim is simply that we ought never simply take another's word for 
something. One might think that other people can point us to evidence we haven't seen, or 
introduce us to reasoning we haven't thought though ourselves, but may never simply tell 
us what to believe. To make this claim, one must subscribe to the following principle: 
 
No Testimony Principle (NTP): The mere fact that a trustworthy source testifies that p 
cannot give one a reason to believe p.  
 
NTP implies that an interlocutor may only point out new evidence and present argument 
for me to judge, but that I must evaluate the evidence and think through the arguments 
myself.  
But NTP is utterly absurd. To summarize various considerations from earlier in 
this dissertation: NTP makes all forms of testimony unusable, but testimony is vital to 
broad swaths of human activity. Very convincing work has already been done on this 
subject. Annette Baier has argued that any form of cooperative human activity requires 
trust (1986, 1992). John Hardwig (2005) argues effectively that without trust in 
testimony, much of our normal epistemic life would be impossible. Legal trials depend 
on using the observations of others - when a jury hears eyewitness testimony, they are 
taking another person's word for evidence that they cannot observe for themselves. 
Modern scientific work depends essentially on using the observations of others, argues 
Hardwig. A scientist can't observe every experimental result herself; she has to accept the 
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experimental reports of other scientists in other laboratories. Furthermore, she can't work 
out every result from all related fields of science and mathematics myself. She simply 
don't have time to collect the data herself, perform the statistical analysis herself, etc. etc. 
She has to trust not only the observations, but the judgments of other scientists.  
NTP is too a stringent a requirement for human lives. If NTP were true, for 
example, I could not ask somebody what time it was and take their word for it; I would 
have to see the watch for myself. There is simply far too much evidence for a single 
person to sort through on her own. Science, and much of daily life, requires the 
delegation of epistemic tasks.  
 
 
Double Counting and Faculties 
 NTP is obviously flawed; it forbids us from ever using testimony in any sensible 
way. Any successful argument claiming the importance of independent reasoning must 
allow for such everyday uses of testimony. Defenders of moral self-sufficiency must 
allow for some unavoidable uses of testimony, while dismissing testimony in situations 
of peer disagreement. 
Kelly's presents a novel model of the use of testimony, which aims to avoid the 
flaws of NTP, while stop arguing for essential epistemic self-sufficiency. Kelly claims 
that we use testimony only as a proxy for the testifiers' actual grounds. That is, if 
somebody reliable believes p, and I have no idea what their grounds are, I may treat their 
belief that p as indicating the presence of good reasons for p, without actually knowing 
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what those reasons are. For instance - if you run in shouting that there's an elephant 
running around loose outside of the circus, then I may use your claim to justify a belief 
that there is such an elephant. But it's not your belief in the elephant that's doing the 
work; it's your presumed grounds. I assume that you either saw the elephant, or had 
sufficient grounds to infer that there was an elephant. I use those presumed grounds to 
justify my belief - I can't say what those grounds are exactly, but I have reason to think 
they're good grounds. After all, you're a rational person, and you believe it, so you 
probably have good grounds.  
 But a proxy is merely a stand-in for the evidence. Once I go into the circus tent 
and come into direct, unmediated contact with the evidence, your testimony plays no 
further role. I cannot add your testimony as to the elephant to my seeing the elephant and 
be doubly sure. Rather, my seeing the elephant for myself replaces your testimonial 
proxy and renders the testimony epistemically unimportant. I no longer need a proxy for 
the evidence, since I have the evidence for myself. 
Instead of NTP, Kelly subscribes to the following principle: 
 
No Mere Belief Principle (NMBP): The mere fact that another rational being 
believes p, in and of itself, can never be a grounds for one's believing p. 
 
NMBP is compatible with the use of testimony as evidence of other matters. The fact that 
you believe makes it likely that you have good grounds, and those implied grounds can 
serve as the grounds for my own belief. But once I've seen the actual grounds for your 
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belief and decided for myself that they're no good, then the mere fact that you disagree 
plays no further role.  
 Here's the argument in Kelly's terminology. Imagine that I believe H, on the basis 
of some set of non-testimonial evidence, E. Suppose that I discover that you also believe 
H, on the basis of the very same body of evidence. I shouldn't treat our agreement as 
further confirmation of H - that would be double-counting the evidence.  
 
I am thus in the awkward position of treating your belief that H as a reason to believe that H, despite 
the fact that you do not treat this as an epistemically relevant consideration. Again, it might make 
sense for me to treat your belief in this way if I lacked access to your first-order evidence: in that 
case, your belief stands in as a sort of proxy for the evidence on which it is based... But when I do 
have access to your first-order evidence for H, and I continue to treat the belief that you have 
formed in response to that evidence as a further reason to believe that H, aren't I essentially engaged 
in a kind of double-counting with respect to the relevant evidence?52 
 
When I list my evidence, E, for believing H, I may not enter the fact that I myself believe 
H as additional evidence for H. That would be double counting the evidence, for the 
belief that H, in some sense, is simply a recapitulation of E. This is the basic case of 
double-counting. Therefore, Kelly argues, if I were to use the fact that you believed H as 
a further reason for my believing H, that would be making precisely the same mistake. 
Since H is just a proxy for some set of evidence, E, and your believing H is just a proxy 
for that same set of evidence, E, then entering your belief in H as part of my body of 
evidence, E, would make the same error of double-counting as in the basic case.  
 There is something quite intuitive about this argument. Imagine, for example, that 
you and I just read the same history book. Let us suppose, for simplicity's sake, that we 
read the same physical copy. Suppose I were to cite some bit of trivia from it at a cocktail 
                                                
52 Kelly (2006), p 26 
119 
 
party, and you were to agree that the bit of trivia was, in fact, true. Furthermore, suppose 
we know that both of us claim this bit of trivia solely on the basis of having read it from 
the same copy of the same book.  I shouldn't use your agreement as further evidence. 
Since our grounds our identical - that is, since our grounds is that this one particular 
history book says so - counting your agreement as further evidence would be basically 
counting the same book twice. My belief and your belief appear to be independent, but 
since they are based on the same evidence, they are actually not independent at all; 
increasing our confidence by taking both belief into account would be double-counting. 
 Thus, if Kelly's model is correct, we may use testimony in those cases when we 
have no access to the evidence ourselves, but once we do, the testimony loses all 
epistemic value. Using testimony and our own evaluation of the evidence would be 
double-counting. Thus, the model supports a sophisticated form of self-sufficiency, 
applicable to all cases of disagreement under epistemic parity. 
 
 
Confirmation and agreement 
 Kelly's double-counting argument makes a fundamental mistake. It presents an 
oversimplified view of the relationship between all-things-considered beliefs and first-
order evidence. Kelly claims that my using my own judgment that H as a further reason 
for my believing H is double counting. This much I will grant. But he also claims that my 
using your judgment that H as a further reason for my believing that H is double counting 
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on the same grounds. But this is a mistake, for my relationship to my own judgment is 
quite different from my relation to your judgment.  
When I take my own judgment that H as a further reason that H, I've added no 
piece of evidence. When I take your judgment that H as a further reason that H, I have 
added a further piece of evidence - namely, that your rational faculties are in agreement 
with mine. When I take the fact that we agree into consideration, I'm not doubling the 
evidence - I'm taking the agreement as further grounds to believe that both our rational 
faculties are functioning well in judging from the evidence. When I think I see a ship in 
the distance, and you chime in and say you see it too, this increases my confidence. But 
I'm not increasing my confidence by entering into my epistemic accounting the claim 
"There is a ship there" twice. I'm entering the claim, "I see a ship there", and the distinct 
claim, "Your eyes also see the same ship." There is added data here, for agreement is a 
form of confirmation of my own eye's reliability. That is, what I'm adding with the 
agreement is not the ship, again, but the fact that my visual system has been confirmed by 
another purportedly reliable source. This process of confirmation is nothing strange - it is, 
in fact, incredibly mundane. It happens when students in a math study group solves the 
same problem independently, then checks to see if they agree with each other. If they all 
got the same answer, this is good evidence that they did things right (though not certain 
evidence). The fact that their rational faculties agree is a reason to think they've all 
mastered the skill.  
 The double-counting argument would only work if an agent's believing in H 
reduced entirely to E, the evidence for H. But it doesn't. Belief in H depends both on the 
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evidence, and my faculties and skills for evaluating that evidence. It makes sense that I 
can't treat my belief that H as further evidence for H. I've used one body of evidence, and 
my own faculties, to arrive at H. The fact that I believe H adds no extra data to the 
reasons to believe H. But your believing H, though it may involve the same body of 
external evidence as my believing H, also introduces new information about the 
deployment and output of a distinct agent's faculties and skills. When I take into account 
the fact the you agree with me that H, on the basis of H, what I'm taking from you is not 
E again, but the further fact that your faculties are functioning similarly to mine in this 
case.   
 Imagine that you and I read the same book in college, ten years ago. I claim a bit 
of trivia from it, and you agree. This agreement does in fact add confirmatory weight. 
The original, external evidence is precisely the same between us, but the agreement adds 
a degree of confirmation to the proper functioning of our faculty of memory. We're not 
adding in the information that there's another book that also claims this fact; we're adding 
that we both remember the same thing about the same book, and so are less likely to be in 
error about what we remember.  
 In precisely the same way, the fact that somebody disagrees with my evaluation of 
the same evidence is not some strange double-existence of the evidence in opposite forms 
- it's the same evidence, and two different judgments based on the evidence. Kelly's 
mistake, in thinking that judgments are a proxy for evidence, is to think that there's no 
distance between the evidence and the judgment. It's to think that our judgment is simply 
a transparent window to the evidence. But there is distance. In most everyday judgments, 
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we deploy some fallible faculty. This is why we use disagreement and agreement as 
checks on functioning. If two of us use the same data and perform the same calculation, 
and we get the same result, this is confirmatory. If we get different results, this is 
evidence that something has gone wrong with one of our calculations. It may be that it's 
more likely to have gone wrong with my calculation rather than yours or vice versa, 
depending our degree of ability and our present degree of drunkenness and so forth. But 
the mere fact that a judgment is mine doesn't guarantee it. At least not when the judgment 
relies on defeasible faculties.  
Now, there is an imaginable response on Kelly's behalf: that what I've shown is 
not that the double-counting argument is wrong, but that two agents are never in true 
epistemic parity. They always have access to different data; I have access to the data of 
my eyes, and you have access to the data of your eyes, I have access to my own reasoning 
faculties, and you have access to yours, etc. etc. In that case, Kelly's claim is true but 
vacuously fulfilled; there would be no disagreements could fit that criterion of epistemic 
parity, because no two agents could ever truly be in a relationship of true parity. In any 
case, I think the central insight of my argument remains the same: in any possible 
disagreement, there will be some epistemic information that will alter the all-things-
considered judgments of the involved parties. The information is reflective information 
about the agents' own well-functioning. Kelly's insight about double-counting might 
explains why I don't treat the belief of others as equally important as mine, but it cannot 





Proofs and Entitlement 
 The prominent role of fallible, defeasible faculties in the preceding discussion 
also points out exactly those conditions under which Kelly's argument would, in fact, be 
plausible. In order for the Kelly double-counting argument to eliminate disagreement 
entirely, my judgment p must be sealed against the possibility of faculty malfunction. 
Let's start with a degenerate case, for simplicity's sake. If, for example, my evidence was 
p, and my judgment was that, in fact, p, then there's no work done by any fallible 
faculties of judgment, and no room for error. If I counted my judgment that p based on 
the evidence that p, and then added to it your judgment that p based on the evidence that 
p, I would, indeed, be double-counting p.  
 Simple entailments will work the same way. Let us say that the evidence, E, 
consists of p & q. I judge based on the evidence that, in fact, p. If you judge on the very 
same evidence that p then it seems like my using the fact that your judgment agrees with 
mine would likely be double-counting the evidence. This is because your agreeing 
judgment adds no information to my judgment.  
  This is, perhaps, why Kelly's argument seems so plausible: it is correct for 
special cases where there is no exercise of a defeasible faculty. Take, for instance, any 
situation where the relationship between evidence and judgment is a very simple and 
straightforward proof. Let us say that the evidence consists of the fact that p, and the fact 
that, if p, then q. I judge that q. You refuse to judge that q, and say that, even though you 
agree with all the evidence, it just doesn't seem to you that q follows. In this case, I can 
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dismiss you because, in simple proof case, there is no possibility of error. If the judgment 
involves the use of no faculties whatsoever, or only uses non-defeasible faculties, I can't 
stand back from my own judgments in order to downgrade my degree of self-trust. 
There's simply no room to do any downgrading. We can't do bilateral downgrading, 
because there's no aspect of myself vulnerable to downgrading - so it's got to be my 
confidence in my interlocutor that gives. Kelly's argument does work in cases where 
there's no reliance on any defeasible faculty. 
But these are rather specialized, and rare cases. (Some even hold that there are no 
non-defeasible judgments.) In most everyday judgments, there is quite a large amount of 
room between the evidence and the judgment. Visual perception obviously involves the 
use of a defeasible faculty. Complex evaluations like, "This table is sturdy," and "He's not 
very trustworthy," surely invoke defeasible faculties of judgment. And unsecured moral 
judgments involve a defeasible faculty, by definition. Kelly's argument fails to apply to 
most non-trivial reasoning, because it fails to take into consideration the fallibility of 
human cognition.  
 
 
Explaining the original case 
 Why, then, was Kelly's original argument so convincing? Recall the case: I hear 
your testimony that there is an elephant and then I see the elephant for myself. It does, 
indeed, seem true that once I see the elephant for myself, another's testimony as to the 
existence of the elephant is rendered irrelevant. The epistemic force of the original 
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testimony seems to be entirely displaced by my own experiences and reasoning. Kelly 
naturally concludes that, as a general matter, getting the evidence for oneself neutralizes 
the relevant testimony. 
 I've argued that this neutralization cannot be complete. I now owe an explanation 
for our intuitions of neutralization and dismissal in cases like the one above. We are, I 
grant, right to think that agreeing testimony that there is an elephant doesn't really matter 
once I see for myself. But this is not, I argue, due to a universal trumping of testimony by 
direct evidence. Rather, it is a special property of certain cases where we already have a 
tremendous amount of confidence in the faculty involved. It's important that, in the 
elephant case, what's involved is visual perception of a nearby large objects. Visual 
perception of nearby objects is typically a heavily vetted, reliable system. For most of us, 
the visual perception of nearby objects is about as confirmed as a faculty could be.  
 I've claimed that agreement and disagreement from interlocutors doesn't give us a 
second entry of the evidence; rather, it provides a confirmation or disconfirmation that 
our faculties are properly functioning. When the faculty is already well-confirmed, further 
confirmation provides a negligible change in confidence. Given that I have a very high 
level of trust in my visual system, the confirmation provided by agreement between my 
brother and myself provides no, or a negligible, change in confidence.  
 I believe my reading to be more accurate to the phenomena of daily life than 
Kelly's, for two reasons. First, while agreement with an already well-confirmed faculty 
has little epistemic effect, agreement with others is part of what confirms the faculty in 
the first place. Part of what makes me so confident in my eyes is the constant, daily 
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agreement between what I see and what others see. Second, my explanation captures the 
asymmetrical worth of testimony in cases like this. If Kelly is right, then neither 
testimonial agreement nor disagreement will have any epistemic weight. But, intuitively, 
in situations like this, only agreement is neutralized. If I am standing next to my brother, 
and we agree, there seems to be no epistemic boost from the fact of agreement. But, if I 
am standing next to my brother, and he says he sees something, and I don't, I'll start to 
worry. If many people disagree with me about simple visual perceptions, I'll have plenty 
of reason to worry. The best explanation for this asymmetry is that the lack of epistemic 
effect from agreement is due to the fact that there's no more room for any extra 
confirmation of some systems (or at least that the system is so well confirmed that the 
effect of further confirmation is negligible). But there's plenty of room for 
disconfirmation of a high-confidence system. 
 It is true that, in the elephant case, the testimony does little work. But that's not 
because it's merely testimony, but because, in that particular case, there's no work for 
confirmation left to do. The visual system is already pretty much as well-confirmed as a 
perceptual system could be. To make this clear, simply re-imagine the case without my 
high degree of confidence in my own visual system. Suppose that I took a hallucinogen 
and spent a day hallucinating wildly. When I wake up in the morning, and I see a giant 
iguana in the room and begin to worry that I'm still in the throes of drug-induced 
hallucination until you say you see it too, then I've really learned something - that my 





IV. Settling the Matter 
 Both of Kelly's arguments fail for the same reason: they depend on an agent's 
treating herself as infallible. It is important to distinguish the point of infallibility to the 
logical point, that one cannot step back from one's all-things-considered judgment. In the 
all-things-considered sense of "judgment", one's judgment is authoritative of what one 
believes. Because how could one believe otherwise than what judges? But this logical 
point is distinct from Kelly's point. Let us distinguish two conclusions: 
 
1. Logical Finality Principle: One's considered belief must reflect one's all-
things-considered judgment. 
 
2. Exclusive Self-Trust Principle: One's belief must reflect only the 
reasoning one does directly from non-testimonial reasons and evidence, 
and exclude any influence from reasoning done by others from reasons 
and evidence. 
 
The Logical Finality Principle is the conclusion of Enoch's argument, and is satisfied by 
any instance of coherent human reasoning. It is an analysis of the notion of considered 
belief, and not a normative principle to guide our thinking. Insofar as we are forming our 
beliefs through reasoning, we are obeying the Logical Finality Principle. When I form a 
moral judgment, then discount this moral judgment because of the existence of 
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disagreement, my all-things-considered judgment is the product of these two 
considerations. I can discount the conclusions of a sub-faculty in forming my all-things-
considered conclusion without violating the Logical Finality Principle.  Thus, the Logical 
Finality Principle is obviously true, but it does not imply moral self-sufficiency.  
Kelly argues for moral self-sufficiency via the Exclusive Self-Trust Principle, a 
much more radical claim. He argues that testimony, in and of itself, is specifically 
excluded from the list of possible evidence and reasons. Our use of testimony is merely a 
proxy for real evidence and reasons, and doesn't constitute a weighting of the testimony 
itself. In claiming that the testimony by itself cannot count, Kelly presupposes that I can 
take myself to be the final authority on epistemic grounds. When an interlocutor 
disagrees with my judgment, thinks Kelly, I may safely ignore the testimony, because it 
contributes nothing beyond the evidence and grounds I have already considered in 
making up my mind in the rest place. Kelly suppresses the contribution of 
discorroboration; he treats an agent's judgment as the final arbiter in disputes about 
matters about the reliability output of my judgment, and the proper functioning of my 
judging abilities.  
But this supposition cannot be sustained after a serious consideration of the 
epistemic status of unsecured moral judgments. Once I've confronted the evidence of 
shared human faculties, I must take others to be potentially authoritative as to the truth of 
various moral claims. Given that my mental faculties are fallible, and that my trust in 
them is defeasible, I must be open to downgrading my trust in my mental faculties. Once 
we see that testimony can be taken to impugn the reliability of my faculties, then Kelly's 
129 
 
argument can be seen as another version of that same mistake as the direct argument. 
Recall, from the discussion of the direct argument: if I believe p, and you claim the 
contrary, I cannot simply conclude that, since p, you're wrong. This would be to treat my 
judgment as infallible, which is unreasonable. Kelly's argument, though it is subtler than 
the direct argument, simply makes the same mistake in a subtler fashion. I believe that p, 
you claim the contrary. I treat the issue as already settled, and I don't allow your 
testimony to re-open the question, because I don't allow your testimony to challenge the 
reliability of my own faculties and abilities.  This is to treat my abilities as infallible, 
which is just as unreasonable.  
   
 
Epistemic Conclusions 
 I now take myself to have finished the argument against moral self-sufficiency on 
strictly epistemic considerations. I've argued that we may reasonably trust our moral 
intuitions, but that that trust is only reasonable if its defeasible. As a further consequence, 
we must take our peers to have, in principle, as much access to the moral realm as we do. 
We are but one rational being among many, all of whom have access to the realm of 
moral facts, and some of whom have a similarly good epistemic claim on reliable access.  
 In this chapter, I've argued that we cannot dismiss the epistemic claim of others 
based merely on disagreement. The best argument for this dismissal - Thomas Kelly's - 
depends on suppressing the possibility that disagreement can give me evidence that my 
own mental abilities are malfunctioning or mistaken. This may work for conclusions for 
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which we have non-defeasible proofs, but for any domain where our access is dependent 
on trust in an entitled, defeasible faculty, we cannot so dismiss. Such dismissal in an 
entitled realm will depend on a supposition of moral infallibility - that I can resolve a 
contest between the reliability of my mental abilities, and the reliability of another's, 
through the unreflective application of those mental abilities. A reflective move, on the 
other hand, might clear things up. If I developed a good account of what made a person's 
moral judgments reliable, I could use it to sort between my judgments and others'. But I 
cannot settle the matter by simply by re-emphasizing my original judgments and the 
conclusions I drew from them, for it is the reliability of my process of moral reasoning 
which has put to question. Since each of us is merely one among many rational agents, 
many of whom have equally good epistemic claims on the moral realm, and since our 
claim and self-trust is defeasible, we must take disagreement as giving us some evidence 
to distrust ourselves. 
 This, I take it, is enough to quell the most significant standing objection on 
epistemic grounds. But now there is room for another sort of protest. "Sure, there are 
epistemic reasons to be morally humble," my opponent might say, "But epistemic reasons 
aren't the only reasons. There are moral reasons to stay true to one's intuitions. They are 
personal, they are part of your identity. To give up on them would be to give up on your 





Autonomy, Understanding, and Disagreement 
 
So far, I've focused on discussing the impact of epistemology on moral reasoning. 
I've argued that moral reasoning cannot occur in an epistemic vacuum; that 
considerations of self-doubt, attained through reflection on disagreement, should impact 
moral reasoning. Moral reasoning, as with all other reasoning, is dependent on the use of 
fallible human faculties and methodologies. What I've argued thus far is that there is no 
epistemic basis for moral self-sufficiency. 
But perhaps the real basis for moral self-sufficiency lies beyond straightforwardly 
epistemic considerations. Perhaps there are peculiarly moral considerations that allow 
moral reasoning to escape from the usual epistemic constraints. Even if moral testimony 
and moral disagreement provide good evidence as to the truth, perhaps it is evidence that 
we ought ignore on moral grounds. Perhaps it is like evidence gathered through illegal 
police coercion: perfectly good evidence epistemically, but nevertheless wrong to use. 
 There seems to be no problem with delegating beliefs in the scientific sphere, but 
a different intuition seems to rule over moral matters. There seems to be a problem - a 
distinctively moral problem - with the soldier who shrugs off all responsibility for his 
actions, claiming that he was simply following orders. A person that simply follows 
everything their parent or superior says is at best still a child, and at worst a slave. There 
seems to be something within moral life itself that calls to each of us to reflect, consider, 
and decide for ourselves. 
132 
 
In this chapter, I will take up several distinctively moral arguments for moral self-
sufficiency. First, I will consider the commonly held intuition that the use of moral 
testimony runs against personal integrity. Second, I will consider arguments from Robert 
Paul Wolff that any use of moral testimony is a violation of the constraints of autonomy. 
Third, I will consider the arguments of Philip Nickel, who claims that the overuse of 
moral testimony violates a special requirement for understanding in the moral domain.   
I hope to show that, though each of these worries captures an important 
consideration for moral life, none of them is so powerful as to block the effect of moral 
disagreement. We are driven to weigh moral disagreement from our underlying 
commitments of any truth-oriented cognitive activity. Insofar as we are concerned with 
getting our moral beliefs right, non-epistemic considerations - integrity, autonomy, and 
understanding - may exert pressure on basic epistemic methods, but cannot obliterate 
them entirely. As long as we take ourselves to be cognitively fallible beings, and as long 
as part of our moral enterprise is to get it right, then we must be open to possible errors in 
our thinking and thus to the evidence of discorroboration.  
The claim of absolute moral self-sufficiency is an exaggeration of a more 
plausible consideration: that there is something wrong with giving ourselves entirely over 
to the command of another. Though I grant that there is something wrong with complete 
moral obedience, I will claim that the primary use of disagreement is not a form of 
obedience. It is, instead, a distinct process, part of an epistemic procedure of self-
checking and corroborating our own mental abilities. Employing this procedure does not 
count as obedience; it is, in fact, virtually the antithesis. The drive to self-checking comes 
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from the very same values that lead us to abhor moral obedience: a drive to 
understanding, to accuracy, to self-perfection, and to greater responsibility for our moral 
beliefs. Moral obedience is a form of disengagement from the moral process. Using 
social sources of information to corroborate and discorroborate our cognitive abilities is 
actually a form of increased engagement with moral reasoning, and a part of a mature 
rational approach to moral judgment. In fact, I will argue, the very values that lie under 
the importance of autonomy and understanding will drive us to actively seek out 
disagreement. 
There is certainly something genuinely problematic with complete moral 
deference, with laying aside all moral thinking and proceeding entirely on authority and 
trust for others. Such deference violates one's responsibility to be a careful, informed, 
thoughtful moral agent. But using other agents as a way to check the reliability of one's 
own cognitive capacities is not a way of giving up that responsibility; it is in fact a way of 
fully living up to the responsibility of being careful, reflective moral agents. When we 
corroborate and discorroborate our abilities, we are acting more responsibly, and more 
thoughtfully. The fact that the best practices for self-assessment involve corroborating 
our judgments with others doesn't show that corroboration violates autonomy; it shows, 
rather, that other people can help us become more perfectly rational, and more perfectly 
autonomous. Moral humility, I claim, is the part of the most rational and autonomous 





Part I. Disagreement and Integrity 
 The first worry I'd like to take up is commonly felt, but rarely articulated in 
academic ethics: that, for reasons of personal integrity, we ought not weight 
disagreement. This is the least serious worry of the three, but a brief discussion of it will 
clear some useful ground. 
 Take Alan Donagan's case of the Austrian farmer. The farmer hears that WWII is 
coming, and he's called to arms by his government to fight on the side of the Axis. He's 
bothered by this; it seems to him that the Axis is in the wrong. He goes to his parish 
priest, and asks what he ought to do. The priest passes up the question, where it 
eventually reaches the Vatican in Rome, and the answer gets passed down: the Axis is on 
the side of right, and the farmer ought to go to war. But the farmer disobeys; he refuses 
because by his reasoning and his principles, the war is unjust. We might read this case in 
the following way: in this case, he has very good reason to think the church is an 
epistemically better position than him. Not only do they have better access to God, but 
they're educated folks who've thought longer about this stuff then him. He's told by his 
village priest that "neither they nor he, a relatively uneducated man, were in a position to 
make an informed judgment about the justice of the war; and that therefore the 
conclusion he had reached about it was doubtful."53 But he sticks to his guns, and our 
intuitions say that he is to be admired for doing so, despite the fact that he is ignoring 
what he has every reason to think is very reliable testimony. Donagan's farmer is an 
archetypal hero of integrity. 
                                                
53 Donagan, Alan (1977), p 16 
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 Why does integrity seem so important? First, we often take our felt beliefs and 
commitments to be partially constitutive of our identity. The second consideration we 
might call sincerity - that our moral beliefs are strongly connected to our emotions and 
perceptions, and acting against them violates some requirement for honesty. I grant that 
considerations of integrity are legitimate, but they cannot be trumping considerations. 
After all, when I see a bunch of KKK members on their way to lynch somebody from 
some particularly detested race, I don't think, "Excellent! What a victory for personal 
integrity against the prevailing attitude!" I think that the act is wrong, and I ought 
dissuade them or stop them in whatever way I can. 
This example serves as a useful counterpoint to the Donagan case of the good-
hearted farmer. Donagan's case is, I believe, subtly tilted, for we all know that in this case 
the farmer is on the side of right and the priest is in the wrong. We admire the farmer for 
maintaining the courage of his convictions, but his integrity is not the sole target of our 
admiration. We also admire him because he's right. If all we cared about was the 
integrity, then we ought equally approve and admire the racists for staying true to their 
felt beliefs, but we don't. It is more important that the racists not lynch than that they stay 
true to themselves.  
Insofar as we take ourselves to be rational, and insofar as we take our beliefs to be 
aimed at objective moral fact, considerations of authenticity cannot be categorically 
trumping. What the overemphasis on moral integrity ignores is that we humans have a 
profoundly complex identity as both moral and rational agents. Insofar as we take 
ourselves to be rational, and to have rational moral beliefs, then we have at least two 
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commitments here. We have the considerations of moral integrity, which weigh on the 
side of staying true to our moral phenomenology, but we also have epistemic 
commitments to rationality, which weigh on revising our moral beliefs in the light of new 
considerations. This is why Donagan's farmer should not peacefully go to war, or 
peacefully go to jail; no matter how he acts, he should be emotionally tortured. He is 
under pressure from two warring commitments. Because our cognitive identities are 
sufficiently complex, we can be put in situations where we are at war with ourselves. Our 
moral beliefs are bivalent, and so are our moral identities. Loyalty to our complete nature 
as moral and truth-oriented agents requires we leave behind this one-dimensional notion 
of moral integrity.  
 
 
Part II. Wolff on Autonomy 
Robert Paul Wolff offers a significantly more sophisticated path to moral-self 
sufficiency. Weighting disagreement in and of itself, says Wolff, violates the conditions 
of autonomy. A genuinely autonomous, responsible moral agent must reason for 
themselves and act from their own judgment. Relying on moral testimony in any way 
violates that autonomy. Wolff's argument is not only insightful, but also representative; it 
clearly articulates the worries that lie under much of the intuitive resistance to my claim 
of moral humility.  
Wolff is surely right that some very particular uses of moral testimony are 
autonomy violations - outright, unthinking obedience. But obedience is not the only use 
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of moral testimony. I will argue that Wolff's argument cannot be extended to block 
appropriate uses of moral disagreement, and so cannot be used to fuel moral self-
sufficiency. Furthermore, I will argue that the use of moral disagreement is appropriate 
for the very same reasons that unthinking obedience is inappropriate. When an agent 
thoughtlessly obeys, they are acting against the duty to be a thoughtful, responsible agent. 
When an agent uses agreement and disagreement to check their own moral reasoning - to 
corroborate and discorroborate - they actually are becoming more thoughtful and being 
more responsible. They are extra-responsive to the reasons and considerations that 
impinge on moral action.  
 
 
Wolff's account of autonomy 
Let me begin by defining some terms. I will attempt to conform my usage to that 
of the contemporary literature. I can be said to be "using testimony" an agent's testifying 
that p gives me some reason to believe p. "Moral deference," in contemporary usage, is a 
particular use of testimony.54 Susan McGrath defines deference as a case in which "one 
holds a view solely because another person holds that view."55 Problems surrounding 
moral testimony have also been examined as issues in moral authority. Elizabeth 
                                                
54 There is a slight quibble here: McGrath takes testimony and deference to be slightly different topics. For 
something to be testimony, it must be that another person actually speaks it. Her definition of deference 
does not require that another person actually speak their view; I can, for instance, come to think that my 
elder monk believes that ought not kill insects on the basis of his constant painstaking actions to avoid 
killing insects. I take it that the difference is not important to my present line of inquiry, since my interest 
has always been in the epistemic weight of the contrary judgments of one's peers, with little attention to 
how those judgments are communicated.  
55 McGrath (2011), p 113 
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Anscombe defines "moral authority" as "taking that somebody said something as over 
and above what you decide for yourself."56 I will assume that the problem of moral 
deference and the problem of moral authority are interchangeable for the present 
purposes.  
Wolff's discussion invokes a decidedly Kantian conception of autonomy to 
explain the problem with moral deference. An autonomous agent is self-governing and 
acts only on rules he gives himself, says Wolff. Certain uses of moral testimony count as 
acting on rules given by another, and so are violations of an agent's autonomy. Accepting 
the command of another, for example, constitutes a violation of autonomy, says Wolff: 
 
Since the responsible man arrives at moral decisions which he expresses to himself in the form of 
imperatives, we may say that he gives laws to himself, or is self-legislating. In short, he is 
autonomous. As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is 
a submission to laws which one has made for oneself. The autonomous man, insofar as he is 
autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but not because 
he has been told to do it... Inasmuch as moral autonomy is simply the condition of taking full 
responsibility for one's actions, it follows that men can forfeit their autonomy at will. That is to say, 
a man can decide to obey the commands of another without making any attempt to determine for 
himself whether what is commanded is good or wise.57 
 
We may not act on the command of another because we have been commanded; rather, 
we must determine for ourselves whether our action is good. Let us call this first 
requirement the requirement of self-legislation. The paradigmatic example of the failure 
of self-legislation is the unthinking soldier - the soldier who does anything his superior 
officer orders, solely on the officer's authority.  
 Wolff provides a second requirement, directed at the use of moral testimony: 
                                                
56 Anscombe (1981), p 44 




The responsible man is not capricious or anarchic, for he does acknowledge himself bound by moral 
constraints. But he insists that he alone is the judge of those constraints. He may listen to the advice 
of others, but he makes it his own by determining for himself whether it is good advice. He may 
learn from others about his moral obligations, but only in the sense that a mathematician learns from 
other mathematicians - namely by hearing from them arguments whose validity he recognizes even 
though he did not think of them himself. He does not learn in the sense that one learns from an 
explorer, by accepting as true his accounts of things one cannot see for oneself.58  
 
Let us call this second requirement the requirement of moral understanding. This is the 
requirement that when we self-legislate, we do so from reasons we see and by reasoning 
we have performed ourselves, understand, and accept. These two requirements for self-
legislation and moral understanding together I will call Wolff's requirement of autonomy.  
Wolff's argument is often taken as an argument for moral self-sufficiency on from 
considerations of autonomy. Wolff seems to claim that the only use for moral testimony 
is for presenting arguments that an agent then decides for themselves - that the testimony 





                                                
58 Wolff (1970), pp 13 
59 It is not precisely clear what Wolff's views on my own position would be. Wolff clearly forbids moral 
deference in its fullest form - that is, he explicitly forbids acquiring a new belief entirely from testimony. 
What he would think about partially downgrading a belief based entirely on testimony is not precisely 
clear. But I think that the spirit of Wolff's arguments are in the direction of forbidding my uses of 
disagreement. When I downgrade a belief based on disagreement, I am making a change in my moral 
beliefs based strictly on testimony, without understanding the reasons for the contrary beliefs. Insofar as 
Wolff seems to be postulating a strict requirement for self-containment, even this change, insofar as it is 
motivated only by testimony without any of my own avowal, it seems likely that Wolff would be against 
my suggested uses for disagreement. 
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The compatibility of evidence and autonomy  
Wolff is certainly onto something very important. It seems crucial that we do not 
give up our duty to be an active, contemplative moral agent, and Wolff presents a 
compelling account of why it is that we have that duty. But any reasonable autonomy 
requirement will not forbid the use of disagreement; it will only forbid unthinking 
obedience. In order to show this, I need to clarify the distinctions between certain healthy 
and unhealthy relationships between autonomous agents and testimony. 
First, autonomy considerations can only forbid very particular relationships to 
testimony. In Wolff's Kantian language, autonomy considerations forbid giving oneself a 
law or rule based solely on the testimony of another. Autonomy considerations cannot 
forbid taking up simple, normatively neutral information through testimony, for this 
would invalidate most normal social procedures for information-gathering - including, for 
example, asking another person for directions.  
One might be forgiven for momentarily supposing that autonomy considerations 
might forbid relying on any sort of testimony, rather than simply forbidding acquiring 
rules for action through testimony. After all, some interactions with testimony can look, 
superficially, like a form of epistemic slavery. After all, what I am claiming is that when 
a peer has challenged one's belief, one must reduce one's confidence in that belief. Isn't 
this a crime against autonomy? It seems that I have no say in the matter. In that way my 
considered belief in the matter is not entirely the product of my own thinking; another's 
beliefs have intruded into mine.  
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 But this worry depends on an oversimplified notion of autonomy and freedom. 
Certainly, in the situation I describe, I am bound to alter my belief in a certain way 
because of the testimony of another, but this constraint is not anything special; rational 
agents are always bound to believe according to the weight of the evidence. Good 
testimony can sometimes rationally determine one's belief, but this is true of any form of 
good evidence. Imagine, for instance, that I am very worried about whether my friend has 
been stealing from me. Imagine I have a very reliable truth serum; I inject it into my 
friend and then, after waiting for the serum to take hold, I ask my friend if he's stolen 
anything from me. When he says no, I have good evidence that he isn't a thief, and this 
ought to sway my belief. Or, for a more everyday example, suppose that I have good 
evidence that my roommate is trustworthy and has no motivation to lie to me. If my 
roommate steps in from outside and I ask her how the weather is, and she replies, "It's 
quite nice and sunny out," the weight of the evidence is now for its being nice out. A 
rational being in this position, already committed to the rationality and trustworthiness of 
the roommate, ought to believe so.  
The fact that a rational being is bound to believe according to the evidence can't 
be a violation of autonomy. To think otherwise is to misunderstand the complex 
relationship between autonomy and rationality. To be rational is to believe in accordance 
with the reasons. Rational beings, in some very important sense, are not entirely 
unconstrained. Their rational nature binds them; they must, on pain of irrationality, 
believe in line with the weight of the evidence. Our intuitions about freedom comport 
with this; if a contemporary scientist believes that 2 + 2 = 5, or that the Earth is flat, the 
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scientist isn't free - he's dumb. It cannot count as a loss of autonomy to be rationally 
bound by evidence. First, taking evidence doesn't subvert autonomy in an improperly 
causal manner as say, storybook brainwashing might be. Taking evidence is a part of the 
functioning of our rationality; when we change our minds because of new evidence we've 
received, this is rationality working as it should. Whatever autonomy is - and I cannot 
hope to even begin to fully analyze the concept here - it must be compatible with the 
conditions of rationality. A rational autonomous being is free to decide whether or not to 
eat very fatty ice cream, and to choose between the sensual satisfaction of the ice cream 
and the health benefits of abstaining. But a rational autonomous being is not free to 
believe, after having read the scientific data, that the very fatty ice cream has no calories. 
That would be a failure of rationality. 
The mere fact that the word of another partially determines my belief - that it 
constrains my belief - cannot in itself constitute a violation of autonomy, as long as that 
determination follows the rational pathways of evidential assessment. The fact that, in 
some cases, our beliefs are determined by testimony is not a special case; it is simply 
another way that rational beings are determined by the weight of evidence. Taking 





Obedience versus guidance 
What exactly is the difference, then, between the healthy way in which agents can 
be determined by evidence, and the unhealthy way in which agents forsake their 
autonomy through excess obedience? What is the nature of the evidence that may 
permissibly pass from one person to another? I do not think I can yet delineate precisely 
what may pass through testimony, for this will depend on developing a sophisticated 
account of what counts as a moral fact, as a moral rule, and as information, and an 
account of why some of these entities cannot be passed through testimony. That task is 
beyond the scope of the current work. I think we can, however, make some inroads into 
accounting what's going on in the clearest cases of problematic obedience, and show 
some uses of testimony that are clearly unproblematic. This will be enough to establish at 
least one unproblematic use of moral disagreement. 
Let's begin with the paradigmatic case of bad obedience, the unthinking soldier. I 
will assume that the unthinking soldier does represent a genuine problem for autonomy. 
But what exactly is wrong with bad obedience? Is it that the unthinking soldier has no 
control whatsoever? No, says Wolff; the unthinking soldier begins by giving himself a 
rule of obedience, by which he ceases thinking and considering in certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, the initial rule of obedience is itself not unthinking - the soldier can clearly 
give reasons for it. "This officer is my superior officer." "We need to obey quickly to 
function as an effective unit." He can provide an explanation of why he is, in general, 
obeying, and he can in any instance of obedience tell you why he's obeying - though the 
latter explanations will presumably suffer from some monotony. What's missing is 
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something about the soldier's attitude and connection to the content of the particular rules 
that arise as he executes his orders.  
Establishing precisely the problem with the unthinking soldier is actually rather 
tricky, for there are superficially similar cases that aren't as problematic. Take, for 
instance, the case of following somebody in a car. Imagine that my friends and I are 
coming back from a camping trip, in which we are divided into two cars. We wish to 
drive into town and meet up at a restaurant. Our cell phones have run out of power, and 
we are in unfamiliar territory. The sensible plan is for one car to be the leader, and the 
other the follower, and for the driver of the first car simply to decide, and the driver of the 
second car simply to follow. The situation is similar in important ways to the case of the 
unthinking soldier: there is an overall reason for following - coordination and the desire 
to eat together. And once the decision is made, the lead driver makes the decisions, for 
reasons, and the following driver follows those decisions, without understanding their 
particular content. Surely this case is morally unproblematic, but what, precisely, is the 
difference between this case and the unthinking soldier case? 
Next, imagine that I come home on my birthday and my girlfriend blindfolds me 
and tells me to follow her. I ask why, and she says, "It's a surprise." She leads me out of 
the house, and I follow blindly. This case, innocuous as it might seem, is strikingly close 
to paradigmatic cases of bad obedience: I seem to be giving up on an understanding of 
the particular decisions I'm following; I don't have an understanding of the precise goal or 
end; my understanding of the end is vague at best. In the car-following case, I at least 
know what we're doing and why; in the girlfriend-surprise case, I don't even know that. I 
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simply trust her good will, and go. But this case is also obviously morally unproblematic. 
What sort of lovers - what sort of people - would we be if we refused surprises like this 
for reasons of autonomy? 
So we have three cases of following directions of some form - two unproblematic 
cases, and one case of bad obedience. What is the distinguishing factor? It cannot be that 
the rule requires external input before it can fully determine a course of action, for all the 
following cases involve external input. Bad obedience cannot be characterized by a lack 
of understanding in the initial decision to follow, since the soldier can be said to 
understand why he is to obey, just as well as the following driver understands why he is 
to follow. Bad obedience also cannot be distinguished by the failure to understand the 
particular reasons for the subsequent actions and decisions, for in the car-following case, 
the follower also doesn't understand why he's turning right or left in each particular 
instance.  
Perhaps, while the car-follower doesn't understand the particular micro-rules and 
decisions being used for each turn, the follower does understand the particular end being 
pursued fully, and precisely what the relationship is between that end, the constraints of 
the situation, and the methodology of following. But this can't quite be the crux of the 
problem either, for the surprising girlfriend case is one precisely where I, the boyfriend, 
don't understand the end being pursued at all - I merely have a general trust that my 
girlfriend has my best interests at heart. 
 Might it be, then, that the car-following case has limited obedience, and the 
soldier's case has unlimited obedience? Presumably, when we follow a lead driver, we 
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won't follow them anywhere - we will follow them as they turn left and right and stop, 
but we wouldn't follow them over the side of a bridge, through a crowded shopping mall, 
or into the side of a bus full of screaming schoolchildren. When we follow a car to a 
restaurant, we do not issue a blank check to the leader. This strikes closer to the heart of 
the matter, but it cannot quite be precisely it, for the unthinking soldier does not have to 
issue a blank check either. It is safe to imagine that an unthinking soldier wouldn't do 
absolutely anything - most probably would not follow orders to shoot themselves in the 
head, or shoot their commanding officer from behind, or to burn down their grandparents' 
retirement home. The unthinking soldiers may be unthinking only in a particular domain - 
about their actions in a foreign country or towards enemy soldiers or a particular ethnic 
group - and yet still be problematically unthinking, as they follow, without thought, their 
commander's orders to burn down villages, torture children, and slaughter civilians. The 
mere presence of a veto - an outer bound to the unthinking soldier's obedience - is not 
enough to make his actions unproblematic.60 
 The problem seems to lie not in the existence or non-existence of an outer bound, 
but in the precise nature of each individual instance of obedience; it is precisely in the 
attempt to surrender responsibility for their actions. If I follow my friend's car, and he 
runs a red light, and I run the red light also, I cannot excuse myself from responsibility by 
claiming that I was following another car. I am responsible for that decision; that is what 
separates the car-following case from the unthinking soldier case. What seems to 
differentiate the problematic and unproblematic cases is that in the car-following case I 
                                                
60 I am heavily indebted for this point to material from private conversation with Brian Hutler. 
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am being guided, and in the unthinking soldier case the soldier is obeying. In guidance, 
the leader is simply suggesting a course of action, which the follower assents or doesn't 
assent to in each case. The assent may be invisible, because it is so quick and nearly 
automatic; in car-following, the actions - turning left, changing lanes - are all so utterly 
routine that they are obviously morally unproblematic. But we can see that there is assent 
in each case, simply by imagining what happens when the leader car does something a 
little dicey - for example, running a red light. The following car has to decide whether or 
not they will follow, and the driver is responsible for that decision. In the problematic 
cases of obedience, I either act on a rule solely because is endorsed by another, or 
endorse a rule on the sole grounds that another endorsed it. In the unproblematic cases of 
guidance I uptake information, and provide or withhold any endorsement myself. If my 
commanding officer issues an order for me to proceed to the north, obedience would be 
to follow with no further deliberation - endorsing it solely because my commanding 
officer endorsed it. Guidance would be to glean information from my officer's statement - 
for example, the information that my commanding officer thinks that it would be a good 
idea to go north - and use that information in a judgment of my own. 
We can also see the distinction between obedience and guidance by looking at a 
paradigmatic case of guidance: tour-guiding. When I am being taken around town by a 
tour guide, and told to walk into certain places and eat certain things, what's being passed 
is information - the tour guide thinks this is a good place to see or a worthwhile place to 
eat. What I'm taking up is the fact about the tour guide's belief, and not entering the tour 
guide's judgment in as my own. When the tour guide says that the food at this restaurant 
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is delicious, I cannot in good conscience skip my meal, return home, and tell everybody 
that the food at that restaurant is delicious. What I can do is say that the tour guide 
thought that the restaurant was delicious, so it probably is; or, I can enter the restaurant 
for a good reason - that the tour guide thinks it's delicious - and then decide for myself. 
We can see the distinction between passing endorsement and passing information by 
looking at when we can and cannot defer responsibility to our tour guide. If the tour 
guide suggests that we might indulge in the local practice of cat-torturing, we are 
responsible for our actions if we do. If the tour guide lies to us and tells us that we may 
participate in this local practice of hitting a bag with a dead chicken inside, for meat 
preparation, and it later turns out that inside the bag was a drugged cat, we may justly 
pass on responsibility to the tour guide, because he has passed us false information, when 
we reasonably expected him to pass us good information. 
 The distinction between obedience and guidance captures something very 
important about where genuine autonomy problems lie, and where they don't. In the 
unproblematic cases, I am merely being guided - I am accepting only information from 
the leader, and then deciding for myself. In the problematic cases, I am obeying - I am 
accepting rules from the leader, which include information, decisions about appropriate 
ends to pursue, and decisions about the best means to achieve that ends. I am, in some 
sense, letting them decide for me. Guidance may resemble obedience closely, but they are 
crucially distinct. I may modify my beliefs and actions in response to testimony, but this 
in and of itself does not show problematic obedience. What matters is whether my own 
judgment and endorsement is interposed between the testimony and the action. When 
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another provides only information, and I provide the rules that connect that information 
to actions, then any following I'm doing is unproblematic, though it may superficially 
resemble obedience.  
Armed with the obedience/guidance distinction, it now seems easy to explain the 
blindfold-surprise case. There, we are placed in a special and very vulnerable relationship 
to our leader - we make them, for a period of time, the source of a tremendous amount of 
information that we would normally gather ourselves. And when they pass us bad 
information, we can pass on the responsibility to them. But we cannot pass on 
responsibility when they suggest bad rules. 
Guidance may resemble obedience closely, but they are crucially distinct. I may 
heavily modify my beliefs and actions in response to testimony, but this in and of itself 
does not show problematic obedience. What matters is whether my own judgment and 
endorsement is interposed between the testimony and the action. When another provides 
only information, and I provide all the rules that connect that information to actions, then 
any following I'm doing is unproblematic, though it may superficially resemble 
obedience. Suppose I am on an airplane and a man in front of me begins to choke; I get a 
doctor on the phone and he walks me through a tracheotomy. It may appear that I'm 
obeying; after all, the doctor says, "Now cut a one-inch hole underneath his adam's 
apple," and I do it immediately, but here I am only being guided. I have already decided 
of my own cognizance to save this man's life by the most expedient means necessary; the 
doctor merely provides information about the means. Cases of obedience and cases of 
guidance may be virtually indistinguishable in the moment of action, but we can tell the 
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difference by the attitude of responsibility the agents have towards their ends and rules. 
In guidance cases, I may pass responsibility about particular pieces of information, but I 
cannot pass responsibility about my decision to act from that information. Obedience 
cases are marked precisely by their attempt to abstain from accepting responsibility for 
the decision to act.  
 
 
The indirect pathway to doubt 
 There is surely something wrong with the sort of outright moral deference that 
marks unthinking obedience. I do not take myself to have fully explicated what that 
wrong is, and where its boundaries are. Perhaps there are some cases where some degree 
of obedience is permitted, some forms of uptaking endorsement or moral rules that are 
permissible; the matter seems terribly complex. What I take myself to have already 
shown, however, is that there is a category of obviously permissible interactions with 
testimony: uptaking non-moral information. Furthermore, there are many situations 
which superficially resemble cases of bad obedience, but in which we actually only 
uptake non-moral information - cases of guidance. What I intend to show now is that 
there is at least one use of moral disagreement where we acquire through social pathways 
strictly non-moral information – where we use the moral testimony of others as guidance, 
not obedience. This is the use of moral testimony for corroborating and discorroborating 
our cognitive abilities - for self-checking.  
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Disagreement can give me a reason to suspect the reliability of my own abilities. 
Evidence that my faculties are potentially unreliable is not a rule for action; it not a moral 
fact of any sort.61 It is information about a non-moral matter, namely, the proper 
functioning of my cognitive faculties. Thus, even if we subscribe to the strongest 
prohibition against uptaking any form of endorsement or moral rule, there is still a 
pathway for moral disagreement to permissibly affect our confidence.  
 First, let me distinguish between two basic uses of testimony. I can use testimony 
as a reason to believe what the testifier believes; I can also use testimony to establish 
what a testifier believes. The former use may be forbidden, but the latter is clearly 
permissible. It cannot be problematic to uptake and use the information that my 
commander believes that we ought to burn down the village of innocents, even as I plot to 
sabotage his plans. There are, accordingly, two ways in which testimony can be used to 
modify my own belief; let me call them the direct pathway, and the indirect pathway. In 
the direct pathway, I come to alter my belief immediately in accordance with received 
testimony. In the indirect pathway, I use the testimony to establish what my interlocutor 
believes, then use the fact that we agree or disagree as potential evidence of our 
respective reliability or unreliability. 
We don't often separate these two uses of testimony in everyday empirical 
matters, since both uses of empirical testimony are permissible, but the distinction is 
crucial for moral testimony. The distinction between the two paths may seem 
                                                
61 I am aware that I am relying heavily on a distinction between information and endorsed rules, without 
having provided an explicit account of the distinction. I do not possess such an account, and I do think there 
are many unclear boundary cases, like facts about aspects of character like dignity or insensitivity. But the 
process-reliability facts seem clearly informational, and clearly outside the space of norms, endorsed rules, 
and any of their kin.  
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superficially fine, but I will claim that they are strikingly different. In the direct path, I 
am obeying, and in the indirect path, I am merely being guided. In the indirect path, I am 
uptaking an endorsement or rule of action directly. In the indirect path, I am using 
testimony to glean a piece of morally neutral information: that an interlocutor I take to be 
reliable on the subject disagrees with me. The distinction between the two pathways is 
everyday. When I'm doing my math homework, I am working under the requirement that 
any answers I commit myself to are my own. It does violate that requirement to simply 
copy my partner's work and conclusion. But it surely doesn't violate that principle to 
check my work against other students, and to doubt my work (and theirs) when there is 
disagreement.  
 The difference between the two pathways rests upon a difference between two 
processes of reasoning.  First, there is the process of moral reasoning, which goes 
something like: "It certainly seems to me that suffering of any sort ought not be brought 
about, unless it is to prevent other, greater suffering. And when I eat veal, I am 
participating in a system that systematically creates suffering, but to an end that doesn't 
prevent other suffering. It only gives me a mild pleasure. So I must not eat veal." The 
moral reasoning process depends on the use of a number of entitled, defeasible 
substantive cognitive faculties. 
 But there is an independent reasoning process I might engage in to check on the 
reliability of those cognitive faculties used in the first process. I can note a disagreement 
between myself and another trustworthy moral peer on this topic, and so acquire evidence 
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that my reasoning process is possibly unreliable. Call this second reasoning process the 
self-checking process. I claim that: 
 
A. the self-checking process is distinct from the moral reasoning process. 
B. the self-checking process does not yield a rule of action or a moral claim of 
any sort, but a proposition of empirical fact. 
 
The self-checking process depends only on using a morally neutral, empirical fact 
through testimony, and no reasonable autonomy requirement can block the use of morally 
neutral information. The self-checking process starts in a different place from the moral 
reasoning process: the moral reasoning process begins with a moral intuition, the self-
checking process begins with an empirical observation about what somebody else said. 
The moral reasoning process yields a rule for action, where the self-checking process 
yields an empirical claim about the reliability of an ability or process.  
The results of the self-checking process can modify my confidence in the results 
of the moral reasoning process, but this does not mean that they are the same process, or 
that constraints on the moral reasoning process must also apply to the self-checking 
process. My all-things-considered final judgment of what to do depends on the results of 
several processes - both the distinctively moral first-order reasoning process, and the non-
moral second-order self-checking process.  
Using the direct pathway for moral testimony would count as obedience, because 
I am endorsing a rule solely on the grounds that another endorses it. The direct pathway 
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is an attempt to skip over the moral reasoning process. But using the indirect pathway is 
merely a form of guidance. I am using the fact that another endorses a particular rule as 
evidence for my own reasoning. I am not skipping over of a moral reasoning process, but 
performing a complex, engaged process of self-checking. These are two distinct 
processes, one essentially moral and directed towards receiving rules of action, and the 
other essentially non-moral and directed towards generating information about the 
reliability one's own mental abilities and faculties. Autonomy considerations can forbid 
an attempt to replace the moral reasoning process with deferral to testimony, but 
autonomy considerations have no application to the morally neutral self-checking 
process.  
Using disagreement as part of the self-checking process will not run afoul of 
Wolff's autonomy requirement for moral reasoning, because self-checking isn't moral 
reasoning. The self-checking process will, however, impact my confidence in the results 
of the moral reasoning. This may seem paradoxical, but it is not. This conclusion depends 
on the claim that there are empirical facts that lie under and buttress my confidence in my 
moral reasoning; thus, non-moral reasoning can infect my confidence in my moral 
reasoning. But surely this claim is correct. Surely empirical evidence can impugn my 
trust in my own judgments - from the discovery that I've been on drugs, to the discovery 
that I have a degenerative mental disease, to the simple discovery that even though I 
thought I was good at calculus and did those calculations very well, I failed three calculus 
tests in a row. Surely, if I were to find out that I had been under the influence of drugs, or 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, when I passed moral judgment on my friends, I would 
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have reason to worry out and doubt those judgments. Since in all reasoning, including 
moral reasoning, we are putting our trust in defeasible reasoning processes and abilities, 




The independence of the direct pathway 
One might then suspect that the indirect pathway, though it is distinct from the 
direct pathway, depends on a hidden use of the direct pathway. After all, don't I have to 
use the fact that my interlocutor is morally reliable to get to the belief that their 
disagreement means something? And isn't leaning on the moral reliability of an 
interlocutor simply granting them direct access to my moral beliefs? 
I grant that the indirect pathway relies on invoking a belief in the interlocutor's 
reliability, but this invocation does not constitute problematic obedience. It is not the 
same as directly uptaking a rule. We can see this in two ways. First, a key marker for 
obedience cases is the agent’s attempts to pass responsibility for his action on to his 
testimonial source. What seems to mark the unthinking soldier cases is that the 
unthinking soldier abandons his responsibility for having correct beliefs. There is no 
attempt to pass responsibility in any form in self-checking through testimony. In fact, 
when we use interlocutors to probe ourselves for possible errors, we are taking up even 
more responsibility in the pursuit of correctness.  
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The independence of the pathways is clear when we look at the rule of action 
that's actually doing the normative heavy lifting. In the obedience case, action follows 
from a rule I acquired through testimony. But in using disagreement for self-checking, 
the action I take - modifying my belief, refraining from action - follows from a rule of 
action I give myself, which takes as inputs empirical facts about disagreement. 
Suppose that I am considering eating this piece of chicken, which I know was 
raised on a commercial farm. I think this is fine, because I am operating under the 
following rule: 
 
Omnivore Rule: Gustatory pleasure can justify some animal suffering, because 
animal suffering is insignificant (depending on the type of animal). 
 
Somebody else claims that this is incorrect, and that the proper rule of action is: 
 
Vegetarian Rule: No amount of gustatory pleasure can justify animal suffering, so 
you ought not eat animals, especially those that have suffered. 
 
If I were to begin to believe the Vegetarian Rule immediately, based solely on testimony, 
then this would be taking the direct pathway; it would be a violation of Wolffian 
autonomy.  
But I can take the indirect pathway instead. I note that there is disagreement. I 
find the omnivore rule intuitive, and my interlocutor finds the vegetarian rule intuitive. 
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There is a disagreement, and since both interlocutors are trustworthy, and since I have no 
ready explanation for the disagreement, I have some evidence to suspect both 
interlocutors, including myself, of unreliability. Now suppose I act using this evidence 
using the following rule: 
 
Faculty Trust Rule:  When there is evidence that a cognitive faculty is or might be 
unreliable to some degree of probability, I ought to reduce my trust in the 
judgments that relied on that faculty by an appropriate measure. 
 
The indirect pathway relies on the Faculty Trust Rule. And it is true that if I endorsed the 
Faculty Trust Rule itself merely on the basis of testimony, I would be sacrificing my 
autonomy. But the Faculty Trust Rule doesn't have to come to me through testimony; it is 
a rule I can give myself. In the autonomy-preserving case, I act from Faculty Trust Rule, 
which I give and endorse myself, and which takes as an input the information that another 
person believes the Vegetarian Rule. In this case, the change in action comes from an 
application of my Faculty Trust Rule, not from a direct transmission of the interlocutor's 
Vegetarian Rule into my belief system. In the indirect pathway, I am not adopting the 
vegetarian rule based simply on testimony, without endorsing or understanding it. I am 
using the fact that another reliable person thinks the vegetarian rule as a data point, and 
engaging with that data point using a rule that I endorse and understand.  
 Finally, we might worry that the Faculty Trust Rule's plausibility depends on 
assigning the Vegetarian Rule some evidential weight from testimony. After all, the 
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process of corroboration and discorroboration only makes sense if we treat an 
interlocutor's believing something as in some way impacting on its likelihood to be. And 
it's true - but what we're granting here is simply the thesis that moral matters are 
cognitive, and that we take others to be reliable sources on cognitive matters. The 
purpose of the foregoing discussion of obedience was to show that the problem of 
unthinking obedience was very particular; it depends on endorsing a rule on the sole 
grounds that another endorsed it. Here, in no way am I endorsing the Vegetarian Rule 
merely on another's endorsement; I am merely using the fact of another's having endorsed 
it as a data point for my own reasoning process.  
 This may seem like hair-splitting. It is not. I am trying to show that the process of 
obedience and the process of discorroboration entirely different; that what we find 
abhorrent about blind obedience is nowhere to be found in discorroboration. When we 
obey unthinkingly, we take ourselves out of the reasoning process. We cannot give any 
explanations for the rules we follow; we are not involved in the process of weighing and 
deliberating and deciding. We make at most a single decision - to obey an authority - and 
afterwards step out of the picture. We do not make ourselves responsible for the 
endorsement of a rule, because we played, at most, a paper-thin role in reaching it. The 
process of corroboration and discorroboration using social information is the opposite. 
When we check our reasoning against others, we are buried in the reasoning process. We 
are fully engaged in two distinct forms of reasoning - first, forming our mind 
independently about the moral matter, and then checking the reliability of that first 
process through another process. Both processes proceed in the full light of 
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understanding: I know why I've decided that eating meat is allowed (because I think 
animal lives are, in the end, is genuinely less important than human desires), and I know 
why I hesitate to act on that belief (because not everybody agrees with me, and because 
this is a reason to worry). I am in full contact with the reasons and rules involved; I am 
fully a participant, and not a resigned bystander, in the reasoning process. The unthinking 
soldier becomes a mere conduit for his officer; the officer's endorsement bypasses the 
soldier's reasoning process and leads directly to action; his rules are merely his officer's 
rules with almost nothing added from himself. When we worry, listen to disagreement, 
and doubt, our final, modified, suspicion-laden rule of action is the product of two 
processes of reasoning, in both of which we have fully participated.  
 
 
Diagnosis: bivalence and alienation 
 If the process of corroboration and discorroboration is not essentially a moral 
matter, why does it trip alarms in the vicinity of autonomy? Let me offer a diagnosis. The 
autonomy-based worries about disagreement depend on drawing a compelling, but false, 
dichotomy between our moral commitments and our epistemic commitments. The 
autonomy worries arise from seeing the sort of rational, epistemic pressure from 
discorroboration as an alien and invasive presence in our moral lives. The view depends 
on seeing our relationship with our moral beliefs as more genuine and integral than 
considerations of cognitive reliability. When procedures like self-checking and 
discorroboration get in between my private moral experience and my all-things-
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considered beliefs, it may seem like I'm alienating myself from my moral commitments. 
But this view suppresses the complexly cognitive nature of moral beliefs, and our 
complex nature as rational autonomous beings. Our moral commitments are an essential 
part of our personal identity, but so are our epistemic commitments. We are cognitive 
beings as well as beings soaked in moral feeling. When we note disagreement and lose 
confidence in ourselves, we are not being alienated through an invasion from without; we 
are in conflict with another part of ourselves.  
 The autonomy worry arises from a one-dimensional view of moral beliefs: the 
view that our moral beliefs are simply products of our freedom, as expressive of our 
nature and phenomenal experience of the moral world. As long as we are moral 
cognitivists, we must view moral beliefs as essentially bivalent. We are committed both 
to a moral belief's being expressive of ourselves and as getting it right of facts 
independent of ourselves. The first set of commitments drive us to keep our moral beliefs 
private, to seal them off from social input. But the commitment to correctness drives us in 
the opposite direction; it drives us to procedures of corroboration and discorroboration, to 
general epistemic principles that obtain of any cognitive domain. Neither of these 
commitments are alien; both sets of commitments arise from the nature of moral beliefs 
themselves. Insofar as we take our moral beliefs to be aimed at truth, we commit 
ourselves to using procedures oriented towards accuracy and reliability. 
 It does seem that there is friction between the commitments to moral 
expressiveness, and the commitments to moral accuracy, but this friction is internal to our 
body of commitments. We have divided loyalties because we are divided beings. We are 
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rational and autonomous; we wish to rule ourselves by rules we give ourselves, and we 
wish to give ourselves rules that are in line with our felt, phenomenally vivid moral 
experiences; but we also wish to give ourselves the right rules. These commitments can 
run counter to each other. It is, in fact, inevitable, so long as our moral feelings are 
simultaneously personal, purportedly cognitive and fallible. 
 The same friction can be seen elsewhere. I wish, for example, to be with a 
romantic partner that I feel love for. But I also wish to love properly. I have learned - 
through trial, error, and lots of advice from friends - that I tend to be attracted to sadistic 
narcissicists, and this attraction easily blooms into love. So I walk a difficult path - I try 
to stay true to my feelings, but also stand back from them, make sure they're right. I 
cannot inhabit my loves without conflict, for my loves are enmeshed in complex, 
sometimes contradictory commitments. This conflict is not an invasion from without, for 
it arises from the fact that there are pressures from different directions laid over my love. 




First-order content and second-order reflection 
 I am certainly not arguing that all uses of testimony are legitimate. I grant that 
some autonomy considerations are legitimate and that direct uses of testimony count as 
violations of autonomy. And by forbidding the direct path, we are forbidding many 
substantive uses of testimony. Only via the direct path could I acquire a new first-order 
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moral judgment, and do it while circumventing my reasoning process. The indirect path 
can only manipulate the second-order degree of confidence I have in a first-order moral 
judgment I've arrived at through my own reasoning. In forbidding the direct path, we 
forbid the wholesale acquisition of rules from other people; what's left is the 
manipulation of our self-confidence in the reliability of our moral reasoning. The latter 
manipulation cannot be forbidden by autonomy considerations precisely because it is not 
an essentially moral matter.  
 If we grant Wolff's view about the problem of obedience, and if my analysis 
holds, we get two very interesting results. First, the effect of testimony will frequently be 
asymmetric, especially for agents with a high initial degree of self-confidence in their 
moral reasoning. Since disagreement can only provide us with a second-order reliability 
assessment, agents with a very high initial self-confidence can only be moved towards 
lowered self-confidence through disagreement. But for agents with less then complete 
self-confidence, second-order reasoning can restore trust as well. Imagine, for example, 
that I am a young Dickensian orphan, who is very morally conscientious, and attempts to 
reason perpetually. The person who I trust, the figure of authority, constantly tells me that 
I am wrong, that I have reasoned in error, and that my beliefs are incorrect. I may come, 
quite reasonably, to distrust my reasoning process, and distrust my conclusions. Later in 
life I discover that most of my early judgments are also held by a vast number of very 
good, sensitive people, and that in the opinion of many, that early master of mine was a 
lying, deceptive, manipulative tyrant. So my confidence in my judgments might be 
restored.   
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 More importantly, the impact of disagreement will be entirely second-order. We 
have a complex, double-stanced relationship towards our moral judgment. Granting 
Wolff's block against obedience, we cannot use testimony in the formation of new first-
order moral beliefs. We are closed to all forms of moral testimony for the purpose of 
generating positive moral content. But we also have a reflective stance on our own 
cognitive abilities, including the abilities used in those private deliberations. And as 
rational, fallible, self-aware agents, we must admit that our cognitions sometimes go 
wrong. The role of testimony will only be in adjusting the degree of confidence I have 
towards my first-order beliefs.   
This dual reflective stance shows up in other places; most of us hold such a 
position towards our judgments of romantic love. We (at least we modern, western folk) 
seem to hold a principle of the autonomy of love. We think that when we love somebody, 
that love must be arrived at through a private process of deliberation and feeling. Nobody 
can tell me who to love; that is something that only I can come to discover for myself. 
But, at the same time, my process of finding love, falling in love, and accepting my loves, 
is subject to input from other people. Though only I may come love another, others can 
certainly help me figure out when I've loved badly, or when I'm mistaken about my 
feelings. I can be reminded by others that my judgment is impaired, that I'm recently out 
of relationship and my emotions are wild, or that I've had to much to drink that night and 
am clearly drunk and so shouldn't get married. Only I can decide who I love, but others 






What I've been arguing is that any reasonable theory of autonomy must allow a 
rational autonomous being to uptake information without thereby violating her 
autonomy. I've suggested a distinction: that autonomy violations will involve uptaking 
something in the vicinity of norms or rules or goals through testimony, whereas uptaking 
morally neutral information cannot count as an autonomy violation. When I use the 
existence of disagreement to reflect about my own reliability, I am a full participant in the 
reasoning process. I am acting on information I have gleaned with the help of others, by 
using the faculty trust rule which I understand and endorse myself. This pathway is 
autonomy-preserving.  
 I can put things a little more clearly if I help myself to more of the Kantian 
framework which seems to lie underneath Wolffian autonomy worries. Let me suppose, 
for the moment, that there is a very strong connection between rationality and autonomy. 
We are rational beings, and in reasoning well, we are autonomous. The connection is 
likely the animating force behind Wolff's worries. The unthinking soldier is not reasoning 
at all; he is submitting. He is giving up on his duties as a rational being to think, consider, 
and take evidence and reasons into consideration. But the epistemically motivated 
doubter is not giving up on thinking. She is reasoning more and insofar as she is 
reasoning from good epistemic principles, she is reasoning better. We can see this by 
examining the ends that move our two agents to action. The unthinking soldier is moved 
by end that comes directly from his commanding officer. It is the officer’s end, and the 
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officer’s justification via that end, that moves the unthinking soldier. The doubter, on the 
other hand, is moved by an end that does not come through testimony. The doubter’s 
proximate end is checking the reliability of her own cognitive abilities (which likely 
derives from the doubter’s ultimate end of having correct beliefs). The doubter does not 
acquire these ends from the testifier, and we can demonstrate this simply: a doubter can 
use the testimony of an interlocutor who does not share the end of checking their 
cognitive abilities.  
Once we begin to take into account the moral beliefs of others - not by submitting 
to the command of others, but by becoming aware of the reasoning of others and using it 
evidence - we become more rational. We are engaged in further rational activities: we are 
triangulating, we are corroborating, we are error-checking, we are debugging. We are 
engaged in an activity of increasing the reliability of our judgments. We are searching for 
evidence of our errors, evidence which may lead us to feel out where we should think 
again, where we should worry, where we should theorize. What this shows is that not all 
instances of interaction with testimony are bad. Certainly, there is such a thing as 
autonomy-destroying obedience. But there is also the proper use of other people as 
rational sources. And if in so doing we are becoming more accurate, more well-informed, 
more self-conscious reasoners, then we are increasing our autonomy. It is true that we 
may allow ourselves to blindly obey other people and so lose our autonomy, but it is also 
true that other people can help us to become more autonomous, as long as we use 
evidence of their testimony thoughtfully and properly, and not lazily. The unthinking 
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soldier has abandoned interaction with standards of correctness, while she who attends to 
disagreement is thereby pursuing correctness more fervently 
  
  
Part III. Moral Understanding and the Right Sort of Reasons 
 Wolff's account focused on explaining the wrong of moral deference with 
references to very Kantian notions of autonomy. Considerations of autonomy were 
supposed to ground requirements for agents to reason, understand, and choose 
independently. The other significant branch of contemporary discussion of moral 
deference does without invocations of Kantian autonomy; these other accounts explain 
the wrong of moral deference by invoking a duty for moral understanding. I will now turn 
to these accounts of moral understanding. 
There is, according to these accounts, a duty to understand one's own moral 
beliefs and judgments. Moral deference and other excessive uses of moral testimony are 
wrong because they replace moral understanding with trust. When an agent undertakes 
actions solely on the say-so of another, they may get the action crudely right, but they do 
not do so with a full understanding of why the action is right.  
I think there likely is an independent duty for moral understanding, and I think 
that some of the contemporary accounts of the duty are as plausible as the autonomy 
accounts.62 But I do not think that any reasonable version of that duty will threaten my 
                                                
62 Either a Wolffian autonomy account or a moral understanding account is capable of independently 
explain the wrong of moral deference. I suspect that the truth is that both accounts are correct, and that 
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arguments. In fact I think that the most plausible account of the duty to understand will 
actually show that we are required to attend to disagreement by the very same values that 
animate our duty to understand. The duty for moral understanding emanates from a duty 
for moral self-perfection, for transforming ourselves into the most accurate, reliable, 
morally sensitive beings we can. Using others to check and reflect on our own reliability 
is another vital part of that process of moral self-perfection. 
   
 
Hopkins and grasping the moral grounds 
 Let us presume that there is something wrong with outright moral deference and 
that what's wrong is, at least in part, that outright moral deference engenders a systematic 
lack of moral understanding. But does weighting disagreement also engender a lack of 
moral understanding? After all, when I attend to disagreement with a peer, I am invoking 
a substantive degree of trust in that peer. I am allowing the fact that my peer believes p to 
influence my degree of belief that p, even if I do not understand their reason for believing 
p. Does this count as a form of problematic deference? To answer, we will have to take a 
closer look at why there is a special duty for moral understanding.  
Robert Hopkins offers an excellent overview of the problem of moral deference in 
his paper, "What is Wrong With Moral Testimony". He raises most of the arguments 
given for the problem of moral testimony and disposes of most of them quite nicely. He 
argues that, if there is something wrong with moral testimony, it must be because 
                                                                                                                                            
agents are subject both to requirements for autonomy and independent requirements to understand founded 
on epistemic norms.  
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acquiring a belief exclusively via moral testimony grants no moral understanding. When 
you settle the matter on testimonial grounds, writes Hopkins, "you have reasons for your 
belief but not moral reasons for it."63 Hopkins suggests the following requirement on 
moral beliefs: 
 
The Requirement: having the right to a moral belief requires one to grasp the moral grounds for it.64 
 
Does Hopkins' Requirement present a problem for the use of disagreement for 
discorroboration?  
 Hopkins' Requirement, if it is true, blocks only the most outright form of moral 
deference, and does not block the use of moral disagreement for discorroboration. This is 
because, as I've argued above, the negative use of moral disagreement is a form of moral 
deference. When I acquire self-doubt through the observation of disagreement with a 
vegetarian, I do not come to think that it is moral or immoral of me to trust myself, or to 
continue eating meat. The content of the beliefs I acquire through the discorroboration 
process are strictly about myself and the reliability of my own faculties. I acquire 
evidence that my moral faculties might be malfunctioning, and I withdraw some degree 
of trust in that part of my judgment on epistemic, and not moral grounds. Any new belief 
I have acquired are strictly epistemic beliefs, and don't fall under the scope of Hopkins' 
Requirement. Furthermore, I fully understand the reasons for reducing my degree of 
confidence. I understand the relationship between disagreement, discorroboration, and 
                                                
63 Hopkins (2007), p 19 
64 Hopkins (2007), p 20 
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self mistrust. The use of disagreement for discorroboration escapes Hopkins' 
understanding requirement in precisely the same way that it escapes Wolff's autonomy 
requirement. The legitimate, non-deferential use of moral testimony is via the indirect 
route: as evidence of potential malfunctioning. Thus, though I grant Hopkins that his 
Requirement is moderately plausible, and would block moral deference, I do not grant 




Nickel and the Requirement of Recognition 
 Hopkins' requirement is very strong, and demands that we possess understanding 
for each and every moral belief we have. Philip Nickel presents what I take to be a more 
sophisticated view. At the center of the view is a more moderated version of the 
understanding requirement, in which an agent has in general a duty to understand their 
moral beliefs, thought his duty admits of occasional exceptions. Nickel's account strikes 
me as the most plausible version of a pure understanding requirement, and I think if we 
accept it, we will find even stronger support for the use of disagreement. I hope to show 
that Nickel's account is not only compatible with my own, but that Nickel's account 
requires that an agent also attend to disagreement and agreement to assess their own 
reliability. The self-checking process I describe and the moral understanding Nickel 




Nickel's view is that: 
 
Morality aims at guiding action rationally, i.e. from a recognition of the relevant moral 
requirements. A moral agent must be responsive to morality as such…65 
 
This is a requirement of morality, claims Nickel; part of what it is to act morally is to act 
from an understanding that the act is moral. The use of moral testimony typically 
provides correct moral belief without understanding, says Nickel. In these cases, 
"although moral testimony may give rise to a correct moral belief in these cases and thus 
'work out' in the crudest sense, it does not provide a basis for morally good action".66  
 Nickel's argument is carried out first through a series of intuitive examples. 
Nickel asks us to consider the following cases: 
 
CASE A: My friend is addicted to heroin, and asks for money. I tell him that I 
will lend him the money as soon as he gets his life together, and my justification 
is that my mother told me to say this.67 
 
About Case A, Nickel says surely the friend should be unsatisfied, even if I defend my 
claim with explanations of my mother's greater age and experience. There is something, 
says Nickel, lacking about my justification if I offer no independent support for my moral 
beliefs, but only defer to my mother's judgment. 
 
                                                
65 Nickel (2001), p 256 
66 Nickel (2001), p 260 
67 Nickel (2001), p 256 
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CASE B: A child is trained to act in accordance with certain rules, not by 
explanations, but by behavioral conditioning and punishment. Once the child is 
grown, she is unmoved by moral concepts. But she continues to perform moral-
seeming actions (like returning borrowed objects) because she feels the force of 
her early conditioning.68 
 
About Case B, Nickel says that we have the intuition that something is missing from this 
action, which is that the action fails to come on the basis of recognition. Thus Nickel 
presents us with a strongly worded Recognition Requirement: 
 
It must be the case that morality requires one to act from an understanding of moral claims, and 
therefore to have an understanding of moral claims that are relevant to action.69 
 
If our intuitions about Case A and B are true, says Nickel, then the Recognition 
Requirement must hold. 
Nickel's version of the duty of moral understanding is significantly weaker than 
Hopkins', for very good reasons. Hopkins' thesis is that moral understanding is a 
requirement for moral action on a case-by-case basis; it admits of no exceptions. Nickel 
makes room for some special cases, in which a moral agent who in general seeks and 
possesses moral understanding, occasionally steps aside and defers to testimony. Nickel 
here is explicitly taking on board Karen Jones' work on moral testimony. Jones argues 
that moral testimony can sometimes be useful as a corrective for bias. A moral agent who 
                                                
68 Nickel (2001), p 257 
69 Nickel (2001), p 257 
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in general possesses moral understanding may sometimes be forced to acknowledge a 
blind spot in his own sensitivities. For example, Jones suggests that a morally sensitive 
man might still be insufficiently sensitive to some of the difficulties of a woman in the 
workplace, especially to the pervasiveness of certain pressures and their moral import. In 
a case where such sensitivity was vital, a morally sensitive man may choose to defer to 
the judgment of somebody more sensitive to that particular matter.70 Somebody who uses 
testimony occasionally and judiciously, as a corrective to bias, is still acting "with a 
conception of the relevant reasons in mind," even if they're unable to apply the relevant 
reasons accurately in each case, says Nickel. "It is only when one has a more global 
inability to grasp relevant reasons, or when one refuses to do so, that one cannot act 
morally well."71  
 Nickel defends the Recognition Requirement as not only intuitive, but rational 
and reasonable. First, he claims that understanding a claim is vital to being able to apply 
the claim generally. When I depend on reliable moral testimony in one case, though I 
may get the action right in that single instance, I won't be able to reliably get similar 
cases right.72 Second, says Nickel, if I don't understand the claims underneath my belief, 
my actions will be more error-prone. Successfully applying moral testimony requires a 
static situation. Typically, I have to communicate the situation to my advisor, receive 
their advice, then deploy the advice. Even if the advisor's testimony is correct, my acting 
correctly depends on the situation's remaining unchanged in its relevant details between 
                                                
70 Jones (1999) 
71 Nickel (2001), p 264 
72 Nickel (2001), p 261 
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receiving the testimony and acting. And, of course, lacking understanding, I don't know 
which parts of the situation are relevant. On the other hand, says Nickel, moral 
understanding lets me respond flexibly to changing situations. If I know what's important, 
I will be able to tell which changes to the situation are unimportant, and which changes to 
the situations are highly relevant. An agent "must try to ensure that she is in a proper 
position to act from a recognition of what morality requires, and she is culpable for 
failing to do so." This shows that there is a "substantial epistemological duty to be able to 
tell what counts as a justification for a variety of moral claims," says Nickel.73 If an agent 
doesn't strive for understanding, she will fail to be flexible, and fail to retain her moral 
correctness in a fluid, ever-changing world. For Nickel, then, the connection between the 
duty for moral understanding and moral action is not constitutive, but pragmatic. Moral 
understanding is required for me to get it right more often.74 75 
Nickel's view that the duty of moral understanding is based ultimately on the duty 
to be morally correct sits very well the Jones-style bias cases. The cases where Nickel 
allows a deviation from the strong case-by-case requirement for moral understanding are 
precisely those special cases where occasional deviations from the rule of moral 
                                                
73 Nickel (2001), p 261 
74 His account could even be used to show how acting independently would be better, even if in that 
particular case moral deference would lead to more morally correct action. This is because acting from 
one's own understanding is part of the process of developing one's understanding. Even if, in one's youth, 
one's parent is clearly more reliable than oneself, part of the process of becoming a morally able agent 
involves frequently striking out on one's own and working from one's own understanding. The errors one 
pays by avoiding deference in some cases will pay off in one's greater abilities down the line. 
75 In fact, it seems to me that Nickel has established something with these arguments slightly weaker than 
his initial claim. His language of his opening claim suggests that he will argue for a constitutive 
relationship between moral understanding and moral action, in general, where his arguments merely seem 
to establish that there is an instrumental relationship between moral understanding and moral action. My 




understanding will lead to getting it right more often. An agent that never seeks moral 
understanding will be unable to get it right in most cases; moral deference, thinks Nickel, 
can never be as reliable as moral understanding. But an agent that possesses moral 
understanding in most cases can permit themselves a few deviations at the limits of their 
sensitivities, in those cases where doing so gets it right more often. Importantly, says 
Nickel, those deviations are performed with a conception of the relevant reasons in mind.  
Presumably, what Nickel means here is that if take myself to be less than perfectly 
sensitive to the moral issues of women in the workplace, I am still working with the right 
reasons in mind. I am acting in order to treat others justly and fairly. I simply lack the 
ability to figure out the best way to achieve those goals in this particular situation, 
because I lack some relevant sensitivity. 
 For Nickel, the wrongs, demands, and duties associated with moral understanding 
gain their normative force as part of the means to getting it right. The duty here is a 
practical one: we do not have a duty to achieve understanding for its own sake, but our 
duty to understand falls out of our duty to become more effective moral agents. This is, 
presumably, why this epistemological duty is not one that applies to all cognitive 
domains, but to the moral one in particular - only in the moral domain are we all subject 
to a duty of correct performance. Furthermore, the duty to understand is a positive, active 
duty; all agents have a duty to strive to increase their moral understanding. Presumably, 
this is because the duty to understand originates in a duty to act well, which is also a 
positive duty - our moral duties are not to pass some minimal moral prerequisite, but to 
actively strive to get it right very often. 
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 If the end of being morally correct is capable of generating one active epistemic 
duty, it should be capable of generating others. There is, after all, more than one factor 
that contributes to getting it right. Understanding, certainly, contributes to getting it right, 
but another factor is having properly functioning cognitive faculties. Nickel is surely 
right that forsaking moral understanding will lead to getting it wrong often. But surely 
having an error in one's understanding process or a flaw in one's faculties of judgment 
would also lead to errors. And if the duty to get it right generates a duty to increase 
understanding, it should also generate a duty to discover and correct for malfunctioning 
cognitive abilities. And if Nickel is right that the goal of moral correctness generates 
positive duties, then, for the very same reason that we must actively seek to develop our 
moral understanding, we must also actively seek out other moral agents and use them to 
corroborate or discorroborate our proper functioning. Both projects are substantial parts 
of the process of moral self-perfection. 
My claims and Nickel's view fit so well because they are sensitive to the same 
fault-lines. When Nickel attends to Jones-style bias cases and allows for occasional 
deviations from moral understanding, he's taking into account the fact that we are fallible 
agents. Nickel and Jones are worried precisely about what I'm worried about: the need for 
a responsible moral agent to seek both understanding and engagement, and yet for a 
responsible moral agent to admit their own potential fallibilities, and move to make up 
for them with all tools available, including the moral judgments of others.  
 Understanding is a cognitive process. It is by its very nature aimed at getting 
things right. But the goal of getting it right also ought to inspire us to ferret out potential 
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problems and malfunctions in our own cognitive apparatus. The cognitive values of 
reliability and truth - of getting it right - call for many methods. Developing one's 
understanding is one such method, and cognitive self-assessment is another. If there is a 
positive duty for moral self-perfection, it ought to inspire us both to develop our 
understanding, and to use all means to check the reliability of our abilities and methods. 
Ignoring contrary testimony is surely a failure of my moral epistemic duties as failing to 
achieve moral understanding. In fact, if the duties of moral self-improvement are as 
pervasive and substantial as Nickel suggests, then it seems like we may have even have 
an active duty to regularly check our abilities, and so a duty to seek out contrary 
testimony and disagreement.  
 
 
Part IV. Alienation and objectivity 
If I'm right, then my conclusions might seem catastrophic for moral life. First, my 
claims seem to run contrary to the most laudable sort of moral commitment; it seems that 
I am calling for an end to moral heroism. Second, given the widespread occurrence of 
moral disagreement, it seems like my conclusions will force us to a sickeningly pervasive 
degree of self-doubt. Third, it might seem like I'm asking us to give up our moral 
commitments, and alienate ourselves from our deepest moral values. 
First, it might seem like my conclusions might lead away from moral heroism and 
towards a tawdry sort of moral cowardice. After all, isn't the very best sort of person the 
one who stays true to their moral commitments in the face of opposition? Take, for 
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instance, an activist, dedicated to their cause, fighting for change against a stifling 
majority. The great moral heroes - those who opposed slavery, brought about women's 
suffrage, fought for the rights of immigrants - are those who fought with uncompromising 
hearts, who believed in their convictions to the fullest, who stood and fought with 
absolute commitment. It can seem that I am arguing against leading a morally 
wholehearted life.  
I accept the charge that my arguments run against certain intuitions about what 
sort of person is the ideal moral hero. The epistemic analysis I've given shows that some 
of our intuitions about how moral life is supposed to go are simply unreasonable; 
intuitions, after all, are defeasible. The hyperconfident activist, who will admit no 
possibility of fallibility in her own thinking, is unreasonable. Any reasonable agent 
exposed to the social evidence of contemporary life must withdraw some degree of their 
confidence. But I do not think I am arguing against all forms activism, nor even moral 
commitment; what I am arguing against is an inflexible moral fanaticism, which regards 
itself as infallible. Remember, I do not argue for a suspension of our moral beliefs in the 
face of disagreement, only a withdrawal from unqualified self-confidence. It is still 
possible to act reasonably from one's qualified moral commitments. My argument will 
forbid only those actions which require complete or near-complete certainty.  
It may help here for me to sketch a picture of where I hope this project will go. I 
have argued thus far that disagreement brings some form of moral self-doubt - a second-
order doubt about the reliability of one's rational abilities and methodologies. I suspect 
that there are practical principles that will interact with this self-doubt, principles that 
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demand high degrees of confidence for action that intervenes in the lives of others against 
their will, especially when that intervention is radical or irrevocable. It might turn out, for 
example, that a committed vegetarian should work mightily to change the law, to speak 
and change the minds of others, to protest and march and the like, but that they should 
not, say, bomb meatpacking plants. In short, I hope that the principle of moral humility, 
combined with principles about restraint in action in the face of self-doubt, will produce 
something like an epistemically founded theory of tolerance, while leaving room for 
committed moral action. 
Second, it seems like my conclusions will lead to pervasive moral doubt. For most 
of us, moral disagreements with peers are very common. Even if we attend only to the 
best cases of disagreement, the number of disagreements is still dizzying. Best-case 
disagreements occur over the permissibility of eating meat, about the permissibility of 
animal experimentation, about the permissibility of military intervention into non-
democratic states, about the importance of ecological preservation compared to the 
importance of human jobs, about the right to suicide, about the degree of obligations one 
has to one's family, to one's state, to one's community.  
This second charge I accept in its entirety. Lacking convincing, foundational 
moral theory, the only reasonable position given the presently available evidence is one 
with pervasive self-doubt and profound moral humility. In the face of disagreement, we 
cannot be entirely certain and entirely rational at the same. Our epistemic position is too 
poor at present, our rational resources too impoverished. This conclusion may be counter-
intuitive, but, again, intuitions are defeasible. 
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Third, it may seem as if I'm asking agents to forsake their identity, to stand back 
from their core commitments, to alienate themselves from the values and moral beliefs 
that, in some sense, constitute their identity. But the use of moral testimony as I have 
described it is not an imposition from without. I've tried to show that the epistemic drive 
to self-doubt comes from within, not without. In each of the discussions of integrity, 
autonomy, and moral understanding, I showed that the reasons and rules an agent uses in 
coming to self-doubt are reasons and rules that any rational agent would be committed to 
- part of the commitment to accuracy that is partially constitutive of rationality. Thus, I 
do not accept the charge that my conclusions lead to alienation. They lead instead to a 
painful and complex process of self-analysis. The charge of alienation depends on the 
false presumption that our moral commitments are an essential part of our identity, but 
that our epistemic commitments are somehow alien. This cannot be the case for rational 
moral agents. Insofar as we take up rationality and its concomitant duties to accuracy, 
reliability, and truth, our epistemic commitments are also a crucial part of our identity. It 
is surely a difficult and painful process to step back from one's moral commitments to 
some degree, but this is a process fueled by other parts of one's rational commitments. 
Furthermore, insofar as our moral beliefs contain within themselves an aim of getting it 
right, they directly plug themselves in to all the norms of sound epistemic functioning. 
Both the worries from autonomy and the worries from understanding are aimed at 
a particular sort of figure: an unthinking, obedient, passive agent who steps away from 
moral life, steps away from the responsibilities of being a rational, truth-seeking agent. 
But I am urging a use of testimony and a use of the disagreement which is the very 
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opposite of the unthinking, obedient, passive agent. In using moral disagreement as a 
method for self-assessment, we are acting from reasons as phenomenally personal, 
endorsed, comprehensible, and directly felt as any moral reasons: we are acting from 
epistemic reasons and standards that apply to any cognitive project. We are acting from 
our commitment to truth, accuracy, and objectivity. The fact that these reasons point us 
towards evidence in the external world does not make them alien; any process aimed at 
getting right some objective, mind-independent properties ought to tune us towards the 
external world. Reasoning in the space of objective cognition - of tracking truths 
independent of my phenomenal experience - must make use of such external evidence.  
The motion of disagreement to self-doubt does lead to a painful, difficult friction. 
But this friction is not alienation - it is not a distancing of myself from my own reasons 
and commitments. It is a friction internal to my commitments, a friction that arises from 
the fact that I am committed to my moral beliefs as I feel them, but also committed to 
getting it right. I am committed both to the phenomena of moral beliefs and to their being 
aimed objective truth; these commitments can lead me in two different directions. This 
should be familiar, though painful territory. Our commitments often lead us into self-
conflict, agony, and friction, especially when they run into the unforgiving world. 
Commitments to family, commitments to country, commitments to artistic and scientific 
projects - when these conflict, we don't call it alienation, we call it tragedy.  
There is a difficulty to moral disagreement that is not there with empirical 
disagreement, I admit. This is because moral our beliefs are crucially bivalent. Our moral 
beliefs are both personal and cognitive. Our moral beliefs are important to us both as 
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expressions of ourselves, our identity, and important to us as trackers of truth. This is 
why moral beliefs are the flash-point for this conflict between different sets of reasons. 
Moral beliefs, unlike everyday empirical beliefs, are complexly entangled with different 
parts of reflective and practical life, and so make themselves subject to very distinct rule-
sets. As parts of our personality and identity, they are subject to considerations of self-
preservation and self-expression. It is important for self-preservation that I maintain and 
conserve key parts of my phenomenal existence, and my moral commitments are, indeed, 
key parts. It is important for my sincerity that I express, and act on my beliefs as I feel 
them. At the same time, our moral beliefs are important to us truth-trackers, and so they 
make themselves subject to the very impersonal rules and procedures of epistemic life. 
Any duties we have to be correct will call us not only to have an internal understanding 
of our moral beliefs, but to look outwards, to other people, to assess the reliability of our 
belief-formation process. But the impersonality of epistemic rules doesn't make them 
alien to the agent. They are a crucial part of the agent - the part of the agent that is 
rational, that seeks to attune their beliefs to the objective, external world. But though the 
evidence a rational agent uses may be impersonal, the essential motive is utterly personal 
- it is the motive of rationality. 
The worry that we are alienating ourselves comes from an attention to the 
personal valence of moral beliefs. They are expressive of our personality, our identity. 
We, indeed, lose something of ourselves when we lose our moral beliefs. But the pressure 
against some of these beliefs, the pressure I'm describing, comes from a place that is also 
deeply embedded in any rational agent - the motive to get things right. In fact, this motive 
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is part of the moral life of a rational agent. I admit that the pervasive moral self-doubt that 
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